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December 1998
Number 88

# FIRST THINGS

## contraception

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## c. s. lewis in the public square
richard john neuhaus

## should the church repent?
avery dulles

**the gayest story ever told**
james nuechterlein

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george m. marsden

**hazards of new fortune**
wilfred m. mcclay

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# Correspondence

## Religion and (or?) Freedom of Conscience

In his fine essay "The Most New Thing in the *Novus Ordo Seclorum*" (Public Square, August/September), Richard John Neuhaus points out John Noonan's seeming tendency to "conflate religion with freedom of conscience."

If Noonan does indeed blur the distinction between the two items, he is only the latest in a long procession going back to the great articulator of the "most new thing," James Madison. Consider just one example.

In a set of resolutions submitted by Madison to the First Congress we find the term "rights of conscience" as a third item after the prohibition of the abridgment of civil rights on account of religious belief and the prohibition of the establishment of a "national religion." The wording is strong: ". . . nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner or on any pretexts infringed."

Are we to conclude that Madison viewed the free exercise of religion as one of a number of "rights of conscience," the others being best left unspecified? Or is the expression "rights of conscience" simply intended, in a kind of legal/literary parallelism, to mean the same thing as the "free exercise of religion"?

Richard J. Niebank
Delhi, NY

**RJN replies:**
This is a big question. There are parallels, overlaps, similarities, and the like between religious freedom and freedom of conscience. But, both historically and at present, they should not be conflated. Especially is that the case today when, in contrast to Madison's time, "conscience" is often equated with individualistic choice disconnected from moral reasoning or truth.

## This Is Theology?

Having just read Lee Smolin's book *The Life of the Cosmos*, I was stunned to find Peter J. Leithart saying, in his comments entitled "Theories of Everything" (August/September), that while he had decided to read this book out of a "newly found appreciation for science fiction," he found it to be "neither fiction nor science," but that he "had picked up a book of theology" instead.

The central point that Mr. Leithart apparently considers the book to illustrate is that "every 'theory of the whole universe' is necessarily theological, and even approaches some kind of doctrine of 'revelation.'" But in fact one of the main reasons the book was written, according to its author, was to show that this is not the case; and Mr. Leithart's comments on the book are so directly opposed, not only to the author's explicit intentions but to the contents of the work as well, that I cannot help but feel that Mr. Leithart has either not read the entire book or else has not read it very carefully.

The heuristic of modern natural science is to explain nature, and natural phenomena, entirely in terms of the natural, without reference to the supernatural, or to the intentions or acts of any Supreme Being or deity. *The Life of the Cosmos* is primarily an attempt to vindicate this heuristic by suggesting a conceptual scheme unifying the two chief theories of contemporary physics (quantum mechanics and general relativity) by means of which "the world must be understood to be the result of processes of self-organization, and not just a reflection of fixed and eternal natural law."

To explain nature by means of the supernatural might qualify as natural theology, but not as natural science. *The Life of the Cosmos* is not any kind of "theology," for rea-



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sons that are summarized in the section entitled "Epilogue/Evolutions," following the last chapter:

> So there never was a God, no pilot who made the world by imposing order on chaos and who remains outside, watching and proscribing. . . . The world will always be here. . . . There is nothing behind it, no absolute or platonic world to transcend to. All there is of Nature is what is around us. All there is of Being is relations among real, sensible things.

I don't think I could write a more sweeping rejection of the beliefs of the world's principal theistic religions (by which I mean Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). But if this book can meaningfully be called a work of "theology," then I am quite at a loss to imagine what a work of "atheism" would look like.

Edmund Weinmann
Huntington, NY

**Peter J. Leithart replies:**
Edmund Weinmann misconstrues my critical comments on Lee Smolin's book as a summary of its thesis. I did not say that Smolin argues that all science is theological, which is manifestly not his view. I argued that, in spite of himself, Smolin makes theologically loaded claims. That is to say, the naturalism of modern science is collapsing under the weight of scientific evidence, hardly an original insight.

## Look Homeward

As one who has been trying for twenty-seven years as a parish priest to answer the question her teenage students put to Amy Welborn ("'Why Go to Mass?'" August/September), I wish to add to the discussion she began.

I thank God I can say that I have always been assigned to parishes where both clergy and those in religious education have had a sense of liturgy and Church that accords with the goals of Ms. Welborn. Of course, things do not always go as planned, but parishioners have always known that these parishes tried to worship and teach according to the mind of the Church. As a matter of fact, I still have the joy each week of teaching our high school religious education class. Perhaps our results over the years are better than those experienced by Ms. Welborn, but I would not bank on it. In other words, I regularly have the experience of telling young people why they are obliged under pain of sin to assist at Mass, of having them agree that they are bound by Church law, and then, the following Sunday, of knowing that many of them do not come. Why not?

My best guess has to do with what I call a disconnect between head and heart. Because so much of their experience tells them that what they feel is the criterion for decision, the boredom they feel at Mass trumps what their heads may tell them about worship, Real Presence, or Church law.

However, there are wonderful exceptions to this widespread phenomenon. I have in mind the considerable number of young people who never abandon the practice of the faith, whatever disappointments they encounter in liturgy and preaching. Most of these young people seem to come from homes where faith is lived, loved, and, very importantly, frequently discussed. That means, it seems to me, that the home—as so many papal documents have said—must be the primary teacher. When parents do that teaching, with patience, joy, love, and wisdom, the attractiveness of faith is hard not to accept. In terms of the mechanics of passing on the faith (I am not speaking here of the essential grace of the sacraments), the parish reinforces and backs up the life in the home.

Monsignor Thomas M. Wells
Our Lady of Lourdes Parish
Bethesda, MD

## Upping the Ante

In his helpful and thought-provoking review of Patrick Glynn's *God:*


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*The Evidence* (August/September), Edward T. Oakes seems to provide some ironic self-reference on the meaning of religious belief in our age. While naming Patrick Glynn's use of Pascal's Wager "Pascalianism in a minor key," Professor Oakes plays the Wager in a tune to which Pascal might also have neither hummed nor drummed.

Pascal's Wager is not to choose belief but to wager that "He is." Pascal does not think that humans choose belief in God: "Faith is a gift of God" (*Pensées*, item 279). To wager "He is" is to become a seeker, following the way of others "who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions," "by the abatement of your passions," "taking holy water, having masses said, etc." (*Pensées*, item 233).

The version of the "famous gambler's calculation" transmitted by Prof. Oakes evokes the rap our age repeats: the simplified, the individualized, the existentialist's karaoke, playing Me as center.

Bruce N. Lundberg
Pueblo, CO

**Edward T. Oakes replies:**
I quite agree with Bruce N. Lundberg that Pascal holds faith to be a gift from God. Therefore, Pascal does not mean to suggest that his famous Wager could *lead* someone to faith in God independently of the grace of God (a common misunderstanding of Pascal's Wager frequently perpetrated in undergraduate courses in the philosophy of religion). Thorough Augustinian that he was, Pascal knew quite well that to become a believer is to become, not a notional assentor, but a committed seeker—which is obviously more a matter of praxis than of yes-or-no belief. Hence his recommendation to any reader intrigued by the logic of his Wager to *act* as if God exists by "taking holy water, having masses said, etc.," actions which will bring subjective faith in their wake for those who have the courage to try the bracing regimen. But of course this recombination of Pascal's to make the wager with *behavior* and not just cogitating undermines the basis of Mr. Lundberg's accusation: that I favor a subjective choice of belief over the (presumably more objective?) wager that "He is." I don't want to rehearse the hoary debate between Pascal and the Jesuits here, but one does not undermine the assertion that faith is a gift of God by saying that faith also means choosing to believe that God exists. Faith, after all, denotes the human response to God, and whether one calls the response a "wager" or a "choice to believe" seems, at least at the level of an ordinary book review, to be making a distinction without a difference.

## Does God Speak in Code?

In William A. Dembski's review of


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Jeffrey Satinover's book *Cracking the Bible Code* (August/September), we are told that "advocates of the Bible Code have jeopardized their careers, converted to orthodox Judaism, refocused their research, and in some cases changed disciplines." However, if Christians are correct that the Old Testament sets the stage for the New and points people to the culminating prophet Jesus, then shouldn't we expect some code data that evoke Christian conversions? The names of specific rabbis are not what Christians would expect to see in a Bible Code, for such people did not regard Jesus as Israel's Messiah, God's incarnate Son, and the Savior of the world.

Whatever the specific revelations allegedly discovered by codebreakers, I see three problems with the whole idea of coded messages hidden in the Old Testament. Dembski recognizes one—sensitivity to copying errors. He apparently solves the problem by assuming that "generations of obsessive-compulsive scribes" made no errors. Now there's a leap of faith!

Secondly, Dembski fails to mention what one can extract from secular literature by playing the identical game. Why not apply the same technique to *Gone With the Wind* and see whether a certain letter-selection scheme doesn't come up with Clark Gable? Would that mean that Margaret Mitchell is God?

Finally—and of greatest importance—is the whole idea that God's way of revealing Himself is through subtle miracle (sounds like an oxymoron, doesn't it?). In his first letter to Corinthian Christians, the apostle Paul wrote, "Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for wisdom; but we preach Christ Jesus, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles."

Paul's way was to proclaim clearly the truth in Jesus Christ with no mincing or equivocation. I think he would be horrified to see people playing computer games with the text of the Bible. He would likely modify Jesus' parable of Lazarus and the rich man, concluding with the statement: "If they do not listen to Moses and the prophets, they will not be convinced even if someone's computer sees Maimonides or Billy Graham hidden in the biblical text."

Edwin A. Olson
Spokane, WA

**William A. Dembski replies:**
I will address Edwin A. Olson's concerns in order. First, advocates of the Bible Code have indeed jeopardized their careers. That's a fact, and it can be verified. What's more, such losses to careers are entirely consistent with the current state of the academy, which tends to reward conformity and penalize genuine innovation.

Second, if Christian themes have failed to be discovered in the Bible Code, this may be (1) because the Bible Code is an experimental artifact (I allowed that possibility in my review), (2) because the Bible Code, though genuine, happens not to confirm New Testament themes, or (3) because the Bible Code, though genuine and confirming New Testament themes, has not been thoroughly examined for such themes.

It's worth remembering that literacy in the languages of the Bible tends to be far better among Jews than Christians. Jewish children frequently learn Hebrew from their rabbi. I can't think of one Christian pastor or priest who teaches Greek in Sunday school (which is not to say they don't exist). Olson's question—"Shouldn't we expect some code data that evoke Christian conversions?"—presupposes that Christians have actually tried to look for such data. I don't know whether they have, and Satinover didn't address this question.

Third, I did not assume that Jewish scribes made no errors in transcribing the Torah. I wrote that "the textual transmission of the Hebrew Bible, and especially of the Torah, is far more accurate than anything else in antiquity." The textual transmission of the Torah is excellent, but it is not perfect (some errors have crept in). On the other hand, the degree of accuracy of that transmission is the best we have prior to printing. This last claim is not a "leap of faith." It is a fact that every textual critic of the Bible knows. It is confirmed by noting how texts vary over time. In the case of the Torah, the variation is minuscule.

Fourth, in my review I did allow that other texts might have codes. Skeptics of the Bible Code claim to have found codes in non-sacred literature, and the results of their research can be found on the web. It is very much an open question whether the Bible Code is specific to the Old Testament.

Fifth, as for using codes to determine that Margaret Mitchell is God, I stressed in my review that the safest approach to the Bible Code is as an authentication scheme. An authentication scheme validates something without adding to its content. Thus my sig-

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nature validates a contract without changing the content of the contract. As an authentication scheme, the code would be incapable of delivering a claim like "Margaret Mitchell is God."

Sixth, Mr. Olson takes offense at what he calls "subtle miracles." Subtle miracles are indeed an oxymoron, since the word *miracle* derives from the Latin verb *mirari*, meaning to inspire wonder or amazement, and subtlety obviously is not the way to achieve wonder. But the Bible Code, if genuine, would not properly be a miracle. Indeed, nowhere in my review did I suggest that it might constitute a miracle. I wrote that if the Bible Code is genuine, it constitutes a "preprogrammed time capsule." Preprogrammed time capsules are not properly miracles but signs.

Signs point to realities beyond themselves. They can be miraculous or non-miraculous. They can be clear or they can be obscure. Sometimes their obscurity disappears in the light of new information. According to Christians, for instance, many prophecies of the Old Testament point to (i.e., signify) Jesus as Messiah. Such prophecies are signs. Yet some of them are subtle signs that do not become clear until they are explicitly connected with the life of Jesus. Hence to the disciples on the road to Emmaus, Jesus had to explain how the Old Testament prophecies actually were signs of his coming (see Luke 24).

In conclusion, I find Mr. Olson's concerns about the Bible Code unfounded. True, Bible Code researchers have yet to produce conclusive evidence for the genuineness of the Bible Code and for the uniqueness of the code to the Old Testament. Even so, I resist dismissing the Bible Code simply on a priori grounds. If the evidence should decisively support a code, then so be it. I myself remain agnostic about the code. Nonetheless, I resist all armchair speculations about why the code can't work.

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## Why Pat Buchanan Is Right

Andrew J. Bacevich's review of Pat Buchanan's book *The Great Betrayal* (August/September) criticizes Buchanan for building his arguments based on historical precedent. Though Buchanan is no economist, his argument is correct, but he is not able to deal with the technicalities. "Free trade" is built on the assumption that (1) capital and labor are immobile, and (2) there is full employment of all economic resources in the economies of the trading nations. The first assumption was true in Adam Smith's time. It no longer is. The second assumption was never true. Since free trade is built on faulty assumptions, the results must be false.

The results are just as Buchanan finds them. The *Wall Street Journal* (August 28) reports that U.S. border towns are suffering from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Free trade is the equivalent to operating the highway system with no traffic laws. It places the United States into direct drive with the rest of the world. If there is no transmission and no brakes, the U.S. economy runs too fast when it goes downhill (good times) and is in danger of stalling out when it goes uphill (hard times). An economy needs both brakes and a transmission. A tariff acts as both brakes and transmission with respect to the outside world.

This does not mean that the United States should not trade. Rather it means that the tariff can act as a buffer between the United States and the rest of the world. Free trade has led to dependency on exports in the grain and other sectors of the economy. The collapse of the Asian and Russian economies has led to severe pain in those export sectors. Buchanan's book has documented the pain in import competing sectors.

Had a sufficient tariff on imports existed, exports in the selected sectors would have been smaller. With lower dependence on exports, their pain in the current markets would have been substantially less. Now both export and import sectors are suffering. Buchanan is right. He bases his case on historical precedent, but there is substantial economic theory to support him. Unfortunately, the old-time ivory tower economists have brainwashed our politicians on the subject. A growing number of economists dealing with the real world no longer favor free trade.

Lawrence Briskin
Centerville, OH

Andrew J. Bacevich has misrepresented the underlying premise of Pat Buchanan's criticism of "America's slavish devotion to global free trade." If he had been intellectually honest, he would have acknowledged that Buchanan accepts the notion that free trade among all nations is a desirable goal. Indeed, he uses the example of free trade between the states of the union to illustrate the value of unrestricted trade among peoples with common goals and ideals. What Buchanan

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argues is that we don't live in an ideal world, and to implement a trade policy that assumes we do is suicidal. Our current policy of dismantling all trade barriers at any cost and regardless of what our trading partners are doing in return is absurd. It is destroying our way of life and is not encouraging other governments to trade fairly or to behave morally.

The U.S. has laws protecting the safety, health, and environment of American workers. What is sensible about shutting down the factories that comply with these laws in order to ship them abroad to support the corrupt and oppressive governments which exploit their workers, have no regard for their health and safety, and destroy the environment? For this and the promise of cheap consumer goods we are asking American workers to sacrifice their jobs? If for no other reason, as advocates of justice and morality we should see the hypocrisy and perniciousness of such a policy.

But, in my view, this is not even the most serious flaw in our present trading policies that Buchanan exposes in his book. One of the reasons we won the Second World War was because of our ability to manufacture military hardware faster than it was consumed or destroyed by the war. We recently witnessed an attack by the U.S. on a small terrorist operation that utilized more than seventy cruise missiles. In a full-fledged war, you can imagine how many of these and other missiles, smart bombs, and military hardware are needed every day. I doubt very many Americans realize that a significant number of the critical, high-tech components needed to assemble those missiles are imported from foreign factories.

After using up our small stockpile of parts, we are totally dependent on the ability of those foreign factories to crank out hardware in order for us to continue engaging the enemy and defending our country. Factories within the U.S. can be controlled and defended in times of national emergency. Who's going to defend those foreign factories? Or, God forbid, what if our enemy owns those factories? The irony of the discussion about deploying a missile defense system for the United States is that our enemies don't even have to hit targets within the United States in order to cripple our ability to engage in a protracted conventional war.

Our choice is not between free trade and protectionism, as those who profit from unrestricted free trade would like us to believe. It is a matter of trading in a sensible manner and selectively using protective tariffs to defend and preserve Amer-


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Jay R. Seaver
Longmont, CO

## Jews and the Slave Trade

Lawrence Grossman's review of Saul S. Friedman's book on *Jews and the American Slave Trade* (Briefly Noted, August/September) prompts me to note three aspects of that effort not previously covered in the literature on this newest wrinkle in the libeling of the Jewish people: (1) The number of slaveholders of Jewish descent was very low for the simple demographic fact that Jewish settlements in the South were few and located in mostly urban enclaves. (2) Jewish landowners of large estates or mansions were even more sparse, although it is true that Jews entered the cotton refining industry, mostly after the Civil War. (3) The laws and prescriptions of the Jewish faith against slavery as set forth in the Holy Scriptures represented an enormous theological and ideological impediment to slaveholding. This is not to say that Professor Friedman ignores evidence of Jewish trafficking in slavery. It is to say that this is the first book to fully expose the legends expounded by Louis Farrakhan and his wing of the Nation of Islam. It need only be added that Minister Farrakhan has thus far ducked every question and rationalized every ounce of evidence with respect to the Muslim slave trade in nations like the Sudan.

Irving Louis Horowitz
Department of Sociology
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ

The vitriolic nature of Lawrence Grossman's review of my *Jews and the American Slave Trade* demands a response. Before writing this book, I was warned by others who had ventured into the field that the subject would bring contumely upon me from a wide range of critics. Indeed, one preliminary review argued that the book should not be published because it would supply additional data to anti-Semites. Grossman is wrong, however, if he believes the book was written under "the naive assumption that bigots can be reformed by factual evidence." Nowhere in the 326 pages of this text do I make such a contention. My purpose, elucidated in the preface and summary chapters, is to refute charges made by the Nation of Islam and to offer information for Jews and Gentiles alike, many of whom have told me personally they are confused about the role of Jews in the slave trade. As I indicate in the conclusion: "Scholars, clergy, and laymen of every background must refute this old/new libel publicly and often. Blacks and Jews especially must educate their own constituents and disavow mutual contempt. In the end, we all must be reminded how for decades, for whatever reasons (altruism, moral conscience, guilt, self-help, expedience), two peoples have stood, marched, and wept together." Perhaps this prose was too "clumsy" or "numbing" for Grossman. Perhaps it is "morally simplistic." If I have made errors in the text (a knowledgeable correspondent for the Simon Wiesenthal Center pointed out several which he did not consider "alarming"), they still do not compare with Grossman's assumption that I hoped to convert Farrakhan's minions, Grossman's disregard for my warning to the reader that a lie must repeatedly be refuted, Grossman's invention that "according to him [Friedman], Jews as a group were never rich or powerful enough to control anything," or the arrogance that informs Grossman's review.

Saul S. Friedman
Department of History
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH

**Lawrence Grossman replies:**
Irving Louis Horowitz writes that *Jews and the American Slave Trade* breaks new ground by pointing out that there were few Jewish slaveholders because, first, most Jews lived in the North, and, second, those in the South tended to live in cities. These are truisms that hardly justify the publication of a 326-page volume. His third claim for the book—that it shows how "the laws and prescriptions of the Jewish faith against slavery as set forth in the Holy Scriptures" made it religiously problematic to own slaves—is an apt example of the historical inaccuracy and naivete that mar the book. The overwhelming majority of American rabbis, North and South—presumably authorities on "Holy Scriptures"—had no religious qualms whatsoever about slavery. Furthermore, while pious Jews throughout history have consulted rabbis on points of Jewish law, one cannot imagine antebellum Southern Jews, whose observance of basic scriptural laws like the Sabbath and the dietary requirements was minimal, taking seriously any rabbinic judgment against such a basic social institution as slavery, even had one been offered.

Saul S. Friedman's letter demonstrates why readers will have a difficult time getting through his book.

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## This Time

# The Gayest Story Ever Told

*James Nuechterlein*

It can't be easy to write a play that is at once boring and offensive. But that is what Terrence McNally has accomplished, so to speak, in *Corpus Christi*, his bathetic rendering of the life of Jesus (here Joshua) as the gay man of sorrows. The critics—including those who clearly wanted the play to succeed—have been withering, though many of them minimize its offensiveness. But even those for whom the concept of blasphemy is incomprehensible or empty agree that *Corpus Christi* is a very bad play.

It does have a more interesting history than most plays. After the Manhattan Theater Club scheduled it last spring, word of its contents leaked out, and religious organizations, the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights in particular, vigorously protested. The club at first backed down, but counterprotests from the outraged national "arts community" over the proposed cancellation prompted the play's rescheduling.

The arts community, it turned out, rescued a turkey. The publicity surrounding the play has guaranteed full houses for its limited run, but don't look for post-New York productions. The night I saw the show, the audience's response could generously be termed tepid. They came eager; they went away underwhelmed.

The story of the play follows, in rough outline, the pattern of the original. Joshua/Jesus is born in a cheap motel in Corpus Christi, Texas, to a bewildered Joseph and a well-meaning but feckless Mary. (Mary's wispy vulnerability raises faint echoes of Blanche DuBois in *A Streetcar Named Desire*.) Joshua senses from the outset that he is different (he tries to like football and girls, but fails at both) and that he is fated to a tragic end (he has ominous visions, and the hammering of nails in a cross echoes intermittently offstage throughout the play).

After unhappy early experiences—lots of nasty encounters with priests and nuns, a sexually humiliating senior prom—Joshua leaves Corpus Christi. He gathers a group of gay disciples, and they gambol about the countryside performing miracles and doing good (interspersed with frequent bouts of boozing and sex). In the end Joshua returns to Corpus Christi, where he is betrayed by Judas (who first seduced him on prom night) to the "fag haters in priests' robes" and crucified in the presence of all who tormented him in his youth. He dies as "King of the Queers."

I have noted that the play is boring. It runs a little under two hours without intermission, and every minute weighs. I found myself looking for signs of its ending. (Ah, the Last Supper. It can't be too long now.) The problem is not in the production. The director, Joe Mantello, keeps things moving as well as he can and the ensemble cast is lively and competent. But there is only so much they can all do with a leaden script that veers between sentimentality and juvenile satire.

Part of McNally's problem is that he is trying to tell two stories at once. On one level, *Corpus Christi* is a not unfamiliar version of the Jesus story geared to a liberal Catholic imagination. This Jesus is genuinely, if ambiguously, divine—as, to a lesser extent, are we all. John the Baptist anoints Joshua (and all the disciples): "I bless you and I baptize you and I recognize your divinity as a human being." Joshua/Jesus has miraculous powers, though they sometimes fail. He preaches a gospel of unqualified affirmation that has no need of repentance and in which love is the universal solvent. If we but learn to repeat the mantra "I love you" fervently enough, the play suggests, all will be well. Liberal Christianity has been peddling this watered-down version of the Jesus story for a very long time now, and if that is all McNally intended, he would stand accused not so much of blasphemy as lack of originality.

But that is not all McNally is up to. Alongside the benign liberal Jesus, he gives us an angry gay Jesus—and it is this latter Jesus that finally takes over the play. The affirming Joshua teaches his disciples to turn the other cheek, but when a priest has the effrontery to criticize his blessing of a gay marriage, Joshua strikes him twice across the face.

And indeed, given the sanitized gay world of this play, who would not share his outrage? Joshua and the boys are (Judas aside) as fresh-faced and winsome a group as could be imagined. They may indulge a little too freely in alcohol and sex—and they do talk awfully dirty—but it's all carried off with a kind of frat boy innocence. So perky and insouciant are they that one would not be surprised to hear any of them exclaim at any point, "Hey, kids, let's put on a show!" Take away what the play views as the homophobic viciousness that lurks everywhere, and all would indeed be well in the world of *Corpus Christi*.

Except, oddly enough, for sex—about which McNally seems somewhat conflicted. At times, *Corpus Christi* approaches sex the way it approaches everything else between gay and straight: gay good, straight bad. Sexual couplings between heterosexuals are invariably ugly and often violent:

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as the numbingly repetitive vulgarity of the dialogue indicates, what these people do is simply described by a four-letter word. Gay sex, on the other hand, is often sweet and ennobling. But not always. It is Judas, after all, who introduces Joshua to sex. More than that, Joshua regularly warns his (many) sexual partners: "You can come no closer to me than my body. Everything important is hidden from you." Whatever these cryptic words are meant to convey, it would seem that even gay sex has its dark side.

Sex aside, however, there is little that is ambiguous in *Corpus Christi*. The author is not simply an angry gay; he is an angry lapsed-Catholic gay. If there is any anti-Catholic cliché the play avoids, this Protestant viewer missed it. McNally's hatred for the Church is his business, but the damage it does to his work is ours as well. This is not a work of the imagination; it is a polemical—and yes, thoroughly blasphemous—rant.

A number of reviewers have worried that the play's weaknesses will blind viewers to its important message of the need for toleration. But that is not McNally's message at all, and if it were, it would be unnecessary. No one outside the fever swamps disputes the point that no decent person will have anything to do with gay-bashing. McNally's point is rather that no decent person will express disapproval, on any grounds, of homosexual behavior. Any such disapproval is itself gay-bashing.

What's wrong with *Corpus Christi* is not, finally, its excesses. What's wrong is the vast, sad confusion —and the attempt at moral blackmail—that lies at its heart. FT

## Christmas Day in the Morning

My lady takes the pins from her hair,
lets the heavy plaits fall. The sweaty nurse,
half-asleep in the corner, hides her face
from the white streak of sunlight on the floor.
As it should, the day breaks clear
and hard. The basin-water's turned to ice.
In the courtyard, a clamor of geese,
dogs quarreling underfoot, and everywhere

the blind cold, the dumbstruck wind.
In the crib, the staring child. My lady goes
on working the hard comb through her hair.
Bells crack apart the brittle air.
On the church wall, the saints in flat haloes
eye the cross in the Child's cold hand.

**Sally Thomas**

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# Opinion

# Liberating Academic Freedom

*George M. Marsden*

It is often said that every book is autobiographical. That certainly is true of mine. About a decade ago I began working on a book that I eventually called *The Soul of the American University* (Oxford University Press). My interest in the role of religion in American higher education was sparked by twenty years teaching at Calvin College. At the end of that time I taught for a semester at the University of California at Berkeley, and that made me reflect on the difference between the two institutions.

What struck me was that Calvin measured up surprisingly well in the comparison. Berkeley was an exciting place with many wonderful people. Yet Calvin had many professors who were as talented as those teaching at Berkeley and the best Calvin students seemed as good or better. All in all I was pretty sure that the best students at Calvin were getting as good or better an *education* as were the best at Berkeley. They seemed on average to be excited about a wider range of intellectual interests and to relate these to ethical and social questions that would shape their vocations. They were more likely to see some coherence in their education and to view it as preparation for a vocation and not simply for a career.

These impressions were no doubt biased and may be hard to prove, but one thing I do know from teaching twenty years at Calvin. The conventional wisdom that one has to be in a highly diverse atmosphere in order to have a creative intellectual environment is simply wrong. Calvin has strict religious tests for all its faculty. Most of its students come from the same denomination, Christian Reformed. Nonetheless, such apparent homogeneity produces surprising diversities. Rather than, as in a secular university, where almost every discussion has to go back to irreconcilable first principles, people can debate issues at a much higher level. They might agree on first, second, or third principles, but have strong and creative debates after that. No more subjects are off limits than at other academic institutions, and in fact there is greater opportunity to discuss the religious dimensions of topics.

What was most striking in the comparison of Calvin with Cal was that the sort of education going on at Calvin was *virtually unknown*. What was especially unheard of in mainstream academia was what was central to the academic enterprise at Calvin—the integration of faith, learning, and life. As sophisticated as the discussions of such issues seemed to be at Calvin, in most of the rest of academia they were simply dismissed as "religious" and therefore passé, irrelevant, and unprofessional. People who heard that Calvin had strict religious tests for its faculty would assume that it was on that basis second class and backward.

So one question I addressed in *The Soul of the American University* was why it is that twentieth-century colleges that retained any substantive religious identity came to be thought of as inherently inferior. No matter how good they might be academically, they were thought to be essentially a little below standard. They would have to conform to the prevailing secular national standard if they were to be fully respected.

The American Association of University Professors is one of the best illustrations of the attitude in question. The AAUP, I want to emphasize, has done valuable work in providing procedural safeguards for faculty at all institutions. For instance, it has established the point that, in fairness to faculty, every institution must make clear its standards *prior* to hiring. Nonetheless, despite such accomplishments, since its beginning the AAUP has treated schools with religious tests for their faculty as necessarily second rate. While the AAUP has recognized the "right" of religious schools to discriminate on the basis of their religion, the organization has made it clear that it holds in disdain schools that persist in exercising that right.

This disdain was evident in the classic Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of 1915. The committee noted that a church or a business has a moral right to set up a proprietary institution to be used "as an instrument of propaganda." While the committee professed not to have an opinion on "the desirability of the existence of such institutions," it insisted that it was "manifestly important that they should not be permitted to sail under false colors." The hopeful sign, the committee suggested, was that "such institutions are rare, and are becoming ever more rare." Most denominational colleges were evolving toward uniform ideals of academic freedom in which their particular religious traditions would not substantially intrude.

The 1940 report on academic freedom by the AAUP and American Association of Colleges likewise upheld the "right" of colleges to define them-

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selves religiously, but also implied that religious discrimination in hiring was a departure from a higher standard that would remove religion as a factor in choosing faculty. In 1970 an "Interpretive Comment" was added to the 1940 declaration, making explicit that any departure from the norm of freedom from religious tests was undesirable. "Most church-related institutions," the signers noted, "no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse such a departure."

In 1988 an AAUP subcommittee on academic freedom was asked to help the organization clarify the implications of its stance toward religious colleges. That subcommittee endorsed what it saw to be the essentials of the 1940 position: "(1) the prerogative of institutions to require doctrinal fidelity; and (2) the necessary consequence of denying to institutions invoking this prerogative the moral right to proclaim themselves as authentic seats of higher learning." The subcommittee on the one hand repudiated the implication of the 1970 Interpretive Comment that seemed to undermine the first of these essentials. Yet at the same time it emphasized in the second of these principles that no "authentic" institution of higher learning could have religious tests. So, for instance, the subcommittee said it was "a wrong" for "an otherwise free university" to include a school of theology "that requires creedal orthodoxy as a consequence of its singular religious mission." "In sum," said the committee, "the housing of an unfree school within a free university is a contradiction: it may be *in* the university but, being unfree, it is not *of* the university, and it has no business being there."

In 1996 this subcommittee was asked to reflect further on the implications of its stance. While maintaining its earlier principles, it now also acknowledged that religiously defined institutions "unquestionably contribute to the pluralistic richness of the American intellectual landscape." "But," the subcommittee added, "they are usually not institutions of a kind to which the academic freedom provision of the 1940 Statement apply, and hence imposing censure on them would usually not be appropriate." The committee accordingly recommended that the AAUP should not seek to prosecute academic freedom cases in institutions of this inferior type that persist in retaining religious tests for faculty, so long as they are entirely up front about their standards and follow due process.

This policy is an important step forward in taking seriously the legitimacy of religious pluralism in education. However, the principles on which the policy is based are still demeaning toward institutions with religious tests. Essentially the view seems to be that these are hopeless cases and that the AAUP should not attempt to turn such institutions into schools "freely engaged in higher education."

These subcommittee reports simply take it as axiomatic that an authentic seat of higher learning must be "free" from any religious or ideological restraints. They seem to see this as a fixed truth, or as a sort of orthodoxy of the academic profession. Professors at an "authentic seat of higher learning" must be fully free to question everything, with no prior restrictions.

My view is that the time has come to question this academic orthodoxy. It is, after all, not all that old. As an orthodoxy, it has existed for less than a century, and it is very much the product of the assumptions of the American Progressive era. If we go back to the early twentieth century we find a culture dominated by the ideal of national consolidation. Some groups, such as Catholics, fundamentalists, and ethnic minorities, were resisting, of course, but national consolidation shaped mainstream educational policies. What was most needed, according to the prevailing wisdom, was to get away from local and parochial prejudices that threatened the unity of the nation and held back its economic and moral progress.

This was particularly true in higher education, which in the nineteenth century had been badly fragmented by denominational loyalties. Religious tests needed to be left behind if educational institutions were to participate in the intellectual mainstream. As the AAUP Report of 1915 put it, religious colleges were moving from being private proprietary institutions to being "public trusts." Religious belief might be fine as a private matter, but education was being defined as an essentially *public enterprise.* In the public domain, the report affirmed, science should rule. "Education," it said, "is the cornerstone of the structure of society and progress in scientific knowledge is essential to civilization." Unlike religion which could divide, science was unbiased and nonsectarian, and so would unite society. Scientific education could help defeat religious and other prejudices, thereby ensuring social progress. The architects of such educational ideals typically hoped that an inclusivist public moral and religious consensus would emerge that would replace divisive sectarian views. They sought a basis for such a consensus in a combination of science, the ideals of democratic civilization, American nationalism, the liberal Protestant heritage, and the larger Judeo-Christian moral tradition.

A number of those foundational assumptions no longer command the wide assent they once enjoyed. Few of us have faith in the advance of science as the great unifier or the best hope for humanity. Just about all of us would, of course, like to retain some national unity and to find some moral basis for doing so. Few of us today are confident in American nationalism or can see much hope for the institutions of the now-consolidated central culture for producing the consensus necessary for moral leadership. Since the 1960s such hopes for moral progress through na-

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tional consensus have been in a shambles. We still somehow manage to muddle through, but we hardly want to look to the centers of our culture—whether it be the government, the media, or the business world—for our moral leadership.

Nor do we look to the universities. Most of us recognize that our universities are incapable of providing the kind of coherent moral leadership that our Progressive predecessors hoped they would. Even though universities today contain many moral individuals, they are morally incoherent as institutions. Aside from championing ideas of tolerance and freedom, they stand for very few first principles. Conflicting political claims have long preempted most meaningful ethical debate. True to postmodern promises, power often determines what is "right." No moral claim is safe from deconstruction. The humanities, where one might most hope to find a basis for moral guidance, have been effectively immobilized for that purpose.

Besides, most university students do not even study the humanities—at least not more than they have to. Universities and their undergraduate programs are typically dominated by technical and career concerns, so that precious little of their curricula even contemplates any ideal higher than success. We might argue about the details of this characterization, but most of us would agree that university education today is not notably successful in producing a moral consensus or in forming good citizens, whatever might have been envisioned for it early in the century.

In light of all this, we should be rethinking the cultural role of religiously based colleges. Given the morally fragmented, technically oriented careerist state of our major universities and their undergraduate colleges, why in the world should we think that *they* should be setting the standard for the best education and that religious colleges should be trying to catch up? True, secular universities still have vastly more resources. But what else do they have? In these days of a perpetual buyers' market for faculty, many religious colleges, even of modest means, can have excellent faculties. Building a vision around particular religious traditions often makes such colleges better at producing morally responsible citizens than the giant universities.

So perhaps the time has come when it is the secular universities that should be thought of as second class and urged to find some way to match in quality what the best of the religious colleges are doing. To do so they would have to begin to cultivate subcultures of religious diversity. Rather than perpetuating the myth that the best education must be free from religion, they should begin taking seriously the possibility that various religious perspectives might have *legitimate* bearing on academic inquiry.

Early-twentieth-century academic progressives assumed that "free" scientific-based inquiry would lead to social and moral progress. While one can point to real benefits from such ideals, it is now apparent that such policies are also in many ways counterproductive. They certainly have not produced the moral and social progress originally envisioned. Encouraging merely "free inquiry" in universities has ended in moral incoherence; the achievement of technical expertise is now the principal benefit of most university education.

The best religiously oriented schools offer academic communities that sustain rigorous interdisciplinary discussion on the meaning and limits of human experience and its relation to larger reality. Early in this century the founders of the AAUP could assume that such wide-ranging interdisciplinary discussion would automatically take place at the best colleges and universities. Even nonreligious scholars then shared common enough heritages to allow vigorous debates relating their disciplines to the larger issues of life. Today, little can be assumed and as a result most scholars confine their inquiries to their specialized subdisciplines. Religiously defined institutions offer intellectual communities that can provide the best alternatives to our fragmented intellectual life.

What grounds remain for believing that nonreligious schools are superior seats of higher learning compared with their religiously defined counterparts? Do secular institutions really encourage more wide-ranging inquiry? Or does their inquiry simply range over different areas? Freedom, after all, is not an absolute. It exists only within a system of restraints and higher values. All educational institutions impose limits on what may be said or taught; religious institutions will simply determine those limits somewhat differently than will nonreligious ones. These are relative differences, not absolute differences in kind between some schools that are "free" and others that are "unfree."

One of the oldest meanings of "academic freedom" is that educational institutions should be able to set their own standards, free from undue outside interference. Today outside pressures often come from government or other secular agencies which have a different view of what it means to "freely engage in higher education." These agencies sometimes set standards based on wholly secular notions of "the public good," and so inhibit religiously based academic inquiry. Further, so long as fair procedures are followed, professors who choose to teach at a religiously defined institution are not being unduly restricted in their academic freedom. They, after all, have freely chosen to work under such confessional constraints.

(None of this means, of course, that we do not continue to need national standards for procedural justice. Some religious schools have been dictatorial and

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unfair in their practices of hiring and firing faculty or in inhibiting what may be taught or published. It needs to be emphasized that a religiously defined school's freedom to set its own standards does not provide license to arbitrarily enforce such standards. Religious institutions need to be up-front about their rules and follow openly stated standards of due process. They should recognize as well that educational institutions are healthiest when there is room for real intellectual inquiry, honest questioning, and creativity. So they should enforce their stated rules with enough flexibility to maximize freedom within the bounds of loyalty to their tradition.)

If we open-mindedly revise our estimations of what is important for colleges and universities to achieve and of which schools measure up to this standard, the religious universities and colleges will cease to be well-kept secrets and will become subjects of discussion and emulation. If we are looking for what is truly the best in higher education, the virtues of religious institutions make them strongly deserving of our highest regard.

GEORGE M. MARSDEN *is the Francis A. McAnaney Professor of History at the University of Notre Dame.* *This essay is adapted from a presentation at a conference in Chicago on "Academic Freedom at Religiously Affiliated Institutions" sponsored by the American Association of University Professors.*

# Hazards of New Fortune

*Wilfred M. McClay*

We'd done business over the phone for years, but I hadn't actually seen her for at least a decade, and I was greatly looking forward to it. A businesswoman of immense energy, competence, and focus, she had worked punishingly hard for many years, and was now reaping the rewards. The promotion into upper management, the gauntlet of secretaries, the corner office with its panoramic view of the city, the elegant clothing, the resplendent coiffure, the aura of serenity and well-being—all these were new since my last visit, palpable evidences of her new status.

They couldn't have happened to a more decent or deserving person, someone whose very life refutes the cynical (and stupid) idea that success in our day is merely a matter of impression management. After a disastrous divorce years ago that had left her saddled with the upbringing of two very young children, she found herself at the bottom of a formidable hole. But she proceeded to climb out inch by inch, without ever yielding to feelings of bitterness or grievance, instead showing an admirable tenacity, dedication to hard work, and boundless devotion to her children. There was no room for anything else. So her success was the fruit of many years of deferred hope and denied gratification, true grit and real sadness.

As we settled into our chairs and began talking, I spotted the glittering cluster on her left ring finger, and guessed that there must be another reason for her radiant contentment. Sure enough, she soon announced that she was to be married again, this time to a wealthy and politically connected attorney and businessman who moves in a glamorous world of entertainers, sports figures, and other high flyers. Her days as a lonely and struggling single mom would soon be the faintest and remotest of memories, crowded out by a life of skyboxes and high-powered board meetings and romantic getaways in exotic climes.

Clearly she was swept away by this tidal wave of good fortune, and who could blame her? I begrudged her none of it. For one thing, it was more than good fortune. Life had dealt her a rotten hand, and yet she had played it with triumphant mastery, turning her misfortunes to good use, never whining about her victimization but following a path of steady, dogged application.

My joy was not unmixed, however. I was a touch uneasy about some of her fiancé's business associates, who, to say no more about it, didn't strike me as her kind of people. Far more disturbing, though, were the occasional overtones of what can only be called "political correctness" coming out of her mouth. She had never uttered anything remotely resembling such things before, and it was jarring to hear them. They seemed so completely out of character that at first I thought she was joking, and chuckled appreciatively. When she responded with a reproving glare, my amusement evaporated. She was in deadly earnest, and I was expected to play along with this new earnestness. Her makeover was going to include a whole new set of political cosmetics—attitudes that were antithetical, in some ways, to the very values that had guided her to the place where she now sat.

She was especially strange in talking about a new school for one of her children, a subject on which she sought my insights as an "educator." It turned out, though, that she didn't really want advice. A prime stated criterion was that the school be "diverse" and "inclusive"; but when I suggested that the excellent public high school in her area (my own alma mater) possessed those very qualities in abundance, she waved aside the idea dismissively—it "didn't have enough" for her child—and instead rattled off a fa-

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miliar list of stupendously expensive private schools to which she'd narrowed her search.

Nothing wrong with that, of course, particularly if one has the money with which to play. But there was something bizarre about her inability to acknowledge the central role of *prestige* in her thinking. When I casually referred to one of the schools—an institution I know quite well—as "elite," she became visibly agitated, and insisted that she'd been told the school had become "incredibly diverse and inclusive." I was familiar with these claims of inclusiveness, which every exclusive school in America now feels obliged to make, and knew them to be, well, incredibly bogus and self-serving. How diverse could it be, I asked, with a total price tag approaching $20,000 a year? Who are they kidding? And, I might well have added, who are *you* kidding? But the conversation had now grazed a third rail, a matter too sensitive to be discussed honestly, and so I promptly dropped the subject.

This small encounter would not be worth relating were it not redolent of larger truths. It reflects the curious fact that, in America, a rise in social standing is often accompanied by the acquisition of what we are pleased to call "liberal" attitudes, and even "liberal" political views. This isn't universally true, of course. But it is true often enough to call into question the near-universal assumption that wealth invariably makes people more "conservative" and complacent. And it is a phenomenon likely to persist and even grow in the years to come, whether or not explicitly "liberal" ideas come to enjoy a renaissance, because it has very little to do with the validity or efficacy of those ideas. Indeed, as the next generation of newly wealthy Americans begin to indulge themselves in the respectability game known as philanthropy, they are likely to be suckers for every bad guilt-discharging idea of the past fifty years, and new ones yet to be devised. (Ted Turner is a harbinger in this respect.) Veblen's conspicuous consumption is still around. But it generally has to share the stage with conspicuous compassion, another form of compulsive display.

Such a development seems paradoxical. But the paradox is easily explained, though less easily addressed. As sage observers from Tocqueville to Lipset have pointed out, Americans are intensely devoted to the dual principles of liberty and equality. These principles are, so to speak, the oil and vinegar of American political ideology. To some extent, they can support one another, and in the right proportions even richly complement one another. But they always stand in tension, because they point in opposite directions and are ultimately hostile to one another. Given the vast range of human capacities, the exercise of liberty inevitably leads to social and economic inequality, as my friend had proved by her own success in career and (I hope) matrimony. Yet Americans' simultaneous commitment to the principle of equality makes us extremely uneasy with the resultant disparities of wealth, power, or status—even though such disparities are the very marks of distinction that we crave, and toward which we strive.

Success in the American way of life, then, comes fraught with certain inevitable psychological tensions, and contemporary liberalism—or, to be more precise, a certain kind of liberal attitudinizing—offers itself as a way of managing those tensions. It allows one to be successful and to enjoy all the most conspicuous and pleasurable marks of distinction, so long as one is willing to pay the (small) price of verbally identifying oneself with underdogs and marginals. One is allowed to be a "winner" so long as one expresses solidarity with the "losers," and blames the other "winners" for their inegalitarian selfishness and greed. Conspicuous achievement, then, has to be balanced by conspicuous projection. One discharges any guilty feelings one might have accumulated in one's ascent, and banishes the weight of one's sins, by projecting them onto designated scapegoats, real or imagined, e.g., racists, homophobes, rich Republicans, and the rest of the whole demonic host.

In this way the successful manage to pay their respects to both of the mutually jealous American gods, liberty and equality. That there is often an element of self-deception or worse in such a maneuver should be obvious. Think of the strange incoherence of a commonplace term like "underprivileged," which implies that all life's good things are both privileges and entitlements. Or think of the contortions that educationists go through to assert that the pursuit of equality and excellence are fully compatible—a sophisticated expression of the syndrome associated with Garrison Keillor's Lake Wobegon, where all children are above average. That our compulsion to talk and think this way nevertheless prevails should suggest how profound are the psychological forces at work, forces impervious to mere evidence. And one should never forget that the sacrificial demonization of enemies, on whose heads the sins of the community come to rest, is an essential element in the moral economy of this peculiar arrangement. (Even sweet old Garrison Keillor is capable of being surprisingly nasty when he is talking about the Designated Demons who dwell outside the charmed circle of Lake Wobegon.)

Well then, you ask, shall we say that an ethos of naked self-seeking is better? Would I have been happier had my friend knocked off the diversity-cant, and simply asked me which school was the most prestigious? Of course not. Just as even a reign of furtive hypocrisy is preferable to a reign of unashamed vice, even a self-deceiving conscience is generally far better than none at all. More than that, though, I had to admit that there was a true generosity of spirit behind

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my friend's sappy ideas, a spirit I cannot help but admire, and would not want to see extinguished. She can't help it if the conjoined principles of liberty and equality operate to make us perpetually uncomfortable.

What is hardest of all for her to let go of, I think, is the illusion that she can still be "just folks," despite her fabulous new life. Would that it were possible. But the fear of losing the very past from which one has fled, or the fond hope of carrying it forward into a world in which it simply has no place—these are among the most persistent if submerged themes of American history, dark threads discernible in the bright fabric of a thousand sagas of immigration, migration, and social advancement. Those dark threads remind us that even the change and mobility we cherish are never cost-free. On balance, the price is worth paying, particularly when one considers the alternatives. But there is always some price to be paid, and something precious to be left behind, as my friend is beginning to discover. The price is often greater than we imagine it will be. Such are the ironies of opportunity, and the hazards of new fortune.

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## Nicholas of Myra

*Patron Saint of Pawnbrokers*

In the company of "publicans and sinners,"
and the poor trading penknives for pocketfuls of bread,
the pawnbroker stands by his glass counter,
buys and sells portions of strangers' lives.
Some days he looks in the family heirloom mirror
he bought for a few bucks from a bankrupt butcher
and sees the gray hairs of Faustus.

Too many TVs line the inside
of his eyes when he tries to sleep;
pocketwatches click his breathing.
He does not ask what is borrowed or stolen,
what is the last token of love off a widow's hand.
Hope is the act of returning, the memorized object not gone.
Still, each day his cases are full; business goes on.
A tired ex-nun sells him her medallion of Nicholas.
He keeps it under his shirt, prays she will not return.

**Marjorie Maddox**

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# Contraception:
## A Symposium

*This year is the thirtieth anniversary of the encyclical of Paul VI,* Humanae Vitae, *routinely described in both the general and religious press as "controversial." We asked Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish thinkers to respond to one or more of the following questions:*

- *Do you judge the argument of* Humanae Vitae *convincing with respect to contraception?*
- *How do you think the argument could have been made more convincingly?*
- *In view of developments in the last thirty years, was Paul VI right about the moral and social consequences of contraception?*
- *If you agree that the message of the encyclical has not been effectively communicated, why is that the case?*

— The Editors

### Harold O. J. Brown

Thirty years ago Pope Paul VI issued the encyclical *Humanae Vitae* ("Of Human Life"). It came as a chilling blast to liberal Catholics and others—the population control establishment, for example—who hoped for a major change in the Church's stand on artificial contraception. With the Second Vatican Council still a very recent memory and *aggiornamento* still in the air, many Roman Catholics as well as others expected the Pope to "bring the Church up to date" and validate at least some forms of artificial birth control, which many Catholics were already practicing.

Although Pope Paul was known to be a man with conservative and traditionalist inclinations, the pressure on him to concede on this point was intense. There was a kind of neo-Malthusianism in the air, with the Club of Rome warning of *The Limits of Growth* and Paul Ehrlich menacingly brandishing *The Population Bomb*. It was taken for granted that humans were reproducing themselves too rapidly for individual societies and the earth as a whole to sustain. In his preamble to *Roe v. Wade* five years later, Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme Court would offer "population pressure" as one of the reasons for permitting abortion on demand.

The Pope threw a bomb of another kind to social engineers of Planned Parenthood and the hedonistic practitioners of the *Playboy* philosophy: *Humanae Vitae* reiterated the traditional Roman Catholic (and general Christian) conviction that sexual relations should be reserved for marriage and that artificial means must not be used to prevent conception. It was not until 1930 at the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican bishops that any Christian body had ever explicitly authorized the use of contraceptives. It was only in the mid-1960s that two decisions of the Supreme Court explicitly authorized the distribution of birth control as a constitutional right, first to married couples (*Griswold*), then to everyone (*Baird*). While most Protestant leaders regarded artificial contraception with some misgivings, in the absence of a foundation in natural law they had not developed good and principled arguments for dealing with it. To the extent that contraception was regarded as a Catholic preoccupation Protestants tended to be tolerant of it.

The Pope used the traditional natural law arguments of Catholicism against contraception, essentially maintaining that it is a violation of natural law to divert a function from its natural and presumably divinely intended use, in this case, to replace procreation with mere recreation. This was a tactic that would not impress most Protestants, whose limited openness to natural law thinking was under direct assault from the eminent Karl Barth (1886-1968), for whom, as for his fundamentalist detractors, only the Word, i.e., biblical revelation, really counts.



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Since Scripture does not explicitly mention contraception, many Protestants were left speechless. The first divine command, "Be fruitful and multiply," might seem to have been fulfilled already, and if Onan was slain by the Lord for "spilling his seed," one could argue that his offense was not contracepting by *coitus interruptus*, but refusing to fulfill the command of Levirate marriage on behalf of his deceased brother (Genesis 1:28, 38:8-10; the command is made explicit later, in Deuteronomy 25:5-6).

Scripture is in fact not terribly explicit on such matters; one can well argue, on scriptural grounds, that "multiplication" is not the sole reason for marriage and sexual congress. Not a few passages of Scripture say that husband and wife should delight in one another without mentioning children (e.g., Proverbs 5:18-19), but the Bible also makes it plain that marriage *is* for children, if not only for children. Consequently, Protestants who support contraception have regularly argued that it should be practiced with restraint, only within marriage, and for the purpose of spacing children, not of preventing them altogether. The difficulty is that once it was established, the permissibility of contraception proved impossible to control.

Perhaps the Pope's valiant sally was simply too late, for both medical and societal developments were overrunning such barricades as still stood, or that he was attempting to erect. After 1958 the birth control pill began to be available, and for the first time in human history sexual intercourse appeared to be possible without fear of pregnancy. Medicine had also made progress against one of the other prudential impediments to sexual license, venereal disease.

The Pope's arguments did not carry the day, not even with many of the higher clergy and rank-and-file Roman Catholics. However, as the late French geneticist Jérôme Lejeune used to say, *Seul Dieu pardonne vraiment, l'homme pardonne parfois, la nature ne pardonne jamais*: "God alone truly pardons, man sometimes pardons, nature never pardons." The acceptance of artificial birth control does not necessarily entail acceptance of abortion; indeed, Margaret Sanger herself, the founder of Planned Parenthood, opposed abortion for the very logical reason that abortion kills a child. However, once the easy accessibility of contraceptives made the sexual revolution possible, abortion on demand followed contraception as an even ruder assault on "the laws of nature" and, we might add, "of nature's God."

Pope Paul's arguments failed not because they were unsound, but for other reasons: they interfered (as all divine law, both natural and revealed, will do) with human autonomy; and they came too late, when they had already been overrun by medical developments and the sexual revolution. Now society is caught in the whirlwind, with massive rates of abortion, unwed motherhood (or "single parenting," as PC language puts it), sexually transmitted disease, the widespread collapse of the natural family, and an aging population in all developed countries. Protestants, who once looked with a certain superciliousness at the Pope and his commitment to "outmoded values," are now forced to contemplate the wreckage of a society in which both the Bible and natural law are scorned. *Seul Dieu pardonne vraiment, l'homme pardonne parfois, la nature ne pardonne jamais.*

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## J. Budziszewski

*Humanae Vitae* rests on two pillars. One is reverence for the purposes to which sex and marriage are ordained; the other is reverence for the human body, for its natural cadences and operations. To those who prefer to theorize at greater heights, the latter is especially scandalous. For in the background of *Humanae Vitae* are not only the odorless and immaterial substances of will and thought and promise, but also the embodiment of those intangibles in flesh: glistening eyes and soft dark orifices, moisture and menses, muscle and bones and blood. Rightly so, for body and spirit are equally the concern of the adoring God, who by Creation fused them, by Incarnation assumed them, and by Pentecost infused them. In our day it isn't the Christians who sweep the body under the carpet and speak of love only in pretty priggish abstractions. Look rather to those who find that reverence for the body's lovely ways gets in the way of the unlovely things that they want to do with it.

So deeply has God wrought His purposes upon the human body that it is not merely fruitful but rhythmic—providing not only for the bringing forth of children but for their spacing. To deprive an act of conjugal love of its potential to breed new life is not only irreverent but needless; rather than hindering nature, we have only to cooperate with it. Discipline is difficult, but as experience confirms, the difficulties themselves are ordained to our many-fold good, and avoided only at peril.

I am grateful to Paul VI for saying these things, and hope that I will not be blamed for remarking what also needs to be remarked: that he did not say them convincingly. Though addressed not only to Roman Catholics but to "all men of goodwill," *Humanae Vitae* is both diffuse and elliptical; its premises are scattered and, to non-Catholics, obscure. Though the encyclical letter is magisterial in the sense of being lordly, it is not magisterial in the sense of teaching well. It seems to lack the sense, which any

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discussion of natural law requires, of what must be done to make the self-evident evident, to make the intuitive available to intuition, to make what is plain in itself plain to us.

The greatest obstacle to the communication of Paul VI's message is that the spirit of the age has burdened most people with a false picture of nature. Their eyes dazzled by what technology can do, when they gaze upon human nature they see not a Design, but a canvass for their own designs. Because they can sever the *causal* link between sex and procreation, they suppose they have severed the *link* between sex and procreation. This helps to explain why, despite having been vindicated by the passage of time, the Pope's warnings about the moral and social consequences of contraception have been so roundly ignored.

First the encyclical admonishes that artificial contraception will make it easier for people to rationalize sexual immorality. When modern people hear this they are dumbfounded. If there is artificial contraception, how could any sex be immoral? The pill *changed* human nature, don't you see? For old nature the old rules were necessary; for new nature we have new ones. If the new ones too should prove confining, we'll change our nature again, just as we did before. It is the same sort of reasoning that leads some people to propose making future astronauts like tadpoles because on long space journeys they won't need legs.

The Pope's second warning is that husbands who become accustomed to artificial contraception will "lose respect" for their wives; finding it unnecessary to heed the cadences of feminine fertility, they will disregard the cadences of feminine feelings too, finally demanding that their wives be ready for sex at all times. Of course the Pope was right—but this is turning out to be one of those cases where the new rules too prove confining and we must "change" human nature yet again. Why can't a woman be more like a man? With the woman's version of Viagra, maybe she can.

Paul VI's third admonition was that once people view artificial contraception as morally indifferent, it will become an instrument of state policy; governments will interfere in the mission which God has given intimately and exclusively to spouses. And so, of course, they have. The difficulty is that in order to object to the interference, one must believe in the mission. Anyone who regards artificial contraception as morally indifferent has already rejected the mission. But not to worry: Once women become more like men, fertility rates will fall so rapidly that not even the most obtrusive commissar will think the growth of population a threat.

The nature of a thing, said Thomas Aquinas, is a purpose implanted in it by the Divine Art, that it be moved to a determinate end. Human nature is not an object to be manipulated, but a creation to be honored: not just a collection of processes, but an embodiment of purposes. The teleological link between sex and procreation persists even after the causal link is broken, for in the long run, to demand the gift of conjugal love without its accompanying fertility is to demand the impossible. The end of saying "I will give myself to spouse but not to children" is to say "I will give myself to no one; I belong to myself." Deliberate sterility insults the past and destroys the future; it makes us like the animals, who have neither history nor hope.

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## Charles J. Chaput, O.F.M. (Cap.)

Thirty years later, in an age when the word "prophet" seems worn out by misuse and overuse, one man still has a lock on the title. Paul VI was prophetic. Because in *Humanae Vitae*, he was right.

In presenting his 1968 encyclical, Paul VI cautioned against four main problems that would arise if Church teaching on the regulation of births was ignored. First, he warned that the widespread use of contraception would lead to "conjugal infidelity and the general lowering of morality." Exactly this has happened. Few would deny that the rates of abortion, divorce, family breakdown, wife and child abuse, venereal disease, and out of wedlock births have all massively increased since the mid-1960s. Obviously, the birth control pill has not been the only factor in this unraveling. But it has played a major role. In fact, the cultural revolution since 1968, driven at least in part by transformed attitudes toward sex, would not have been possible or sustainable without easy access to reliable contraception. In this, Paul VI was right.

Second, he also warned that man would lose respect for woman and "no longer [care] for her physical and psychological equilibrium," to the point that he would consider her "as a mere instrument of selfish enjoyment, and no longer as his respected and beloved companion." In other words, according to the Pope, contraception might be marketed as liberating for women, but the real "beneficiaries" of birth control pills and devices would be men. Three decades later, exactly as Paul VI suggested, contraception has released males—to a historically unprecedented degree—from responsibility for their sexual aggression. In the process, one of the stranger ironies of the contraception debate of the past generation has been this: Many feminists have attacked the Catholic Church for her alleged disregard of women,

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but the Church in *Humanae Vitae* identified and rejected sexual exploitation of women years before that message entered the cultural mainstream. Again, Paul VI was right.

Third, the Holy Father also warned that widespread use of contraception would place a "dangerous weapon . . . in the hands of those public authorities who take no heed of moral exigencies." As we have since discovered, eugenics didn't disappear with Nazi racial theories in 1945. Population control policies are now an accepted part of nearly every foreign aid discussion. The massive export of contraceptives, abortion, and sterilization by the developed world to developing countries—frequently as a prerequisite for aid dollars and often in direct contradiction to local moral traditions—is a thinly disguised form of population warfare and cultural reengineering. Again, Paul VI was right.

Fourth, Pope Paul warned that contraception would mislead human beings into thinking they had unlimited dominion over their own bodies, relentlessly turning the human person into the object of his or her own intrusive power. Herein lies another irony: In fleeing into the false freedom provided by contraception and abortion, an exaggerated feminism has actively colluded in women's dehumanization. A man and a woman participate uniquely in the glory of God by their ability to cocreate new life with Him. At the heart of contraception, however, is the assumption that fertility is an infection that must be attacked and controlled, exactly as antibiotics attack bacteria. In this attitude, one can also see the organic link between contraception and abortion. If fertility can be misrepresented as an infection to be attacked, so too can new life. In either case, a defining element of woman's identity—her potential for bearing new life—is recast as a weakness requiring vigilant distrust and "treatment." Woman becomes the object of the tools she relies on to ensure her own liberation and defense, while man takes no share of the burden. Once again, Paul VI was right.

From the Holy Father's final point, much more has flowed: In vitro fertilization, cloning, genetic manipulation, and embryo experimentation are all descendants of contraceptive technology. In fact, we have drastically and naively underestimated the effects of technology not only on external society, but on our own interior human identity. As author Neil Postman has observed, technological change is not additive but ecological. A significant new technology does not "add" something to a society, it changes everything—just as a drop of red dye does not remain discrete in a glass of water, but colors and changes every single molecule of the liquid. Contraceptive technology, precisely because of its impact on sexual intimacy, has subverted our understanding of the purpose of sexuality, fertility, and marriage itself. It has detached them from the natural, organic identity of the human person and disrupted the ecology of human relationships. It has scrambled our vocabulary of love, just as pride scrambled the vocabulary of Babel.

Now we deal daily with the consequences. During a single week this past July, news media here in Denver informed us that (1) nearly 14 percent of Coloradans are or have been involved in drug or alcohol dependency; (2) a special commission appointed by Governor Roy Romer praised marriage while simultaneously recommending steps that would subvert it in Colorado by extending parallel rights and responsibilities to persons in "committed relationships," including same-sex relationships; and (3) a young east coast couple were sentenced for brutally slaying their newborn baby. According to news reports, one or both of the young unmarried parents "bashed in [the baby's] skull while he was still alive, and then left his battered body in a dumpster to die."

These are the headlines of a culture in serious distress. American society is wracked with sexual identity and behavior dysfunctions, family collapse, and a general coarsening of attitudes toward the sanctity of human life. It's obvious to almost everyone: *We have a problem*, and it's killing us as a people. So what are we going to do about it? What I want to suggest is that if Paul VI was right about so many of the consequences deriving from contraception, *it is because he was right about contraception itself.* In seeking to become whole again as persons and as people of faith, we would do well to revisit *Humanae Vitae* with open hearts. Jesus said the truth would make us free. *Humanae Vitae* is filled with truth about our sexuality, our purpose as human beings, and the nature of married love. Lived selflessly, it is a source of real joy. We impoverish ourselves and those we love by ignoring it.

CHARLES J. CHAPUT, *a Capuchin Franciscan, is the Archbishop of Denver.*

## Eric Chevlen

One who goes out of his way and meddles in strife not his own, says the Proverb, is as one who pulls a dog by the ears. It is unlikely to be a beneficial experience for either party. A non-Catholic, and especially a Jew, must hesitate, therefore, before presuming to offer a critique of a papal encyclical. *Humanae Vitae* in particular has been a contentious document among those who, to use Pope John Paul II's metaphor, are my younger brothers in faith. A thoughtful and loving brother must surely avoid aggravating any discord in his beloved younger brother's family.

Two aspects of the encyclical, however, invite me, indeed call me, to reply. First, the encyclical is not

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simply addressed to the "faithful of the whole Catholic world," but also to "all men of good will," among whom I hope to be counted. More importantly, the encyclical is not based upon Christian doctrine, but explicitly on natural law. If *Humanae Vitae*'s analysis is correct, it is as binding upon me and my Jewish brethren as it is upon Catholics and the rest of the human family, since we all share the same nature, just as we all share the same Creator.

Natural law theory has never been an important part of Jewish thinking. It is not simply that with the Written Law, the Oral Law, the Codes, the Commentaries, the Supercommentaries, and the Responsa, we have enough law to deal with already, thank you. More importantly, Judaism stresses the fallibility of unfettered human moral reasoning. The Talmud is full of examples in which we are told that certain laws are made explicit because otherwise human reasoning would have led to error. True, we do not share the concern our Christian brothers have about the corrupting power that sin wields over a fallen mankind. But we do stress the pernicious influence of self-interest in moral decision-making. The hazard of self-interest is greatest, because it is most insidious, when we think it influences us least.

What moral insights can we achieve with natural law alone? Those raised in the Catholic tradition may think of the glorious systemization of Thomas Aquinas. Others may admire the noble code of the Stoics. But human reflection on nature and its inherent laws has far more often led to subjugation, exploitation, and rationalization than it has to the sort of justice for which John Paul II and others have spoken so passionately. Even Aristotle concluded that natural law justified the subordination of slave to master, woman to man, and foreigner to Greek. The ultimate fruit of natural law unguided by revelation is not justice, but paganism.

*Humanae Vitae* is far from pagan, of course. It assays to be "a teaching which is based on the natural law as illuminated and enriched by divine Revelation." But by reversing the proper priority of those two sources, the encyclical has inevitably opened the door for error.

The encyclical argues that there is an "inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act." In fact, though, it is a commonplace observation that this connection established by God is anything but inseparable. A woman's natural cycle of fertility and infertility, both monthly and over her lifetime, shows that the connection is at best intermittent. The natural law argument by design can cut both ways. It could as easily lead to the reasoning that because God willed us to be fertile intermittently, we may legitimately will the same thing, and act accordingly.

It is precisely acting on this human will of intermittent fertility that is so adamantly proscribed by *Humanae Vitae*. It is striking that it is condemned not simply as wrong, but as "intrinsically wrong." Even homicide cannot be so described, since occasionally it may be morally licit, as in cases of self-defense.

The encyclical argues that we may "take advantage of the infertile period," but it "condemns as always unlawful the use of means which directly prevent conception." Simultaneously willing infertility and engaging in coitus is permitted, apparently, but not tinkering with the physiology. In both cases, of course, the couple "are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid children and wish to make sure that none will result." The difference is that in the former case "the husband and wife are ready to abstain from intercourse during the fertile period as often as for reasonable motives the birth of another child is not desirable." The encyclical sees sexual abstention during times of suspected fertility as the only contraceptive technique conforming to natural law. The view of human nature thus proffered, however, is too pinched to encompass the multidimensional reality of our existence. The desire of married couples to engage in sexual intercourse is a process at once physiological, psychological, and often spiritual. On the physiological level alone it engages all the senses, the circulatory system, the respiratory system, the alimentary system (whose functions are temporarily suppressed), and the endocrine glands, to say nothing of the generative organs themselves. I cannot agree with *Humanae Vitae* that the frustration of this complex multisystem physiological process is somehow more natural than simply retaining a few milliliters of semen behind a latex barrier. The natural law argument is unpersuasive, because it is so—unnatural.

*Humanae Vitae* also makes consequentialist arguments in favor of its proscription of artificial contraception. The most important one, I believe, is that "a man who grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a woman, and, disregarding her physical and emotional equilibrium, reduce her to being a mere instrument for the satisfaction of his own desires." This may be true. But the reverse risk is also present. A couple who engage in periodic sexual abstention may deny the wife the satisfaction of her desires when they are at their peak, during the time of her ovulation. The result would be an even greater disregard for her physical and emotional equilibrium.

Ironically, periodic abstinence during the period of least fertility (and hence least female desire), as described in the Hebrew Bible, is never even mentioned in the encyclical. Yet it would serve the goal of forcing the couple to intermittently disengage sexually, and see each other as more than sexual objects.

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Moreover, the periodic abstinence would allow a renewal of sexual desire between husband and wife, reducing the risk that familiarity and satiation might lead to dissatisfaction and desire for novel sex partners. That, coupled with the episodic use of contraceptives that our God-given rational nature has discovered, could lead to a satisfying marital life and to mutual respect, along with the fulfillment of the commandment to "be fruitful and multiply." I would be the last to argue that such a program can be justified by natural law. It does not have to be. We know it by revelation.

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## Sarah E. Hinlicky

Married love is the very image of God. It is, for Christians, inherently trinitarian, a dynamic embodiment of love between man, woman, and God. The creation of humankind demands that it must be this way: "In the image of God he created them; male and female he created them." Neither man nor woman alone is a complete image of God. Just as the Holy Trinity is a communion of Persons in love, so humanity was created as distinct persons in need of one another's love. Adam, searching through the created world for a companion, found none suitable, and God saw it was not good for him to be alone. Eve comes from Adam, from his flesh, and they are split into two: it is their joy and gift from God to become one flesh again. Together, united by their Lord in holy love, they take part in the divine life.

This, then, is the Christian meaning of marriage: self-giving, self-joining love, by the love of God and on the pattern of His own trinitarian love. It is the godly exercise of both freedom and commitment, the highest spiritual calling. Such love encompasses all aspects of one's being, the soul and the mind and the body, intertwined with the spirit. In marriage, man and woman seek to become one flesh again, and the sacrament of marriage by the grace of God allows that reunion to take place. The physical union of sexual love is the most powerful expression of the rediscovered unity in God. Its power—on account of pleasure, intimacy, and unity—is so great and affects both men and women so deeply that it has been sacramentalized in marriage to encourage stronger love and union between lovers.

Sexual love is a good in itself. It need not be—in fact, cannot be—explained, reduced, measured, or justified. It simply *is*, a beautiful and mysterious expression of God's impossible, irrational love for humanity. Within a God-given marriage, lovemaking occurs by the free desire of the spouses for one another, for pleasure or comfort or closeness, in joy or in sorrow. It is not confined by rational limits, and it is not merely instrumental to any other purpose. To restrict it by reference to other ends is to fundamentally misunderstand holy eros.

When spouses have such an abundance of divine love, it is their joy to have children together. Mutual love grows into another life. By God's gracious gift, the child comes into being through their unity, spiritual and physical. The divine calling to marriage means that they are not merely objects in nature, or at the mercy of their biology. By love and by spirit they elevate their physical bodies to a higher plane, above the ordinary programmed procreation of other animals. Rather, as free agents in communion with God by love, they can choose wisely when to have children, and how many. To some are given the strength and enthusiasm to devote themselves to large families; others are blessed with smaller families. Either way, the central concern is always love and communion with God.

In this light, it is clear that the use of birth control by married couples can be a great blessing. It permits them time to grow in greater love and commitment at the beginning of a marriage, and to prepare themselves for the great task of parenthood. It is difficult to believe that nonabortafacient forms of birth control are intrinsically evil, for if they were, surely they would produce evil results in the couples that use them; and yet there are very many spouses who employ contraception with only beneficial results. Paul Evdokimov, an Orthodox theologian, puts the matter succinctly: "It is perfectly clear that one must avoid all complicity with decadent morals. But one must equally steer away from every attitude that renounces human responsibility and invokes divine Providence too lightly."

When men and women abuse the availability of contraception to facilitate promiscuity, or when spouses in principle reject children as an invasion of their isolated lives, it is not out of a disdain for the law. It is from a lack of love. Lovelessness is forbidden by the God of love, and so all of His commandments are meant to foster love. It is to this divine ethic of love that all men and women of good will should adhere.

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## Gilbert Meilaender and Philip Turner

As theologians representing the Lutheran and Anglican churches who seek a common mind with our Roman Catholic brothers and sisters, we think it most appropriate for us to direct our attention to the first of the questions posed for this symposium: "Do you judge the argument of *Humanae Vitae* with respect to artificial means of contraception convincing?" Our answer in brief is *no*, but before stating our

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reasons, we should note that we share in many ways what appears to be a major concern of Paul VI's encyclical. Like him, we believe that the tendency of modern society, and along with it many Christian people, to make an *absolute* separation between what we will call the "purposes" and the encyclical calls the "meanings" (*ratio*) of both sex and marriage is contrary to the order of creation, subversive of the matrimonial estate, and harmful to individual men, women, and children. Indeed, we will suggest that, if anything, the encyclical understates the harmful results of this separation.

On what ground(s) is the use of "artificial" means of contraception prohibited by the encyclical? The central argument is that "there is an unbreakable connection between the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning" of the conjugal act. It is simply the case, so the argument goes, that acts of sexual intercourse are by their very nature open both to engendering and strengthening the unity of a couple and to producing offspring. Hence, in order to keep together what God has joined in creation, Paul VI concludes that "it is necessary that *each conjugal act* (emphasis added) remain ordained in itself . . . to the procreating of human life."

This primary line of argument is supported by several secondary ones. Among these is an argument which, though implied rather than directly stated, seems to us to play a larger part in the letter's reasoning than its understated place might suggest. In several ways the encyclical suggests that procreation constitutes "the supreme gift of marriage." Even though, in accord with *Gaudium et Spes*, the Pope makes no attempt to rank the "meanings" of sex and marriage, he clearly teaches, in accord with Roman Catholic tradition, that procreation is chief among these meanings and, given the heightened emphasis procreation repeatedly receives in the letter, it is not surprising that he should so firmly require that every act of sexual intercourse remain open to the transmission of life.

With respect both to *Humanae Vitae*'s chief line of argument and to the secondary argument we have noted, the encyclical states that its teaching "is rooted in natural law" and is "illuminated and made richer by divine revelation." Yet, despite its reference to divine revelation, the letter's only references to Holy Scripture pertaining to the issue in question are two citations from 1 John and Ephesians—passages that are, in fact, related only indirectly to the issue at hand. Though the first three chapters of Genesis are generally cited as *loci classici* for beginning a discussion of marriage and sex, they are not discussed in *Humanae Vitae*. Had more adequate reference been made to Holy Scripture, it might indeed have proved to be the case that "a teaching rooted in natural law" would have been "illuminated and made richer by divine revelation." Had more attention been given to these and other related passages, it might have been the case that no ranking of the unitive and procreative purposes would even have been implied by the argument.

A more sustained attempt to interpret the witness of the Bible leads, we believe, not to a hierarchy of meanings but to a *transformation* and *unification* of the purposes to be found in both marriage and sexual intercourse. This transformation treats the *one flesh union* of husband and wife as the overarching purpose of both marriage and sexual intercourse. A union of one flesh is, however, a complex rather than a simple notion. As displayed in Holy Scripture, it contains a multiplicity of purposes and goods: namely, the unity of the couple, the procreation of children, and the establishment of the basic unit of human society. Within the overarching purpose of a one flesh union, no one of these purposes and goods enjoys priority over the others.

In accord with God's creative will and by his gracious blessing the sexual act within marriage expresses and nourishes the one flesh union of husband and wife, and, as an aspect of that union, it gives rise to children who incarnate it. Within a union of one flesh, it is important that the sexual act give rise to children, whose presence is a sign that self-giving love is creative and fruitful. It is equally important that children be conceived and reared by spouses who regularly and joyfully give themselves to each other in the sexual act—and who can, therefore, understand their children both as gifts of God and as integral to their call to marriage. Spouses should dutifully and gladly embrace all dimensions of the gift God gives us in marriage. Neither more nor less than this is, in our view, biblical teaching.

What of natural law? *In its very nature* the sexual act, as a human act, requires the intervention of human reason and will. Human beings do not come together and mate only at certain seasons of the year, and God himself has so arranged the laws of nature that there are infertile periods in a woman's cycle. The encyclical seems mistaken, then, in holding that intentional use of infertile periods and use of contraceptives are essentially different in that the one "uses a faculty that is given by nature" and the other "impedes the order of generation from completing its own natural processes." If a husband and wife want, as they ought, to hold together within their marriage the love-giving and life-giving purposes of sex, they must "make love" not as the other animals mate but in ways that will fittingly and appropriately realize and sustain each of these purposes within a union of one flesh. Hence, the use of technique to assure the spacing of children and to enhance the shared love of spouses should be understood not as a violation of the natural law but as a right use of reason in support of the divinely intended purposes of marriage.

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By giving a couple moral permission to use the natural rhythms of the menstrual cycle as a means of spacing the birth of children, the encyclical itself recognizes the distinctively human character of the sexual act. Likewise, contraceptive intercourse may sometimes be a fitting means by which husband and wife aim to nourish simultaneously the procreative and unitive purposes of their marriage. We recognize, of course, that the encyclical itself rejects the line of argument we put forward here, but we simply cannot find in its reasoning any coherent rationale by which to reject contraceptive intercourse within marriage as long as procreation is not excluded *in principle* from the overarching good of the one flesh union.

Once its central argument has been presented, *Humanae Vitae* goes on to make an appeal to the good sense of its readers by asking them to consider "what consequences will follow from the methods of contraception and the reasons given for the use of contraception." Among the consequences listed are (a) adultery, (b) "a gradual weakening in the discipline of morals," (c) a loss of respect of husbands for their wives, and (d) the mandating of contraceptive practices by public authority. We leave open the question of how accurate these predictions have proven to be. We believe, however, that it would have been more prescient to mention two results of the separation our society seems increasingly willing to make *in principle* between the unitive and procreative purposes of marriage.

Since the publication of *Humanae Vitae*, sex has become increasingly a form of play (which we then try vainly to convince our children they are not ready for). In addition, new reproductive technologies have made childbirth and nurture into a voluntary project one can pursue for private reasons apart from any thought of marriage. Together these developments have played havoc with the public meaning of marriage. It has become less and less a public vocation that presents each couple with a task and more and more a private arrangement entered into by individuals for their own purposes. As we noted above, this subverts the order of creation, the estate of matrimony, and the wellbeing of men, women, and children.

As Protestant theologians we are well aware that the Protestant churches, in allowing the use of contraceptives, have failed to accompany this permission with effective catechesis and discipline with respect to the purposes of sex and marriage. The evidence seems to indicate, however, that, at least in this country, Roman Catholic catechesis and discipline have not fared much better. We are—jointly—faced with something far more profound than a decline in morals. We face subversion of the public meaning of marriage. Roman Catholics may quite rightly ask of Protestants a new seriousness in our understanding of the purposes of marriage and in our intent to hold these purposes together within the bond of marriage. We, in turn, may rightly ask of them that an argument which is not adequately grounded in Scripture and which, simply as an argument, has proved singularly unpersuasive no longer be made a cause of division within the one Church. Together then we can reassert the seriousness of marriage as a public institution in which we undertake a threefold task—to give rise to the next generation, to preserve the integrity of the basic unit of society, and to love with fidelity that neighbor whom God gives us as husband or wife.

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## R. Albert Mohler, Jr.

The effective separation of sex from procreation may be one of the most important defining marks of our age—and one of the most ominous. This awareness is spreading among American evangelicals, and it threatens to set loose a firestorm.

Most evangelical Protestants greeted the advent of modern birth control technologies with applause and relief. Lacking any substantial theology of marriage, sex, or the family, evangelicals welcomed the development of "The Pill" much as the world celebrated the discovery of penicillin—as one more milestone in the inevitable march of human progress and the conquest of nature.

At the same time, evangelicals overcame their traditional reticence in matters of sexuality, and produced a growth industry in books, seminars, and even sermon series celebrating sexual ecstasy as one of God's blessings to married Christians. Once reluctant to admit the very existence of sexuality, evangelicals emerged from the 1960s ready to dish out the latest sexual advice without blushing. As one of the best-selling evangelical sex manuals proclaims, marital sex is *Intended for Pleasure.* Many evangelicals seem to have forgotten that it was intended for something else as well.

Thus, the evangelical reaction to *Humanae Vitae* was, generally speaking, dismissal and disregard. Pope Paul VI apparently caught many Catholics by surprise with his total rejection of "artificial" methods of birth control, but most Protestants seemed to expect this reaffirmation of Rome's historic tradition. Indeed, birth control became fixated in the Protestant mind as a "Catholic issue." That is, until recently.

A growing number of evangelicals are rethinking the issue—and facing the hard questions posed by reproductive technologies. Several developments

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contributed to this reconsideration, but the most important of these is the abortion revolution. The early evangelical response to legalized abortion was woefully inadequate. Major evangelical bodies and denominations—including even the Southern Baptist Convention—accepted at least some version of abortion on demand.

The evangelical conscience was awakened in the late 1970s, when the murderous reality of abortion could not be denied. A massive realignment of evangelical conviction was evident by the 1980 presidential election, when abortion functioned as the fuse for a political explosion. Conservative Protestants emerged as major players in the pro-life movement, standing side-by-side with Catholics in the defense of the unborn.

The reality of abortion forced a reconsideration of other issues in turn. Affirming that human life must be recognized and protected from the moment of conception, evangelicals increasingly recognized Intrauterine Devices (IUDs) as abortifacients, and rejected any birth control with any abortifacient design or result. This conviction is now casting a cloud over The Pill as well.

Thus, in an ironic turn, American evangelicals are rethinking birth control even as a majority of the nation's Roman Catholics indicate a rejection of their Church's teaching. In this light, a new evangelical assessment of *Humanae Vitae* is in order, and its thirtieth anniversary is an opportune moment.

At this first level, a theologically grounded understanding of sex would require that evangelicals agree with the encyclical's opening statement that "God has entrusted spouses with the extremely important mission [*munus*] of transmitting human life." This mission of the stewardship and transmission of life runs counter to the secular mind, but is central to the biblical vision. Such a view stands in sharp contrast to our culture's prevailing treatment of children as inconveniences or as accessories for the extension of the ego.

We must also recognize the prophetic character of the encyclical's warning about the inevitable result of the contraceptive mentality. As Pope Paul VI warned, widespread use of birth control would lead to "serious consequences," including marital infidelity and a general erosion of morality. In reality, The Pill allowed a near-total abandonment of Christian sexual morality in the larger culture. Once the sex act was severed from the likelihood of childbearing, the traditional structure of sexual morality collapsed.

Against this tide, a biblical vision of human sexuality must include what the encyclical identifies as the integrity of conjugal love within the marriage bond. This marital union is indeed intended for the procreation and parenting of children, and conjugal love is to be "both *faithful and exclusive* to the end of life." In the context of that bond, the unitive and procreative meanings of conjugal love are to be connected. So far, so good.

For most evangelicals, the major break with the encyclical's teaching comes at the insistence that "it is necessary that each conjugal act remain ordained in itself to the procreating of human life." This claims too much, and places inordinate importance on individual acts of sexual intercourse, rather than the larger integrity of the conjugal bond.

Thus, I believe that the encyclical would be strengthened by an affirmation of the very "principle of totality" it rejects. The focus on "each and every act" of sexual intercourse within a faithful marriage that is open to the gift of children goes beyond the biblical demand. Since the encyclical does not reject all family planning, this focus requires the distinction between "natural" and "artificial" methods of birth control. To the evangelical mind, this is a rather strange and fabricated distinction.

Nevertheless, thirty years of sad experience demonstrate that *Humanae Vitae* sounded the alarm, warning of a contraceptive mentality that would set loose immeasurable evil as modern birth control methods allowed seemingly risk-free sex outside the integrity of the marital bond. At the same time, it allowed married couples to completely sever the sex act from procreation, and God's design for the marital bond.

In joining arms against the Culture of Death, evangelicals will find much common ground with conservative Roman Catholics. Nevertheless, whereas Catholics distinguish between "natural" and "artificial" methods of birth control, evangelicals will focus on the critical distinction between abortifacient and nonabortifacient forms of control.

Standing against the spirit of the age, evangelicals and Roman Catholics must affirm that children are God's good gifts and blessings to the marital bond. Further, we must affirm that marriage falls short of God's design when husband and wife are not open to the gift and stewardship of children.

For evangelicals, much work remains to be done. We must build and nurture a new tradition of moral theology, drawn from Holy Scripture and enriched by the theological heritage of the Church. Until we do, Catholics are not likely to be impressed by our arguments. For now, *Humanae Vitae* remains an unanswered challenge. It is high time evangelicals answered the call.

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## Alicia Mosier

Most objections to *Humanae Vitae* are born from a simple misunderstanding of what it argues

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against, and a surprising unawareness of what it argues for. Three objections in particular arise again and again; if the confusion about the Catholic teaching on contraception is to be straightened out, we must address them, and the encyclical itself gives us the resources to do so.

The first common objection goes like this: "*Humanae Vitae* is a condemnation of artificial contraception. What it sees as immoral is the fact that something artificial is interposed into the conjugal act. But clearly what is artificial is not necessarily immoral." We can begin to answer this objection by stating the obvious point that Paul VI, in conformity with the traditional doctrine of the Church, does indeed condemn artificial contraception. But the argument made in the encyclical is not nearly so narrow as that; in reality it has almost nothing to do with the nature of any specific contraceptive device.

Although the opposition of the terms "artificial" and "natural" is the most familiar lens through which to read *Humanae Vitae*, it is secondary to the encyclical's larger concern—namely, "responsible parenthood," the properly ordered use of the gifts God gives in marriage. The issue, then, is not captured in the word "artificial." What is wrong is not something "artificial," not a "thing." What is wrong is contraception itself: the deliberate will, the choice, to subvert the life-giving order and meaning of the conjugal act.

A second common objection to *Humanae Vitae* claims that couples who contracept are in fact giving each other the "gift of self" in the same measure as couples who practice Natural Family Planning (NFP). The former, so the objection goes, are no less generous with each other because there is a physical barrier between them that stops procreation from taking place; their intercourse realizes their one flesh union just as fully as the latter couple's does.

Paul VI addresses this objection directly. Conjugal acts, he states, "must remain open to the transmission of life" to serve the good of procreation. But he goes on to say that without that openness, sex doesn't advance the unitive good of marriage either. A sexual union in which contraception takes place and thus in which the procreative good is actively thwarted, he implies, is not a one flesh union at all. Husband and wife are not fully giving themselves to each other; there is a barrier between them, and it is as much spiritual as physical. The acts of intercourse performed by married people in such a context may be sexual, but they are not marital.

Some argue that as long as a marriage is open to life "in principle," contraception is acceptable and licit. They make the point precisely: the only way contraceptive intercourse can possibly be morally justifiable is if the good of procreation is thought of as a "principle" rather than as something to be worked toward in the reality of our physical world. By definition, not excluding procreation in principle implies not excluding it in reality.

A third objection very often raised against *Humanae Vitae* asks this crucial question: Does the issue of how births are spaced have anything at all to do with the natural law? Since Paul VI takes for granted that the relation is self-evident and requires no elaboration, we need to point out more explicitly how the natural law informs—and can be thwarted by—the regulation of births.

When Paul VI states that every act of intercourse "must remain open to the transmission of life," he is reasoning from the principle that everything is ordered by God to an end, and that to perform an action that willfully changes the course of something that is moving toward its given end is to act in contradiction to God's design. It is to commandeer what God has inscribed in His universe, rerouting it toward an end one prefers; it is not to be responsible to God in tending His gifts.

In strictly biological terms, the simple physical act of intercourse is directed to the conception of a child: This man and this woman come together, these organs and cells meet, and if the timing is right a new life begins. The Church perceives this as an example of an act ordered to an end, and ordered that way by the Creator. In other words, it is a manifestation of the natural law by which all things, physical and spiritual, are divinely ordered.

But conjugal acts are meant for more than having children. As Paul VI himself states, there is another end—unity—to which they are ordained. If a couple decides they ought not procreate for a time, the need remains for them to seek union with each other; the most obvious way to do so is through sexual intercourse. But how, in such a circumstance, can both divinely given ends of intercourse be preserved? According to Catholic teaching, they can—if the couple does not contracept.

Paul VI writes that "every action [is illicit] . . . which proposes, either as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible." Proposing to render procreation impossible means, simply put, willing directly against the order of intercourse and consequently against new life. Two distinctions can be made on the basis of natural law with regard to this proscription. The first is between contraception and NFP; the second is between wrongful and licit uses of NFP itself.

Couples who contracept introduce a countermeasure into an act known beforehand to be potentially causative of a new life, a countermeasure whose sole purpose is to make it impossible for a new life to come to be. Contraception is an act that can only express the will that *any* baby that might result from *this* sexual encounter not be conceived. It actively subverts the progress of intercourse toward its end; it completely detaches the unitive and procreative

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goods. Moreover, it manifests a will aimed directly against new life.

The method of NFP is never contraceptive; it never renders procreation impossible. Couples who practice it add no countermeasure to the conjugal act to stop it from attaining its natural end, but simply abstain from sex at certain times. Their intercourse is always "open to the transmission of life," even if no life can come about from it.

Nonetheless, there can be uses of NFP that are not consonant with the natural law and the moral principles enjoined on parents. A husband and wife may leave open the possibility of procreation by using NFP, but if what they really and directly *will* is that it not be possible for a baby to be conceived, that a new life not come to be, their action cannot be adjudged morally good.

For example: imagine a young married couple who are planning a long vacation in Europe a year from now. They want to do a good deal of traveling when they are there, and a new baby would be an inconvenience. They choose to use NFP, and the wife does not become pregnant. What is the moral status of their action? No fault can be found with their method, but as we have seen, it is not only "method" that is at issue in *Humanae Vitae*; there is much more to responsible parenthood than that.

Paul VI states that if a decision to space births using NFP is to fall under the category of "responsible parenthood," it must be "made for grave motives and with due respect for the moral law." Discerning the seriousness of one's motives is precisely the task of a well-formed conscience, without which we are apt to confuse our personal preferences with moral goods. A well-formed conscience ought to tell us that, at least in ordinary circumstances, inconvenience on a vacation (or whether one takes a vacation at all) is not a morally serious reason for preventing the conception of a child.

NFP practiced in this way is just as contrary to God's design as contraception, but for a different reason: in this case the husband and wife do not use a wrongful means but refuse to cling to the right end. They might still want to have a baby "in principle," but for selfish reasons—reasons untutored by conscience—they reject having one in fact. NFP is never contraceptive, but the will can be.

Many examples may be cited of a regulation of births that respects all the goods of marriage and intercourse; as Paul VI notes, "physical, economic, psychological, and social conditions" can all play a role in the decision to space births. To take a very clear case, imagine that a married woman has been diagnosed with cancer; she and her husband and their doctor resolve to bring her cancer into remission, a task that would be nearly impossible under the financial and physical strains of childbirth. To facilitate their goal, they decide to abstain periodically from sexual intercourse.

This couple wants to be responsible to the gift God has given them. In fact, they may "want" a child. But like laborers in the vineyard, they must plant in due season. Their circumstance calls for prudence; the wife's health needs to be restored, for the good of the whole family. This couple's will is not directed against life but toward remission, toward health, and in the end toward justice for all involved—that is, toward a significant moral good that bears upon the good of responsible parenthood. Their will does not divert the divinely given order of intercourse from the ends of unity and life, and neither does their method.

*Humanae Vitae* is not a simple-minded condemnation; this is shown by the very fact that the Church asks married people to consider all the goods of their way of life. Especially as John Paul II has subsequently explicated the teaching, it is rich and positive. One of the most remarkable gifts God has given us is the ability—the vocation—to participate in His life-giving and unifying love; in marriage we can do this, as Paul VI puts it, by "collaborat[ing] with God" in the work of generating and sustaining life. Contraception allows us to collaborate when we want to, on our terms. But the Church's teaching enables us to collaborate with God at all times, even when prudence requires the spacing of births.

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## Janet E. Smith

Recent textbooks presenting the Catholic teaching on contraception have, I am glad to report, begun to give it a positive evaluation. It is laudable and right that they make clear that the IUD and chemical forms of contraception on occasion work as abortifacients—that is, they sometimes work by preventing the implantation of the fertilized ovum (the new human being). Yet when it comes to explaining why contraception itself is wrong, these texts often give a false explanation. They claim that the Church condemns contraception because it is artificial, and that natural family planning is morally acceptable because it is not artificial. In truth, the artificiality of contraception figures not at all in the Church's condemnation of contraception. Certainly, the Church teaches that contraceptives commonly known as "artificial birth control" are morally impermissible, but it is not because of their artificiality that they are condemned.

It is not surprising that many people think this is the Church's teaching because many Catholic publications written by "experts" and even receiving imprimaturs say so. I recently found this teaching in two very popular textbooks and a marriage preparation text that are considered to be "conservative."

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This misrepresentation of the teaching of the Church may explain at least in part the resistance of some to Church teaching; they rightly reason that the Church is guilty of a terrible and manifest inconsistency. "Artificial" simply means "made by art," and things made by art are regularly approved by the Church. Moreover, are not some of the methods of natural family planning reliant upon such artificial tools as thermometers?

That "experts" hold and propagate this view is, however, less easy to understand and perhaps not very forgivable. None of the recent statements on this teaching—*Humanae Vitae, Familiaris Consortio*, the extensive deliberations of Pope John Paul II, and the new *Catechism of the Catholic Church*—give the slightest suggestion that the Church opposes contraception because it is artificial. The books I reviewed were written very recently; one unfortunately suspects their authors of having failed to read key texts. Indeed, one is at a loss to determine what source they have for their claims.

Since I can give only a brief presentation of the Church's teaching here, I recommend that everyone consult the documents mentioned above. Those who appreciate precise and profound philosophical reasoning should read Karol Wojtyla's *Love and Responsibility*. Archbishop Charles J. Chaput's recent pastoral letter on *Humanae Vitae* provides a magnificently clear and accessible presentation of Church teaching, arguably the very best to date. It should be as widely distributed as possible. My explanation here will be a more technical consideration of the distinction between natural and artificial.

While it is true that the Church does approve of the use of artificial things, it insists that they must first be subject to moral evaluation. *Donum Vitae* states that "[reproductive technologies] are not to be rejected on the grounds that they are artificial. As such, they bear witness to the possibilities of the art of medicine. But they must be given a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the human person, who is called to realize his vocation from God to the gift of love and the gift of life." Later the document states, "If technical means facilitate the conjugal act or help it to reach its natural objectives, it can be morally acceptable. If, on the other hand, the procedure were to replace the conjugal act, it is morally illicit." The Church approves of what is artificial when it facilitates nature and disapproves of it when it violates nature. The distinction between facilitating nature and violating nature is key—"artificial" forms of contraception violate nature. So do some "natural" means that have historically been used as contraceptives, such as seaweed and natural sponges; these too fall under the condemnation of the Church.

The natural law upon which the Church bases much of its moral teaching has a very specific understanding of "nature" that unfortunately eludes many. The "nature" referred to in "natural law" is not biological nature but human nature—our nature as rational, free, and relational creatures. Acts that violate the rational, free, and relational nature of the human being are thereby unnatural and immoral. Appeals to "natural law" are appeals to the dignity of the human person, not to biology.

Contraception violates the dignity of the human person in several ways. It reduces the sexual act to a merely biological act on the level of animal existence. Humans freely and rightly contracept and sterilize other animals because their existence and their sexuality have a merely instrumental value. Their sexuality is ordained to the propagation of the species, and since species are ultimately ordained to the benefit of human beings, we can manipulate them to our benefit. Although our ingenuity allows us to manipulate the human sexual act in the same way, morality prohibits this. The vulnerability of the human person and the intrinsic value of human life set strict conditions for having sex morally.

The sexual relationship between spouses is one of God's great gifts to mankind. Relating to one's spouse enables human beings to overcome their existential loneliness and their selfishness by participating in a common good of inestimable value—the bringing into existence of another creature with an immortal soul.

The sexual act is morally performed only within marriage where it has the ordination both to deepening the union of the spouses and to building a family. Sexual acts that fail to deepen the union or deliberately preclude building a family are thereby immoral. Contraception violates both meanings of the conjugal act. It obviously violates the procreative aspect of sex, but it also impedes the union of the spouses.

Contraception treats the procreative meaning of the sexual act as though it were an impediment to spousal union. But the conjugal act is meant to be an act of total self-giving, which includes giving the power of becoming a parent with another. Spouses who contracept are not giving totally of themselves to one another; in violating the baby-making power of the sexual act, they confine their act to being ordained solely to mutual pleasure. They are not achieving the union proper to spouses, but are holding back from each other and preventing God, if He so chooses, from creating a new human life.

On the other hand, couples using methods of natural family planning are respecting the nature of the conjugal act through their acts of self-denial. They do not violate the baby-making power of the sexual act because it is not present in a way to be violated. They refrain from acts of conjugal intercourse during the fertile periods because they have judged that responsible parenthood requires them to

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limit their family size temporarily or permanently. In these instances, their spousal union is deepened and confirmed by their abstaining from sexual pleasure.

The Church's teaching on contraception embraces the deepest of human values, both natural and supernatural. To reduce it to a rejection of the "artificial" falsifies and trivializes it. The Church's teaching is surely an exaltation and an exultation of the natural, properly understood, and we shortchange ourselves if we fail to realize this.

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## It's Still the Same Old Story

Often I rang her doorbell after midnight
in my mind, hat in my hand and hoping.
If a man answered, all hair and husband
in his underwear, what would I do?

Two years since she flew away, taking her name
like a house key. Coiled in an Air Force cockpit,
I fed on dials and dog fights, emerged months later
with a chest of wings, Caliban in blue,

highballs and dogfights at dawn the way to strut.
Pilots worshiped the god called luck,
two-headed Buddha called throttle and stick,
power we wielded with our fists. I thought of her often

after lights out or alone at forty thousand feet. Once,
I cursed an engine fire at night, spiraled
and set it down at the base in her home town,
time for a telephone. I flipped to her name

and there it was: I remembered the number,
even the lick of the tongue of her dachshund.
Taxi idling behind me, I stared at that doorbell
and almost stalled, reached out and pushed.

All that, decades ago. Someone I flew with
has gone to the moon and back, others shot down
over Laos and Hanoi, the endless guilt of surviving.
But here is her photo on this cluttered desk,

her paintings on every wall, our grandchildren
clattering pans in the kitchen, and when I rise
and go there, she leans down, gray-haired
and laughing, watching them roll the dough.

**Walt McDonald**

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# C. S. Lewis in the Public Square

***Richard John Neuhaus***

The first thing I should say is that I am not a Lewis scholar. The second thing is that, from what I understand of the man, he would likely be amused that there are people called Lewis scholars. There are simply those who can stop reading Lewis, and those who can't. After a while, some of the latter find that they are thought to be Lewis scholars. The third thing I should say is that I am very much aware that anybody who knows much about Lewis might think my title—"C. S. Lewis in the Public Square"—highly improbable.

The phrase "public square" evokes images of the political arena with its partisan games and intense debates over public policy. Lewis did occasionally, very occasionally, address what are ordinarily called political issues. One thinks of his reflections on the Second World War, on pacifism and belligerency, on laws regarding obscenity, and on the nature of criminal punishment. But, for the most part, Lewis is understandably viewed as a determinedly apolitical, even private, man. Indeed, in many ways he took his stand, and encouraged others to take their stand, over against politics—especially politics as dominated by the machinations of the modern State. He was on the side of reason, myth, splendor, and virtue, in the hope that such vital elements of life might "still trickle down to irrigate the dust-bowl of modern economic Statecraft." This might be called the C. S. Lewis trickle-down theory of politics.

His skepticism with respect to the modern State was emphatic:

> Christianity, with its claims in one way personal and in the other way ecumenical and both ways antithetical to omnicompetent government, must always in fact . . . be treated as an enemy [by the State]. Like learning, like the family, like any ancient and liberal profession, like the common law, it gives the individual a standing ground against the State.

As in Augustine's two cities—the *civitas terrena* and the *civitas dei*—Lewis insisted on clear distinctions, and was not intimidated by the risk that distinctions may turn into antinomies. Of course the City of God is not immediately available to us, and we have to make do with the earthly cities we have. Like Augustine who preferred the ancient Romans to those of his own day, Lewis recognized the need to make comparative judgments between political regimes, but insisted we should do so without delusions. "The practical problem of Christian politics," he wrote, "is not that of drawing up schemes for a Christian society, but that of living as innocently as we can with unbelieving fellow-subjects under unbelieving rulers who will never be perfectly wise and good and who will sometimes be very wicked and very foolish."

The kind of people we are is more important than what we can do to improve the world; indeed, being the kind of people we should and can be is the best, and sometimes the only, way to improve the world. Society is ever so much more important than the State, and mores more important than laws: "The law must rise to our standards when we improve and sink to them when we decay." Better, therefore, to attend to standards than to laws. This overlooks, we may observe, the ways in which laws influence standards, but it reflects Lewis' studied skepticism toward the search for political or legal fixes for human problems. His disdain for the public excitements generated by what he derisively referred to as "the news" is well known. Amidst the incessant declarations of public crises about this, that, and the other thing, C. S. Lewis looks very much like an "escapist."

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After all, he spent a large part of his life writing fairy tales for children, didn't he?

Nevertheless, there is something to be said regarding "C. S. Lewis in the Public Square." Lewis was anything but the isolated and privatized individualist whom the Greeks called an "idiot." If we do not think of Lewis' work as public, it is probably because of our shriveled definition of "public" that equates "public" with the "political," and further equates the political with the governmental. Lewis was a public man. For even the most reclusive author, to publish is to go public. The recluse or the "idiot" publishes what is *private*, which is a form of exhibitionism. Lewis frequently published what is *personal*, always in the expectation that it would engage the like experience of other persons who are, broadly speaking, the public. Lewis wrote in the service of public conversation. Throughout his writings, one detects between the lines the inquiry posed to his readers, "Is it not true? Do you not find it to be so?"

His effort was to engage, inform, and elevate what is today called "public discourse," although I doubt he ever used the term. He was, I think, inclined to assume that his experience was the common experience. In this sense, although he cherished excellence, he was not an elitist. Anything but. One might even risk calling him a populist. Whether it was "mere" Christianity or "mere" sex or the "mere" companionship of friends, his purpose was to elicit what is already there, if only we would open our eyes to see it—the wonder disguised in the "mere." In this he was at one with Chesterton, who declared that the only sin is to call a green leaf gray. Epiphanies did not await the occurrence of something extraordinary or out of the way. They are to be discovered in the ordinary, and ordinary people are capable of that discovery.

To elicit what is already there, and bring it to fuller and finer expression. I was recently reading Edward Norman's magnificent history of Christian architecture, *The House of God*, and came across this: "The other religions of the ancient world had incorporated some sense of God's presence but it remained latent and descriptive. Christ came among men with a simple ministry of teaching whose main purpose was to confirm that the kinds of ways in which God had been understood in Natural religion, and the very language used to express those insights, were broadly right. Yet he came also—and this was the unique gift of Revealed religion—to redeem men and the world which was their home. . . . Hence the Incarnation. God literally became a man in order that the human categories of spirituality could be recognized as truly divine, and not the mere invention of a frightened race seeking some means of converting a miserable and ephemeral existence into a dignified and permanent purchase upon the existence of the universe." I expect Lewis would approve of that way of putting the matter.

Far from being private and idiosyncratic, Lewis' métier was the public, as in universal. He was in the fullest and finest sense a humanist. He was a Christian humanist, to be sure, but he could say with the pre-Christian Terence, "I am a man: nothing human is alien to me." Being a *Christian* humanist was in no way a limiting factor. Quite the opposite is the case, if Christ is the Logos who informs, sustains, and fulfills all that is. Lewis frequently used "humanism" and "humanitarian" as pejoratives, but only because in common usage those terms reflected smug liberal prejudices that were not nearly humanistic enough. For Lewis, the great fact is that God became a human being, and you cannot get more humanistic than that.

In discussions of the universally human, the universal is frequently pitted against the particular, but this was not the case with Lewis. This is underscored by Gilbert Meilaender, one of the most insightful readers of Lewis, in a recent essay, "The Everyday C. S. Lewis" (FT, August/September). He cites John in *The Pilgrim's Regress*, who has finally made his way back to Mother Church and sings:

> But Thou, Lord, surely knewest Thine own plan
> When the angelic indifferences with no bar
> Universally loved but Thou gav'st man
> The tether and pang of the particular.

"The tether and pang of the particular." Although it is not Meilaender's point, and perhaps not Lewis' point in the verse quoted, I would suggest that it is through this particular that we discern the universal. The experience of the particular is itself universal. The experience of the particular is the tether that ties us to the universal, even as there is the pang of its remaining particular, of its not being fully shared with others—at least for now. One day that sharing, that communion, will be consummated. With respect to the tether and pang of the particular, one detects again the implicit inquiry to the reader: "Is it not true? Do you not find it to be so?"

Meilaender notes that in his religious writings Lewis frequently drops the aside that he is not a theologian and that what he says is subject to correction by real theologians. Meilaender suggests that we should "recognize this for what it is: a smart rhetorical strategy that gets the reader on his side over against the presumably elitist theologians." He notes that, in fact, Lewis had read more theology than many theologians but, nonetheless, his writing is better described as "religious" than as "theological." Religious language, he notes, is closely related to poetic language, as distinct from both "ordinary" language and "scientific" language. I do not disagree with Meilaender on that, but there is a trap here that should be clearly marked.

Theology, at least in the great tradition, claims to

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be about truth. It makes cognitive claims about the way things really are. It is one of the great secularizing achievements of modernity to have created the category we call "religion." Questions about God, judgment, purpose, sin, and redemption are all put into a sandbox labeled "Religion," leaving the rest of the public square for the deliberation of questions dealing with "the real world." This is evident in our universities, where theology has long since been replaced by—at best, or perhaps at worst—"religious studies." For two hundred years, theologians retreating from the advance of scientific and philosophical debunkings have taken refuge in the sphere that modernity graciously set aside for religion as a subcategory of poetic expression. Lewis is sometimes viewed as joining that retreat, and there are elements of his work that can be cited in support of that view, but I think that was not his intention. On the contrary, he wanted to call a halt to the retreat. He wanted to persuade us that the religious, and particularly Christian, construal of reality is more encompassing, has more explanatory power, and is, in a word, true. While presenting himself as a religious thinker rather than a theologian, he was attempting to do the authentically public thing that many theologians had lost the nerve to do.

Alan Jacobs of Wheaton College is another close reader of Lewis, and he suggests that the Lewis project is of limited usefulness today ("The Second Coming of C. S. Lewis," FT, November 1994). "Lewis wrote in a time when, among the educated British public if not among their professional philosophers, there was considerably more agreement than there is now about what constitutes a valid and rational argument for a given case." He says Lewis might have paid more attention to Screwtape in the very first letter where Screwtape says that the time has passed in which "the humans still knew pretty well when a thing was proved and when it was not." Lewis' apologetic works, writes Jacobs, "presuppose, and rarely make any argument for, the criteria for rationality." Almost fifty years later, "deconstructionism" and "anti-foundationalism" have done their wasting work. Under the tutelage of today's academy, unbelievers are skeptical about the very notion of "evidence," and they chatter cleverly about "plausibility structures" and "paradigm shifts," leading them to offer the relativistic response to the most convincing of arguments, "That's great if it works for you." Or as it is said in England, "Right you are if you think you are."

In short, it is suggested that Lewis has no standing in the deconstructed public square. His arguments have no public purchase. It is not that the cleverly educated of today disagree with his arguments. On the contrary, they agree with his argument that modernity's methodological skepticism logically leads precisely to where he says it leads. Except the endpoint that he views as catastrophe they welcome with a frisson of nihilistic delight. Consider one of the most rhetorically admirable passages in the entirety of Lewis' work. It comes at the very end of *The Abolition of Man*:

> But you cannot go on "explaining away" forever: you will find that you have explained explanation itself away. You cannot go on "seeing through" things forever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or garden beyond it is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is no use trying to "see through" first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To "see through" all things is the same as not to see.

To which today's clever academic says with patronizing glee, "Exactly, old man. Except for your last line, for to see through all things is to see precisely what is to be seen, precisely what is there, which is to say—nothing!" It is hard to know how seriously we should take the fashionable nihilism of our time. In *The Closing of the American Mind*, Allan Bloom called it "debonair nihilism," which might be described as a flirtation with nothingness that has nothing as a consequence. Bright young things look over the edge into the abyss and gigglingly pronounce it to be "intriguing." It has been remarked that suicide is the most sincere form of self-criticism. With respect to the nihilism so enthusiastically embraced by today's herd of independent minds, one might take it more seriously if more of them leaped over the edge. Of course there are such as Michel Foucault who follow the lethal illogic to its end, but there are many times more who, like Richard Rorty, declare that "truth" (in quotation marks) is socially constructed "all the way down," yet go on living in pleasantly genteel irony, just as though the quotation marks were not there.

*That Hideous Strength* did anticipate, in somewhat apocalyptic terms, our present circumstance. "It was different now. Perhaps few or none of the people at Belbury knew what was happening; but once it happened, they would be like straw in fire. What should they find incredible, since they believed no longer in a rational universe? . . . The time was ripe. From the point of view which is accepted in Hell, the whole history of our Earth had led up to this moment." What could not have been anticipated is the way in which, unlike the earnest evil of the people at Belbury, the story from Hell has been embraced with such cavalier insouciance.

In today's intellectual climate, self-contradiction is deemed a small price to pay for liberation from the limits of reason. It is no surprise that Richard Rorty's

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heroes are—contradictorily, as one might expect—John Dewey and Walt Whitman. Rorty and his votaries respond with Whitman: "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself (I am large, I contain multitudes)." One might say that Lewis has addressed multitudes, but he did so one reasonable person at a time. I expect he would be somewhat at a loss—as are we all—when faced by postmodernist interlocutors quite unembarrassed by being caught in self-contradiction. To the most conclusive of knockdown arguments, they cheerfully respond, "Right you are if you think you are, Mr. Lewis."

The self-described "madness" of postmodernists who have domesticated Nietzsche to the comforts of the faculty lounge may be dismissed as being simply silly. But, as Richard Weaver understood, silly ideas, too, have consequences. Postmodernism may be a temporary aberration, but "temporary" may be a long time. It is an intellectual posture well suited to the well situated in a time of affluence and relative tranquility. In circumstances of personal crisis, we may be sure that the most ironic of Rorty's liberals will insist upon the most foundational of rationalities. Nobody wants a postmodernist surgeon in the operating room. Slight comfort can be derived, however, from such occasional reversions to sanity. No point is scored. The retort is ready at hand: "Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself."

As Dr. Johnson said of the prospect of being hanged, so some great social, or political, or military crisis might concentrate the minds of our intellectual elites, shocking them back into sanity. But hard-core postmodernists are, for the most part, securely ensconced in the academy, where the reality principle has long been suspended and real-world irruptions short of the cataclysmic cannot penetrate. In a circumstance of real social crisis, however, the irrationalists might be isolated and prevented from spreading the poison of debonair nihilism throughout the culture, as they do at present. But I expect that for the foreseeable future the indulgence of intellectual decadence will hold sway. At least we should be braced for that prospect.

Given this circumstance, what might C. S. Lewis do today? I rather hope that he would continue to do what he did so very well; that he would persistently, persuasively, and winsomely make his arguments, engaging people one by one with the questions, "Is it not true? Do you not find it to be so?" One keeps at this in the confidence that there is such an irrepressible thing as human nature, and people may at some point be shamed into not denying—maybe even admitting—the obvious. Or at some point they may be faced by a question of great personal consequence that requires a yes-or-no, true-or-false, answer. Or, best of all, they may weary of trashing their own dignity as creatures endowed with the divine gift of reason.

So I would hope that in the postmodern wilderness Lewis would keep on making his arguments, in the confidence that people can be brought to recognize that the rules of reason such as the law of noncontradiction are not the iron cage of outmoded rationalism but reason's royal road to discovering what is true. Like solipsism and related sophomoric indulgences, the hermeneutical skeptic's dalliance with nihilism soon becomes tiresome. "Yes, my dear," one is inclined to say, "we see you playing on the edge of the abyss. Now either jump or come away and let's get on with the conversation. It is really most annoying when you keep interrupting by announcing your discovery of nothing. Everything either is or is not nothing; and if it is, it is nothing. So, whatever you may say, you really cannot have discovered it."

In addition to making arguments, I expect that Lewis today would continue to tell stories. In fact I am certain he would, for it was central to his thought that discursive reason is inseparable from myth as a medium of truth. One recalls that decisive September evening in 1931 when J. R. R. Tolkien explained that "the story of Christ is simply a true myth: a myth working on us in the same way as the others, but with this tremendous difference that it really happened: and one must be content to accept it in the same way." Of course, in today's postmodernist climate "stories" are very popular; you have your story and I have my story, and we both know that we are just making it up as we go along. Lewis knew no such thing. As he then insisted that discursive reason is inseparable from myth, he would today, I expect, insist even more emphatically that myth is inseparable from discursive reason.

Lewis' confidence in human nature, with its capacity for reason and susceptibility to myth, gave him a measure of patience with those who did not see the truth or saw it only dimly. It is a patience, premised upon confidence, that might well be emulated by admirers of Lewis who too much relish him in his courtroom style, when he smites the unbelieving opponent hip and thigh, delivering knockdown arguments with a forensic brilliance that leaves the audience breathless. It is true that Lewis could be wickedly clever with liberals who stripped the faith of its substantive truth claims while still thinking of themselves as Christians. But, unlike some of his admirers today, Lewis did not insist that such liberals should fish or cut bait. Rather, he encouraged them to hang around the Christian thing, so to speak, in the hope that it might edge them toward the truth in ways better than they could understand.

> A man who disbelieved the Christian story as fact but continually fed on it as myth would, perhaps, be more spiritually alive than one who assented and did not think much about it. The modernist—the extreme modernist, infidel in

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> all but name—need not be called a fool or hypocrite because he obstinately retains, even in the midst of his intellectual atheism, the language, rites, sacraments, and story of the Christians. The poor man may be clinging (with a wisdom he himself by no means understands) to that which is his life.

Myth and fact are inextricably entangled, and a person is not necessarily a more authentic Christian by being more firmly grasped by the one or the other: "For this is the marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our obedience, but also our wonder and delight, addressed to the savage, the child, and the poet in each one of us no less than to the moralist, the scholar, and the philosopher."

I should say that in public conversation today I do not think the word "myth" is usable, and it was probably less than helpful fifty years ago. Outside the circles of literary criticism, "myth" connotes falsehood. Speaking of a "true myth" may catch attention, but it is also misleading for most people, suggesting that the truth in the myth is something less than *really* true. The word "story" is better. Despite postmodernism's story-telling games, people more readily recognize that stories can be true or false. But I expect the still better word is "narrative." I may have a difference with Lewis here (one day, God willing, we will find out), but I wonder whether his relentless effort to open people to the truth-disclosing genre of myth did not, because of the connotations surrounding the word "myth," obscure the truth he most wanted to be disclosed. In some contemporary writings inspired by Lewis, the reader may get the impression that the fact of Bethlehem and the myth of Narnia, the fact of Christ and the myth of Aslan, are, at the end of the day, pretty much the same thing. Of course they are the same thing in part, but in much more important part they are not. I quickly add that Lewis should not be held accountable for all that is done by writers who claim his inspiration.

I should also say that Lewis anticipated some of the concerns addressed here. Somewhere he says that imagination is the organ of meaning and reason is the organ of truth. At least according to some interpreters, after the encounter with Elizabeth Anscombe at the Oxford Socratic Club he lost confidence in reason and turned to imagination and myth. I expect it is more accurate to say that he came to more clearly recognize the interdependence of reason and imagination. He did ponder the difference between story and myth in the exercise of imagination. My modest suggestion is that, in today's intellectual culture, there is near insurmountable resistance to proposing truth under the title of "myth." "Story" is better, and "narrative" is better still.

In what might be called his two-pronged apologetic, Lewis employed argument and story, discursive reason and narrative, to powerful effect. In the public square of today and tomorrow, that strategy meets with even greater obstacles than it did in Lewis' time. I have already discussed the concerted attack upon reasonable argument. In that department, Lewis could take much more for granted than we can today. But there is also an attack upon story, or perhaps it is less an attack than a trivializing of story. The story of postmodernism is the story of how, in Robert Jenson's fine phrase, "the world lost its story" ("How the World Lost Its Story," FT, October 1993). All too briefly, and in broad strokes, I will say what I think that means. The late Hans Frei of Yale persuasively contended that the modern world's typical way of understanding human life was through "realistic narrative." A realistic narrative is, as Aristotle taught, a sequence of events that, in retrospect, "had" to happen or could happen in the real world. The realistic narrative of the West—and the West has been the driving force of world-historical change for almost a millennium—was the story that the Bible tells, the story of God with His creatures, from creation, through the election of Abraham, the coming of the Messiah, and the eschatological promise of the Feast of the Lamb.

As is now generally acknowledged, modernity fed off that realistic narrative for a long time. The myth of historical progress and ideological schemes such as Marxism were secularized riffs on the biblical story. But the story-line could not be sustained without its Author and Chief Protagonist, namely, the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus. What we today call postmodernism is the long-delayed general dissemination of what, in the earlier part of this century, appeared in the arts under the title of "modernism." Surrealism, dadaism, the writings of James Joyce and, later, Samuel Beckett—all proclaimed a world that has lost its story, and, along with its story, its coherence, purpose, and promise. We no longer live in what might be called a "narratable world" (Jenson). Of course Lewis was aware of "modernism" in the arts, but it was then on the edges of the public square, presenting itself as the avant-garde. Today, under the title of "postmodernism," it bids fair to take over the public square in its entirety.

Postmodernism dissolves the controlling master story or meta-narrative into disconnected fragments, just as modernist painting, sculpture, and fiction exulted in turning art forms into formless fragments. In the absence of the meta-narrative, other narratives are crippled in their capacity to disclose truth. Consider allegory, for instance. To speak figuratively is to assume a knowledge of that which is figured. The word "allegory" is from the Greek *allos*, meaning other, and *agorein*, to speak publicly in the *agora*, meaning the public square. Lewis assumed, and reasonably so, that his allegories would resonate in a

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public square over which and around which hovered the meta-narrative of the biblical story. He wrote allegorically in the expectation that at least the thoughtful reader would "get it." That cannot be assumed today, and even less will we be able to assume it tomorrow. The modern world, now become the postmodern world, has lost its story.

Postmodernists are incapable of allegory because allegory requires a known story to which it is "other." With debonair desperation they multiply the telling of stories, making them up as they go along, in the hope of finding one with which, as it is said, they are "comfortable"—at least for the time being, until they feel the need for another that will, as it is said, meet their needs. The resulting cacophony in the public square is called multiculturalism. In such a world, Lewis' talk about a "true" story strikes many as quaint. "Right you are if you think you are, Mr. Lewis."

So what are we to do—we who are convinced that we know the Realistic Narrative that, in the words of Dante, moves the sun and all the other stars, the narrative of God's love with His creatures? We cannot, we must not, withdraw from the public square. I suggest that we firmly reject the counsel of those who say that we live in a post-Christian age and should prepare ourselves for a return to the catacombs. If the Narrative is true, if Christ is Lord, it follows that no age can be post-Christian. We might better say that our world is not post-Christian but proto-Christian, awaiting, whether it realizes it or not, the story by which it might, as though for the first time, know itself. Were I writing another article, I would go on to explain why the community that bears the story of the world must itself more clearly exemplify that story. The story must be told by the life of the Church, and by the Eucharist which is the source and summit of the life of the Church, and therefore of the world. Lewis had relatively little to say about liturgy and the ecclesial dimension of Christian faith. I expect he might sense the urgency of saying more today. Church and Eucharist are the story of the world, the *axis mundi*, the center of all that is, the recapitulation of all that ever has been, the anticipation of the promised Feast of the Lamb. The Church must more manifestly *be* what in fact she is, the story of the world. But, as I say, that is the subject of another article.

For the moment, and in answer to the question, What are we to do?, I suggest that we should also do what C. S. Lewis did so very well. As Christian humanists in the public square, we should persist in making the very best arguments that we can. Not in order to score points, but in order to elicit the capacity for critical thought—being confident, as Lewis was confident, that human beings are hard-wired for reason in search of truth. And we should tell better stories that winsomely, even seductively, reintroduce the Great Story; being confident, as Lewis was confident, that the pagans then and now, in the fine phrase of Edward Norman, got it "broadly right." We must help them to tell their story, for, whether they know it or not, their story is the story of God's ways with His creatures, the story of salvation.

In the freedom and confidence that come from knowing and being known by the Truth, we join the everyday C. S. Lewis in the public square—patiently and imaginatively engaging our interlocutors, one by one, and asking, "Is it not true? Do you not find it to be so?" As Lewis well understood, a salutary touch of polemic is in order from time to time—to catch the listener's attention or to clear the air of cant. But the Christian humanist knows that, at its heart, the conversation with the world is a love affair; to elicit what is already there and bring it to fuller and finer expression in what is, finally and simply and wondrously, the truth. FT

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# Should the Church Repent?

*Avery Dulles*

In his 1994 apostolic letter "On The Coming of the Third Millennium," Pope John Paul II said that while the great jubilee of the year 2000 is to be a time of joyful celebration, the joy should be based on forgiveness and reconciliation. It is therefore appropriate that the Church should prepare herself by recalling the sinfulness of her children. The Church, he said, cannot cross the threshold of the new millennium without encouraging them to repent and purify themselves of past errors and instances of infidelity, inconsistency, and slowness to act. He went on to speak of sins against Christian unity and of intolerance and violence in the service of truth. Turning to failures of our day, he asked Catholics to consider how much they had allowed themselves to be infected by the prevailing climate of secularism and relativism, thus contributing to the current crisis of obedience in the Church. He also called for an appraisal of the reception and implementation of the Second Vatican Council.

The Pope gathered up his thoughts on the theme most comprehensively in an unsigned twenty-three-page memorandum sent to the cardinals in the spring of 1994, in preparation for the consistory that met later in that year. This memorandum—which may well have been written by the Pope himself—was never published, but it was studied by all the cardinals and has been summarized and quoted in various places. It proposed "an attentive examination of the history of the second millennium in order to acknowledge the errors committed by its members and, in a certain sense, in the name of the Church." "The Church," it says, "should be aware with ever greater clarity of how much the faithful have proven to be unfaithful throughout the centuries, sinning against Christ and his gospel."

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The idea of acknowledging the faults of members of the Church, and especially of persons acting in the name of the Church, has been with John Paul II ever since his election to the papacy in the fall of 1978. Early in his pontificate he established a committee to reassess the condemnation of Galileo. This committee in 1984 reported its findings to the effect that Galileo's judges committed an "objective error" in rejecting a theory that later proved to be sound. The memorandum of 1994, after alluding to this retraction, went on to speak of other cases in which the autonomy of the sciences might have been infringed. In addition, it declared, violence and undue pressure have been inflicted in the service of faith by the Inquisition, by religious wars, and by disregard of the rights of the human person. In his opening address at the consistory John Paul II expressed his intention in the following strong words:

> With the approach of this Great Jubilee the Church needs a *metanoia*, that is, a discernment of the historical faults and failures of her members in responding to the demands of the gospel. Only the courageous admission of the faults and omissions of which Christians are judged to be guilty in some degree, and also the generous intention to make amends, with God's help, can provide an efficacious initiative for the new evangelization and make the path to unity easier.

As a result of the Pope's initiative an immense program for the coming jubilee has been put in place. The first international meeting of the Central Committee for the Great Jubilee was held at the Vatican in February 1996, with 107 delegates from national conferences of bishops and Catholic Eastern churches, and six additional delegates from sister churches. Of the eight commissions for the jubilee the one most directly concerned with the theme of repentance and



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conversion is the historico-theological commission, which is divided into the two sections suggested by its name. The historical section has chosen to concentrate for the present on anti-Semitism and the Inquisition, leaving other questions for later study.

The historical section convened an international symposium on "The Roots of Anti-Judaism in the Christian Milieu," which met at the Gregorian University in the fall of 1997. The purpose of this symposium was not to make a final declaration but to study the facts and present them to the Pope. A month earlier the Gregorian University had hosted an international symposium on the theological aftermath of Auschwitz. Shortly after these two symposia the Holy See's Commission on Religious Relations with the Jews released on March 16, 1998 its document "We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah." This document expressed deep sorrow and repentance for the sins and failures of Christians during that terrible crisis.

A similar symposium is planned on the theme of the Inquisition, or more correctly, the Inquisitions. The committee will have to face the delicate problem of evaluating the morality of judicial procedures that measured up, it would seem, to the standards of their day but failed to protect the rights of the accused and the freedom of consciences according to the standards of our own time.

In a third phase the Church's official self-examination will focus on the reception of Vatican II, especially the major thrust of its four great constitutions. Many other themes, besides, could figure in the Church's examination of conscience. Last year the Italian journalist Luigi Accattoli published *When a Pope Asks Forgiveness,* a book collecting no less than ninety-four statements of John Paul II expressing sorrow or repentance for corporate sins in which Christians and Catholics have been implicated. In addition to anti-Semitism and the Inquisition, this book deals with topics as diverse as the Crusades, dictatorships, divisions among Christians, discrimination against women, religious and secular wars, coercion of consciences, colonial oppression, black and Indian slavery, the Mafia, the genocide in Rwanda, and resistance to new scientific discoveries (Galileo, Darwin, and others). The Pope's statements on these points are quite diverse in character, as might be expected because of differences in the Church's relationship to each of these issues. It would be too much to say that in each case the Pope has pronounced a *mea culpa* on behalf of the Church.

Among the steps to be taken the Pope generally proposes one or more of the following: beseeching God's forgiveness, asking forgiveness from others who have been injured, extending forgiveness to them for any harm they may have inflicted on Catholics, a firm purpose of amendment regarding the future, and what the Pope calls the "purification" or "healing" of memories, which would be hoped for as the result of all the preceding.

The Pope's proposals for repentance raise some very difficult theological questions that are being debated by experts all over the world. At the consistory of 1994 many cardinals are said to have expressed misgivings. Shortly after the consistory Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, Archbishop of Bologna, detailed his reservations in a book, *Christus Hodie,* published in 1995. In this country Professor Mary Ann Glendon of Harvard Law School has voiced some misgivings ("Contrition in the Age of Spin Control," FT, November 1997), and in England the journalist-historian Paul Johnson has expressed his dismay that the Pope is taking part in what Johnson describes as the charade of bogus apologies. On the basis of these and other comments I should like to discuss under seven headings some common objections and some possible replies.

1. The Church, some contend, cannot repent, for it is always holy. According to Cardinal Biffi, the Church, considered in the very truth of its being, has no sins, because it is Christ's Mystical Body. We belong to the "total Christ" insofar as we are holy, not insofar as we lack holiness. Our sins are, so to speak, "ontologically extra-ecclesial," since they place us in opposition to the very nature of the Church.

The distinction between the Church as holy and its members as sinful has a long and venerable history. Biffi is able to quote from St. Ambrose the sentence: "The Church is wounded not in itself but in us" ("*Non in se sed in nobis Ecclesia vulneratur*"). Pius XII in his encyclical on the Mystical Body of Christ maintained that the Church is holy in her sacraments, her deposit of faith, her divinely given constitution, and the gifts and graces by which the Holy Spirit continues to work in her. "It cannot be laid to her charge," he concluded, "if some members fall weak or wounded." The Second Vatican Council, following Pius XII, carefully avoided speaking of the Church itself as sinful or as committing sins. The great ecclesiologist Charles Journet, in an article on the ecclesiology of Vatican II, pointed out that while from a purely empirical point of view the Church may appear to be sinful, the eye of faith is able to discern that the Church in its theological reality as Body of Christ is sinless, albeit not without sinners.

Some theologians respond to Cardinal Biffi's position by contesting the distinction he is making. Joseph Komonchak, for example, contends that the distinction implies that the Church as sacrament of Christ is some vague transcendent reality, far off in the empyrean. But this charge is unfair, since Journet and Biffi are talking about the Church here on earth. They prefer to define it in terms of its formal principles and in terms of what its members are at their best and are called to become. But the Church may also be described more concretely and empiri-

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cally as it actually exists in history, with its admixture of good and evil, saints and sinners. Although these two perspectives on the Church are different, neither can be called wrong.

Theologians of both groups can acknowledge that while sin is present in the Church, the Church is not related in the same way to holiness and sin. It exists most perfectly in Mary and the saints, who live according to the inner law of its being and exemplify its true nature. They are most receptive to the Church's faith and sacraments, and to the guidance of the Holy Spirit, who has been poured forth upon it. Members of the Church who fall into sin and error are less intimately united with the Church. Serious sin, indeed, erects a barrier between the sinner and the Church and may even in some cases result in excommunication. By obtaining absolution from their sins the members become reconciled and reunited not only with God but also with the Church.

John Paul II's proposal does not require the attribution of sin to the Church. He seems, indeed, to concede what Cardinal Biffi asserts about the holiness of the Church. In the documents we are considering he takes pains to avoid saying that the Church itself has sinned. Although he has at least once spoken of the Church as "holy and sinful," the Pope's normal practice is to attribute sin more precisely to the "members" or "children" of the Church. In addressing the symposium at the Gregorian University on the roots of anti-Judaism in November 1997, he spoke of prejudices and erroneous views in the "Christian world" and explicitly declared that he was not ascribing them to the Church as such.

Even so, however, sin exists within the Church. Affected as they are by the secular culture of their day and by the weight of their own fallen humanity, the members resist the truth and goodness that the Church by its nature tends to instill in them. Whether they be Popes, bishops, priests, religious, or laity, they can be unfaithful not only individually but also corporately, and even sometimes when claiming to act in the name of the Church. The Church is injured and contaminated by their conduct. Vatican II could therefore declare that the Church, "embracing sinners in her bosom, is at the same time holy and always in need of being purified, and incessantly pursues the path of penance and renewal." It does collective penance in seasons such as Lent. A corporate examination of conscience is therefore very much in order.

2. A second objection is that contrition on the part of the Church involves the concept of collective guilt, which is theoretically questionable and practically dangerous. According to the general teaching of Catholic theologians, sin in the proper sense of the word is always the choice of an individual, personal will, and therefore cannot be imputed to the Church or any other collective subject. In the words of John Paul II, "There is nothing so personal and untransferable in each individual as merit for virtue or responsibility for sin."

The concept of collective guilt has been responsible for great evils in history, such as blaming the Jews as a people for the crucifixion of Jesus. Vatican II, attempting to overcome this misunderstanding, declared that the sufferings of Jesus could not be charged against all the Jews living at that time, still less against the Jews of today. Ed Koch, former mayor of New York City, recently wrote: "Blaming Christians for the Holocaust would be as unjustified as holding Jews accountable for the death of Jesus. Individuals were responsible in both situations." Thus it must be asked: Is the Pope reintroducing the unfortunate concept of collective guilt?

As a first approach to an answer we may perhaps turn to the Bible. In certain texts God is apparently portrayed as punishing the whole people for the sins of a few. As David Klinghoffer noted in these pages ("Anti-Semitism Without Anti-Semites," April): "God views the People Israel as an eternal community, not just as disconnected individuals. We are all responsible for all. . . . Maybe to emphasize our interconnectedness, the Lord does not practice precision bombing." In the later books of the Old Testament, however, the prophets insist that the Israelites of their day are not being punished for sins they did not themselves commit. Jeremiah declares: "Each one shall die for his own sin" (Jeremiah 31:30). Ezekiel says still more explicitly: "The son shall not suffer for the iniquity of the father, nor the father suffer for the iniquity of the son; the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon himself, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon himself" (Ezekiel 18:20).

In our eagerness to avoid the concept of collective guilt, we should be on guard against exaggerated individualism. Every sin has social ramifications. It lowers the moral level of the society to which the sinner belongs. In so doing it contributes to structural evils that afflict society at every level: families, neighborhoods, and nations. These "social sins," as John Paul II teaches, are the result of the accumulation of many personal sins. We are all inclined to accept, support, and even exploit the structural evils of the society to which we belong. To a greater or lesser degree we are implicated in the materialism, consumerism, and prejudices of our culture and in its violent and discriminatory tendencies. Sins such as anti-Semitism have been more than merely individual aberrations.

Evils committed by Christians, especially if they are frequent or habitual and are done in the name of the Church, are very damaging to the Church's mission. Vatican II in its Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World notes that believers, "to the extent that they neglect their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are deficient in their religious, moral, or social life, . . . must be said

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to conceal, rather than reveal, the authentic features of God and religion." The Decree on Ecumenism says that as a result of the failure of Catholics to live by the revealed truth and the sacraments, "the radiance of the Church's face shines less brightly in the eyes of our separated brethren and of the world at large, and the growth of God's kingdom is retarded."

To regret the past and to ask pardon is not necessarily to judge oneself guilty. It is sufficient that we stand in some kind of solidarity with those who have done wrong. Thus parents can ask forgiveness for the misbehavior of their children, or children for that of their parents, and even be ashamed of it, without feeling culpable for that misconduct.

In the case of the Church we must recognize not only our moral solidarity with other members but also what may be called mystical solidarity. As fellow members of the one Body of Christ, we are bound together in a single organic whole. We benefit from one another's merits and suffer from one another's faults. As Paul writes in 1 Corinthians 12:26-27: "If one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it." More than any merely social or political group, the Church retains its identity through time. Richard John Neuhaus has eloquently written ("Apologies on the Cheap," FT, April): "In the Church, the dead are not dead; in Christ we live in communion with all who are in Christ—past, present, and future. We are implicated in the weakness of sinners as, happily, we are implicated in the holiness of the saints."

3. Penitence for offenses committed long ago involves a further difficulty. We are in no position to judge the culpability of persons who lived in past centuries and in cultures foreign to our own. In the words of Paul Johnson, "There is something repellent, as well as profoundly unhistorical, about judging the past by the standards and prejudices of another age." When we attempt such judgments, he says, we place ourselves in a position of moral superiority, and thus our expression of repentance is really a disguised manifestation of pride.

In responding to this difficulty we may follow the general line taken by the papal theologian, Georges Cottier, O.P. It is true, he says, that we cannot judge the subjective guilt of our predecessors centuries ago. But without pretending that we are morally superior, we can judge that they made certain mistakes. Their moral failures may have been extenuated or excused by their good faith. Nevertheless it is still proper for us, their successors, to express sorrow for the objective wrongness of what they did. Without judging the subjective guilt of our forebears we can say that some of their actions were objectively wrong and deserve to be disavowed.

4. Regardless of whether the evil actions were committed in our own or in another culture, say the objectors, it is artificial and insincere to apologize for the misdeeds of other persons. Paul Johnson says that the modern fashion of public breast-beating has not one iota of genuine sincerity in it. These "bogus apologies" in his judgment are "disguised attempts to gain moral kudos at the expense" of others. Regrettably, he remarks, even the Pope seems to be taking part in this charade.

Such apologies are very much in vogue among the politicians of our day. Mayor Rudolph Guiliani has recently apologized to the Jewish community of Crown Heights in Brooklyn for the failure of the city administration under Mayor David Dinkins to have prevented riots against them in 1991, and some blacks are asking him to apologize for the injuries they suffered in the same incident. President Clinton has come close to apologizing for the involvement of Americans in the slave trade. To whom are such apologies due? How far back in time should one go? Should the mayor of Milan, asks Cardinal Biffi, make amends for the misdeeds of the Sforzas in the fifteenth century? Or should the Spaniards apologize to the English for the Great Armada, to use one of Johnson's examples?

In reply it must be said in the first place that apologies to other people are not the true intent of the Pope's proposal. Declarations of repentance are quite another matter, since repentance is directed primarily to God, from whom forgiveness must ultimately come. Repentance would seem to be singularly appropriate for the Church as a people uniquely called to holiness. Commenting on the "Declaration of Repentance" issued late last year by a group of French bishops, Jean Duchesne observes ("Letter from Paris," FT, February) that, because of misleading stories in the press, the Declaration was "interpreted as a purely human business, where God virtually need not have been mentioned, [with the result] that the fundamentally religious and spiritual substance has too often been overlooked."

When we repent for corporate misdeeds, we acknowledge that we are not morally superior but are in some way implicated. Jesus indicated that the Pharisees of his day were guilty of the same faults as those who persecuted the prophets (Matthew 23:29-33). In a similar way, we would do well to acknowledge that we are tempted to adopt the ecclesiastical narrowness and pride that have afflicted some Christians. Unless we disavow such attitudes explicitly, we can hardly avoid succumbing to them.

By concentrating on religious repentance it is possible to circumvent the complex problems involved in apologies. The further we go back in time, the more questionable apologies become. If the Inquisition violated the human rights of certain defendants, repentance may be in order even though we cannot identify any living person who could receive our apology or grant forgiveness. But if the offended par-

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ties still exist, there is nothing to prevent the Church from apologizing to them, making amends, and asking their forgiveness.

5. Cardinal Biffi and others object further that in calling for ecclesiastical penance, the faithful, especially those who are young or less educated, will be scandalized and confused. They might draw the conclusion that the Church is not holy and is not a reliable guide.

In reply it should be mentioned in the first place that the Pope is not proposing confessions of doctrinal error, but only confessions of failure to act according to the Church's standards of belief and conduct. The proposal does not call into question the holiness of the Church or the reliability of its message. But the Church has always admitted that its members, whether ordained or lay, commit sins and practical blunders. Every Christian, even though he be a priest, a bishop, or a Pope, daily says the prayer "Forgive us our sins as we forgive those who sin against us."

While some Catholics are perhaps scandalized by admissions of fault, others are scandalized by the refusal to admit such faults. They reproach their fellow Catholics for what they see as their tendency to justify everything that has been done by their coreligionists, especially by persons purporting to act in the name of the Church. The repentance proposed by the Pope can perhaps remove this source of scandal.

6. Others object that admissions of fault on the part of the Church would play into the hands of the Church's enemies. At the consistory of 1994 some bishops from Eastern Europe are said to have remonstrated that the proposed declarations of contrition would support the charges made by atheistic communism to the effect the Church has consistently impeded human progress. Mary Ann Glendon warns of the danger that "sincere expressions of regret" on the part of Catholics may be "opportunistically exploited by persons or groups who are only too eager to help the Church rend her garments and to heap more ashes on the heads of Catholics." "Let us be vigilant," she writes, "to prevent [our public acts of repentance] from being hijacked or exploited."

Thus far, in the statements dealing with matters such as the Galileo case and the Holocaust, Church officials have been careful to guard against exaggerations. In the case of the Holy See's statement on the Holocaust, some were dissatisfied because it did not condemn the alleged failure of Pius XII to speak out with sufficient clarity on the subject. For some critics of the Church, as Professor Glendon says, "no apology will ever be enough until Catholics apologize themselves into nonexistence."

Our aim cannot be to appease the implacable foes of the Church, who will complain no matter what is done. But the fear that they will take advantage of our repentance should not deter us from doing what is morally required of us. While hostile critics will be dissatisfied, many persons of good will will be appreciative.

7. Finally it is asked, what purposes would be achieved by such acts of repentance? Since there is no way of undoing the past, would it not be better to let bygones be bygones rather than dredge up painful memories? From a study of the documents I believe it is possible to distinguish a variety of benefits.

First, there is the purely religious goal of conversion and reconciliation with God. There can be no holiness without conversion and no conversion without acknowledgement of an unworthy and sinful past. In becoming aware that we belong to a community that has frequently failed its divine Lord, and in so doing failed other human groups, we are delivered from unwholesome pride. Relieved of the compulsion to defend the whole record of the past, we are less inclined to make scapegoats out of others. Freed from unrealistic perfectionism, we can turn humbly to God with the realization that His forgiving love is the only true source of our security.

In the second place, corporate penance has an ecumenical goal. Since the faults of Catholics have unquestionably contributed to Christian divisions, repentance may facilitate the path to reunion. In his encyclical on ecumenism, John Paul II speaks of the need to overcome our clannish exclusiveness, our reluctance to forgive, our pride, our presumptuous disdain, and our unevangelical proclivity to condemn the other side. By repentance and mutual forgiveness Christians of different ecclesial bodies can heal the smoldering resentments that derive from actions committed centuries ago, such as the mutual condemnations of Rome and Constantinople, the sack of Constantinople, the martyrdoms of the Reformation period, and the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.

Thirdly, the proposed action would facilitate the new evangelization for which John Paul II has repeatedly called. Evangelization is not a matter of self-promotion on the part of the Church's members. Far from seeking to persuade the world of their own perfection, Christians acknowledge that they are at best unprofitable servants. Like Paul, they proclaim not themselves but Christ and him crucified, to the glory of God most high. If any of us are inclined to boast, let us imitate Paul by boasting of our weakness so that the power of Christ may dwell in us (cf. 2 Corinthians 12:9). We do not ask others to join a flawless community but to enter into a vast company of sinners who find redemption and forgiveness in Christ. He, the treasure of the Church and the light of the world, deigns to speak and act in us and to incorporate us, unworthy though we be, in his body here below, his holy Church.

As the Church purifies herself from sin and the effects of sin, she grows into deeper union with her di-

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vine Lord and advances toward her heavenly goal, where Christ and the saints now dwell in glory. By putting off the encumbrances of worldly attachments, the Church makes herself ever more transparent to the Lord. The kingdom of God, already present in mystery, is obscured by tepidity and infidelity but is made powerfully present by penance and renewal. The program of contrition and reconciliation initiated by John Paul II is therefore charged with hope and promise. Faithfully carried out, it could usher in at the turn of the millennium a new springtime of Christian witness. FT

## The Illustrated Gospel

Ada, now, likes the Holy
Innocents. I have had to explain
*slaughter*, which she understands

vaguely as it applies to pigs.
In Giotto's fresco, the Innocents
appear as a heap of white

bodies, scattered like hair
just cut, linear blood
spurting tidily from their necks.

It's horrifying. It looks
planned, the whole thing.
The flat soldiers, starched

into their armor, seem too
appropriately unmoved by all the mothers'
boneless arms which are not raised,

but float up—gravity
has not been invented, I explain—
as if the body's mourning were a separate

thing from the will's. I try
to turn the page, to where the Holy
Donkey flies the family into Egypt.

Look how it turns out, I want to say.
She wants the children God wanted
to die, the truth, the street full of tears.

**Sally Thomas**

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# Books In Review

## What Is Man?

**THE CITY OF MAN.** By PIERRE MANENT. Translated by Marc A. LePain. With a Foreword by Jean Bethke Elshtain. *Princeton University Press. 225 pp. $24.95.*

**MODERN LIBERTY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PIERRE MANENT.** Edited and translated by DANIEL J. MAHONEY and PAUL SEATON. *Rowman and Littlefield. 239 pp. $22.95 paper.*

***Reviewed by*** **Russell Hittinger**

"TO LOVE DEMOCRACY WELL, it is necessary to love it moderately." So concludes Pierre Manent in his book *Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy* (1982). But, Manent points out, it is not easy to love democracy moderately. As Tocqueville reported, the democratic revolution separated "modern" man from his predecessor across an historical abyss like two different species of animals in the realm of nature; it fabricated a social world at once flimsy and inexorable, arrogantly triumphant and at the same time devoid of grandeur. How can this rupture, which inspired in Tocqueville himself a kind of "religious dread," be loved moderately?

In his new book, *The City of Man*, Manent sets out once again to understand this problem. He does not directly investigate the institutions of political liberty, but rather democratic man himself, "the sovereign acknowledged by history, the true King of kings and everyone's good friend." To the question *Quid sit homo?*—"What is man?"—Manent answers that the epithet "modern" is something more than an expression of poetical, self-congratulatory sentiment. As he tells the story, there is indeed a *modern* man who is not reducible to his predecessors. "[N]either Christian nor Greek, he is that third man full of force who despairs of the good but not of himself." If here Manent fails to provide a satisfactory answer to his own question of how we can love democracy or democratic man moderately, he nonetheless provides a brilliant description of the "modern difference."

Born in 1949, Pierre Manent came of age intellectually during the turmoil of the Fifth Republic, which culminated in the attempt by the New Left in May 1968 to bring down the government. United in a dogmatic rejection of liberal society, this amalgam of leftist movements and ideologies was, like Marx, convinced that bourgeois civilization had hollowed out "the contents of life." (Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* [1973] would end this conceit.) In the wake of the student revolt, Manent converted to Catholicism. He then became a student of and eventually an assistant to Raymond Aron, from whom he learned a different reading of the liberal tradition, especially in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. For a time, Manent was an editor of the neoconservative journal *Commentaire*. A teacher at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris since 1992, Manent is perhaps the brightest light in a new generation of French intellectuals who think through the history and implications of liberalism without Marxist blinders. He is perhaps best known to American readers for *An Intellectual History of Liberalism*, which appeared in France in 1987 and was published in English in 1994 by Princeton University Press in its series entitled "New French Thought." This year has seen the publication not only of *The City of Man* in that same series, but also of a collection of Manent's essays, entitled *Modern Liberty and Its Discontents*.

In the volume of collected essays, Manent characterizes himself as having "camped for the past twenty years" at the outermost boundary of Tocqueville's work. Tocqueville, although he described the "modern difference" more clearly than anyone, did not concern himself with its genesis. He masterfully described the depth of the revolution and its future direction, but he told us little about how it was prepared intellectually, making it seem to arise *de novo*. For the past twenty years, Manent has tried to piece together the history unexamined by his master.

In *The City of Man*, Manent holds that European moral life was organized and animated by a dialogue ("fraught with conflict") between Greek and Roman civic morality on the one hand and Mosaic precepts and Christian evangelical counsels on the other. We can call the first "the party of nature," which looked to the ancient city and its account of man to provide reasons for the common good. Emphasizing pagan pride, or the virtue of magnanimity, the party of nature held that a fully finalized human form is the common measure of both individual and social flourishing. "The party of grace," by contrast, emphasized the influx of a new "form" in the soul—grace—and the constitution of a new community in the Church. Not by magnanimity but by humility and obedience is man made capable of sacrificial self-renunciation for the common good. Pope Gregory the Great, for example, asserted in the *Moralium*: "Obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another's body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will." For Manent, the tension between these two visions of the human good and their respective virtues is the key to the dynamism of European civilization. The solidarity of the two "parties" is exemplified intellectually in the Thomistic "synthesis," and socially in the chivalric or aristocratic order (which Tocqueville contrasted with the new man born in the revolution).

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OVER CENTURIES these two spiritual forces "turned on one another like two grindstones." Each of the protagonists tried to strip the other of its legitimacy; to each, the "sacrifices the other calls for are vain." Manent contends that the modern "difference" is to be traced to the exhaustion of the dialogue between magnanimity and humility. The "modern" comes into being by rejecting that dialogue *tout court*, for the modern does not see it as a dialogue but as a cultural war in which each party makes impossibly high demands. Modern man's escape from the war was to declare neither side the winner and to take flight into history, which in the modern imagination fixes an unbridgeable gulf between two humanities. The two humanities are no longer intertwined by nature or revelation, but separated by history, "the mother and sum of all successions." Manent observes that modern man thus "feels very sincerely and very modestly superior to all things which are either law or nature and above all else to the humanities that came before him."

The rejection is not without a certain duplicity, which is also characteristic of modern man. In the face of the Church's demands for ascetical sacrifice and holiness, modern man learned to argue the side of nature. As J. S. Mill asserted, "pagan self-assertion" is a good thing. But modern man yearned to be something more than a merely natural man, and thus he also learned to argue the side of grace against nature—not of course supernatural grace, but the lesser grace of pure freedom, which became for modern man a perpetually novel "form" born in each man's soul. Manent wryly remarks, "A theologian might say that in its long wrestling match with grace, liberty came out too strong for nature."

By rejecting the demands of nature and grace, modern man discovers himself as something prior to and more fundamental than either citizen or Christian. Hence we have the new myth of the "state of nature," told with so many ingenious variations from Hobbes to Rawls, in which man is depicted in his aboriginal condition, under neither Caesar or Pope. Thus depicted, man is measured by neither a natural nor supernatural pattern of perfection that would justify either of those traditional authorities. What is left? Man in his two pure endowments—animality and liberty. From his animality the modern philosophers will produce the new sciences of man, not in the classical terms of substance and form, but rather in terms of a machine whose signal trait is self-preservation. From his liberty the modern philosophers will celebrate the creation or, rather, the self-creation of values. In the place of the tension between nature and grace, the modern city of man is organized around the tension of animality and liberty. The first renders magnanimity the vanity of vanities, while the second renders holiness superfluous.

*THE CITY OF MAN* is organized into two parts. The first part studies the modern sciences of man—historical, sociological, and economic—which seek to provide an accounting of man in terms of his common denominators of animality and liberty. Manent focuses upon Montesquieu, but also draws in John Locke, Adam Smith, and Max Weber. The main question is how there can be any authentic science of man, given the fact that modern man understands himself as being simultaneously both lower and higher than his predecessor understood himself to be. Considering man only in his animality ignores his specific difference, making it impossible to answer with any confidence the traditional question, *Quid sit homo?* On the other hand, self-constructing liberty leads to diversity without principle, a plurality without a common nature. In the second part of the book, Manent argues that what makes man "modern" is his belief in the unknowability of his own nature. This epistemic deficit, as it were, creates a space in which a human order can be constructed, "where man can affirm himself without knowing himself, where he can be free." A learned ignorance of his own nature is the modern *felix culpa.*

Manent narrates this story in a Tocquevillean mood of amazement and dread. The reader is never allowed the comfort of quite knowing whether Manent is criticizing or merely describing modernity. Some readers, further, might find themselves disappointed by the fact that although the title of the book is taken from Augustine, we learn surprisingly little about the Catholic and medieval pattern that stands in contrast to the secular cities of the ancients and moderns. Manent acknowledges his debt to Leo Strauss, but by refusing to make the ancient city the main term of contrast to the modern, Manent's historical thesis is quite different than Strauss'. Instead he puts the Catholic city at the center, in contrast to both the pagan city which knew not grace and the modern city which rejected it. Until he gives us a clearer picture of that Catholic city and the intervening millennium of thought, we may wish to reserve judgment about the radical novelty of the modern project. At the end of *The City of Man*, Manent promises to consider "the science of Rome" in a future work.

Perhaps the main problem with *The City of Man* is that Manent tells the story from the perspective of the intellectual founding fathers of modernity. Not surprisingly it is, in the main, an unedifying tale. Unlike his master Tocqueville, Manent does not treat particular political institutions or the lived experience within those institutions. Without that level of concreteness, we can see no countervailing force to the disappearance of man. How can we love democracy moderately if, on Manent's account, democratic man is the most immoderate of creatures, who protests that he cannot be evaluated according to any given notion of man? In his earlier book on Tocqueville, Manent warned that

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there is indeed another side to the story. "The democratic convention, in itself, strictly abstract and therefore, in a sense, strictly inhumane, is continually humanized, in democratic societies, by the compromises that it must make with the necessities of social life, the moral contents inherited from pre-democratic epochs, and finally with the irrepressible spontaneity of human nature."

FOR THE OTHER SIDE of the story, it is necessary to read the collection of Manent's essays, *Modern Liberty and Its Discontents*, edited with a useful introduction by Daniel J. Mahoney. These essays include brief portraits of the thought of Aron, Strauss, Nietzsche, Allan Bloom, Aurel Kolnai, and even a brief intellectual autobiography. There are also essays on religion, totalitarianism, nationalism, and the difference between European and American understandings of liberalism and conservatism. In these essays Manent distinguishes more clearly between the political and philosophical resources of modern democracy. Of special interest is the essay "Christianity and Democracy," where Manent tries to understand how the Catholic Church came to celebrate the right of religious liberty. With remarkable subtlety and precision, he traces the history of the Church's movement from one-sided indignation to celebration of the first of all the rights of democratic man. He also notes many different ironies and traps that emerge once the Church finally submits to the reign of democracy.

He proposes, however, that the rapprochement is "fortunate" for the Church. An essential trait of democratic man is to leave indeterminate any answer, certainly any official answer, to the question *Quid sit homo?* To the question "Who is man?" the moderns answer in a tautology: Man is he who has rights. "Today's Church, or its most astute representatives," Manent suggests, "makes known with a benevolence tinged with irony the import of this lack of self-knowledge." By default, the most important question has been left to the Church to answer. Whereas in early modernity the Church enjoyed political authority but dialectical disadvantage against the questions of the *philosophes*, it is now left with political submission but dialectical advantage. In this curious position, the Church can learn to love democracy moderately. For it can now see democratic man not as a self-assured rival to the Church but rather see him in the poverty of his own self-creation, unable to answer, or even ask, the central question. Manent concludes, "No one knows what will happen when democracy and the Church become aware of this reversal."



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# Onward, Christian Soldiers?

**DOES CHRISTIANITY CAUSE WAR?** By DAVID MARTIN. *Oxford University Press. 226 pp. $56.*

***Reviewed by***
**James Turner Johnson**

THE QUESTION POSED by the title of this book is a simple one, which, on the face of it, fits squarely within the debate over the relation of religion to politics and to conflict that has emerged at the end of the twentieth century. One reason for this debate is that some of the most violent and seemingly intractable contemporary conflicts (Northern Ireland, the Middle East, Bosnia, Sri Lanka) have taken place across lines of religious difference and have often been fed, in more or less direct ways, by appeals to religious warrant or identity. Another factor has been the explicit appeal to religion in the formation of anti-Western revolutionary nationalistic ideologies, classically exemplified by Iran. More broadly, concern has grown over the role of religion in the shaping of civilizations and in the fomenting of hostility between and among different civilizations, not least because of Samuel P. Huntington's argument that such conflict is systemic and likely inevitable.

Anyone familiar with the contours of recent discussion of the role of religion regarding politics and conflict will be both gratified and frustrated by the present book. David Martin, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Honorary Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Lancaster, frames the book as a response to the statement of British zoologist Richard Dawkins that "religion causes wars by generating certainty." The certainty in question is that of ideological commitment, which is held to generate intolerance

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON *is Professor of Religion at Rutgers University.*


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and militancy toward persons informed by rival, often equally certain, commitments. Put this way, Dawkins' position is a play upon Chesterton's characterization of tolerance as a virtue of people who do not believe in anything. Belief leads to intolerance and ultimately to conflict. More generally, Dawkins' position is a version of Enlightenment-induced suspicion towards religion. Perpetual peace will come about only by transcending specific religious differences in the name of a higher rationality. Martin argues just the opposite: that most conflicts empirically have little or nothing to do with religion as such, and that religion rightly construed in relation to society and the individual itself tends to contribute to peace, not war. These major lines of argument are what is gratifying about the book; the frustration occurs in the ways the arguments are made.

First, why choose Dawkins as a foil? The issues treated are much larger than the specific arguments posed against Dawkins (who is, moreover, described so minimally as to be little more than a straw man). Nor is the claim attributed to him—that religion as such causes wars—addressed except indirectly by Martin, whose interest is whether *Christianity* causes wars. This is no small question, but it does not meet the thrust of Dawkins' assertion or the assumptions about all forms of religion that can be read through it. So Dawkins as a foil does not, in the event, turn out to be useful. Indeed, after being brought out at the beginning he waits off stage for most of the book. When he reappears, after long neglect, in order to face final refutation in the concluding sentences of the last chapter, it is a distraction, not a culmination of Martin's overall argument.

WHAT IS THE book really about? Martin advances an argument on two levels. On one level, he distinguishes Christianity's role as a cultural marker from its role as a causative factor in several contemporary and historical conflicts. He notes that the cases reflect different circumstances, and that any conflict has a diversity of causes of which Christian religion could be, at most, one: "War conducted solely for religious reasons is a relative rarity." The examples are apt and illuminating, and much of the thrust of the argument is simple common sense against antireligious dogmatism. But Martin says more. He makes pointed use of sociological distinctions, noticing that in modern societies religion usually "is separated off in a distinct sphere" from politics; as a result, such societies do not fight wars about religion as such.

Martin also recognizes, though, that even in modern societies religion can be made to function as a vehicle for social integration and


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identity. This is bad when it occurs. His examples are French Catholic *intégrisme*, Islamic agitation in Algeria, and the role of Orthodoxy in Serbia. In such cases religion becomes undifferentiated with respect to national identity and political action. Religion functions as a marker of identity that overlaps other markers, such as ethnicity or language. When it functions in such a way religion can be an element in fomenting and sustaining conflict. This is the function of Serbian Orthodoxy and Croatian Catholicism in the former Yugoslavia. But, Martin argues, conflicts involving such undifferentiated religion are not in fact conflicts about religion. "Nobody need suppose that the razing of Catholic churches in Krajina from 1991 to 1995 had anything whatsoever to do with a disagreement over the filioque clause in the Creed or something labeled by Richard Dawkins as religious 'certainty.'"

THIS LINE OF ARGUMENT IS, to my mind, deeply problematic. First, even when discussing Christianity, the phenomenon of religion cannot be captured in specific credal beliefs alone. In both differentiated and undifferentiated societies religion has to do with much more: institutional connections, patterns of social interaction, moral behavior, and, yes, personal and national identity. Second, the differentiated-undifferentiated distinction as classically employed in the sociology of religion is a way of describing the functioning of religion in different sorts of societies. On this usage, if undifferentiated societies fight wars, religion is in fact involved in those wars precisely as a marker of societal identity, whether specific references to beliefs are invoked or not. So Martin skews the issue by his critical use of a differentiated concept of religion to analyze a conflict that involves religion functioning undifferentiatedly.

The reason Martin makes this rather questionable move, I believe, has to do with what he wants to say on his second level of argument. He identifies the "original salience" of Christianity with the "peace code," and links together differentiated religion, voluntary associational patterns of religion, and "peace and reconciliation." Voluntarism in religion, Martin argues, functions as a means of overcoming differences, not aggravating them, while establishment religion may do just the opposite. Drawing on his scholarly research on evangelical and Pentecostal Christian movements in Latin America, he places them alongside voluntary religion in Britain and the United States as examples of what he argues to be a more general phenomenon: that such forms of Christianity employ the core biblical narratives more




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centrally than others and are deeply pacifistic in their relation to the larger national culture. The upshot is that the argument that Christianity causes war has the matter exactly backwards. Where Christianity is highly differentiated and pluralistic in relation to the public sphere, as it is in voluntary forms of Christian religion, the contribution of religion "has been almost entirely directed to peaceful reconciliation internally and peace in foreign affairs."

THIS SECOND LINE of argument also embodies serious problems. The idea that voluntary forms of Christian religion are somehow closer to the original Christian meaning than are established churches cuts far too many corners, blurs far too many important distinctions, engages in too much special pleading, and ignores far too much history to be persuasive. Were the Anabaptists of the Zurich hinterland really closer to the true meaning of Christianity than Zwingli and the (established) Reformed Church of Zurich? Were the various monastic reform movements of the Middle Ages really closer to the "original salience" of Christianity than the meaning preserved in the mainline Catholic Church? Why privilege contemporary evangelical and Pentecostal religious bodies as somehow closer than "church" types of religious organization to the original meaning of Christianity? Indeed, what exactly is that meaning, and is it as pacifistic as Martin argues? Contemporary study of the early Christian movement presents a very different, much more diverse and complicated picture of it than that summarized by Martin in this book. Further, what of contrary examples offered by militant fundamentalist religious bodies that are nonetheless voluntary forms of religious association?

The good common sense of this book's argument against the Enlightenment-induced idea that religion causes war is, in the end, not overcome by the problems noted. But one must be careful to take the book's insights along with a supply of critical salt, and be forewarned as to the author's own conceptions of the nature of Christian religion at its best.

## The Decline of Marriage

**FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION.** By JOHN WITTE, JR. *Westminster/John Knox. 315 pp. $24.*

***Reviewed by*** **Romanus Cessario**

AS ITS PRINCIPAL objective, this ninth volume in the series "The Family, Religion, and Culture" aims to illuminate the transformation of the institution of marriage in the West


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

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since the sixteenth century. Drawing mainly from Protestant authors of the early modern period, John Witte, Jr. discusses "the interplay among law, theology, and marriage in the West." The selected and annotated texts detail the status of marriage in various religious and secular traditions after the sixteenth-century Reformation, and are presented in such a fashion that the reader can come to terms "with the cardinal religious sources and dimensions of the modern Western marriage law on the books." No one aware of the present state of marriage can pick up and start to read a book like this without soon harboring the suspicion that something central to marriage has disappeared over the past several hundred years.

ROMANUS CESSARIO *is Professor of Systematic Theology at St. John's Seminary in Brighton, Massachusetts.*

The bulk of this scholarly volume treats the distinctive and different ways that the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican traditions adapted what the author identifies as the medieval model; the Catholic tradition, with its insistence that marriage constitutes a true sacrament of the new dispensation, thus serves as something of a foil for the book's extended argument. Though Witte does not state explicitly that his methodology is shaped by the Protestant principle, he nonetheless proceeds on the assumption that historical Christianity passed over, at least in the West, into the ecclesial communions that developed out of the Reformation.

The author identifies three ways of conceiving of marriage that emerge in the theological tenets, political structures, and legal systems of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism. The presentation supposes that it is theological views that at least trigger developments in the other areas, which is understandable in a book that proposes a theological reading, not a sociological analysis, of developments in marriage customs. What do we learn? In short, arguments for a particular construal of Christian justification influence and shape views about marriage among Christian believers.

MARTIN LUTHER initiates the iconoclastic change. Lutheran two kingdoms doctrine squarely relegated marriage to "an estate of the earthly kingdom . . . subject to the prince, not the Pope." This removal of marriage from its status as an icon of the union of Christ and the Church resulted in some dramatic contrasts, for "to place marriage in the natural order of creation was to deny it a place in the spiritual order of re-

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demption." Marriage remains, in Luther's own words, "a secular and outward thing." An alien justification does not touch the mating act. Jurists not clerics will adjudicate the difficult questions concerning marriage practice. It is perhaps not without some significance that the Wittenberg jurist Hieronymous Schürpf served as best man at Luther's own wedding to the former nun Katherine von Bora.

At the beginning of his reforming career, John Calvin adopted as his own this standard Protestant view of marriage, but later he was able to develop a more sophisticated analogy for marriage. He applied his own theory about justification as establishing a covenant of grace to the marriage union, and argued that "God draws a husband and wife into a covenant relationship with each other." Calvin enjoined a strict code of marital morality and mores, and so added a spiritual dimension to marriage in the earthly kingdom. The spiritual realities of marriage, however, called for safekeeping by the civil authorities. Witte writes, "Marriage required the coercive power of the state to preserve its integrity. But it also required the spiritual counsel of the church to demonstrate its necessity." He reminds us that the Geneva Council, a political body, enjoyed the authority to punish infractions of sexual morality among both the married and the unmarried.

It is more difficult within the Anglican communion to identify a single figure to whom credit is owed for the development of marriage laws. The peculiar circumstances of the English Reformation account in part for the gradual way in which marriage evolved. Even the celebrated divorce of King Henry VIII did not keep the English ecclesiastical law of marriage in the late sixteenth century from looking very much like the Catholic canon law of marriage of a century or two before. By the seventeenth century, however, the Anglican divines had begun to develop a theology of marriage to replace the sacramental model of marriage that the Thirty-Nine Articles clearly denied. These theologians "regarded the interlocking commonwealths of state, church, and family as something of an earthly form of heavenly government." The commonwealth model of marriage held wide appeal among a diverse spectrum of English theologians, and served as the starting point for the liberalizing reforms later urged by authors as different as John Milton and John Locke.

THE FINAL CHAPTER examines the presuppositions of the Enlightenment, with John Stuart Mill serving as the spokesman and prophet for the "contractarian gospel." Witte argues that this predominantly secular view of marriage provid-



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Assuming that *America* would stereotype us as "hard-boiled" and taking *America* at its word, we at the NEW OXFORD REVIEW, a frisky orthodox Catholic monthly magazine, placed a satirical ad in *America* headlined "Does St. Bozo's Parish No Longer Amuse You?" Three weeks after our ad appeared, *America* printed a letter accusing us of being "very callous" (uh, *hard-boiled*, dude) and of favoring "thought-control" (like *censorship*, man). In reply, *America* offered its "sincerest apologies" to its humor-impaired readers for running the ad, said the ad wouldn't have run had it not been for a "mix-up" in its competence-impaired office, and solemnly affirmed that the ad was "offensive," the Great Sacrilege in today's dumbed-down culture. And, striking a mighty blow against censorship, *America* banned all our "offensive" ads. Ah, you didn't know the liberal Jesuits maintain an Index of Forbidden Ads, did you?

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ed the theoretical justification for the present-day transformation of Anglo-American marriage law. In the end, the author believes that the Enlightenment thinkers developed a "theological" model, even though he completes this exhaustive study by citing a grim text from one of Nietzsche's "Letters" that sounds anything but theological: "'The family will be slowly ground into a random collection of individuals,' haphazardly bound together 'in the common pursuit of selfish ends.'" All in all, the book makes fascinating reading, and should be studied by those who want to discover more about the present configurations of marriage among Christians of all denominations.

Though he devotes the first chapter to "Marriage as Sacrament in the Roman Catholic Tradition," Witte's analysis concentrates principally on the medieval centuries and concludes with some brief remarks on the marriage legislation of the Council of Trent in 1563. This means that some important pages are missing from the Catholic history of marriage. For example, during the Catholic Reform that took shape from the mid-sixteenth century, the Catholic Church helped the institution of marriage and family by committing enormous resources to the work of education and child care. One thinks not only of the personnel that the Jesuits and other religious institutes devoted to teaching young men but also of the teaching congregations of religious women, such as the Ursulines, who educated young women in virtue and learning. Furthermore, it is impossible to understand the Church's teaching about the sacramentality of marriage without some reference to the modern papal Magisterium that begins with Leo XIII and continues under John Paul II, whose instruction on marriage and family remains one of the outstanding features of his pontificate.

Of course, it is never fair to criticize an author for the book that he did not write, but the omission of a contemporary presentation of the sacramental model accounts in my judgment for the somewhat skewed presentation that Witte gives of the Catholic theology of marriage.

One good example of this skewing is the way he interprets Aquinas' discussion of the question whether matrimony still remains "sub praecepto." The author seems unaware that Aquinas never wrote a section on marriage for the *Summa Theologiae*, citing texts from the *Supplementum*, an editor's scissors and paste assemblage of texts from Aquinas' earlier *Sentence Commentary* as if they had been composed for the *Summa*. In any event, in the text under consideration Aquinas is arguing for the licitness of celibate spousal love, not for the thesis that marriage constitutes a great obstacle to virtue. The misrepresentation becomes all the more apparent in light of Aquinas' unequivocal affirmation elsewhere that the marriage act, provided that it meet the requisite conditions established by right reason, embodies an action that is both virtuous and meritorious.

A MORE SERIOUS slight to the Catholic view of marriage is Witte's equation of canonically permitted separation with the practice of divorce. When the Church asserts that spouses "cannot be separated sacramentally as long as they both live, provided they are married legitimately," she is proclaiming a truth about the marriage bond that she believes comes from the Lord himself. Michael Smith Foster in *Annulment: The Wedding That Was . . .: How the Church Can Declare a Marriage Null* (Paulist, 1998) provides a careful explanation of how the Church abides by this norm even to the present day.

The liturgical prayers presently used in the Catholic wedding ceremony capture the Catholic doctrine on marriage: *"Father, to reveal the plan of your love, you made the union of husband and wife an image of the covenant between you and your people. In the fulfillment of this sacrament, the marriage of Christian man and woman is a sign of the marriage between Christ and*

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

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*the Church.*" Unfortunately, the present volume can easily leave one with the impression that the movement from sacrament to contract represents a progression of marriage theory from shadow to light. When one considers the present state of marriage in the West that the author describes in the final pages of his text, there is ample reason to ask whether a renewal of the sacramental view of marriage is not long overdue in Western Christianity.

## Is the Left Good for the Jews?

**JEWS AGAINST PREJUDICE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE FIGHT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES.** By STUART SVONKIN. *Columbia University Press. 364 pp. $32.50.*

***Reviewed by* Edward S. Shapiro**

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR of American Jews has long been puzzling to political scientists, historians, and sociologists. Where the laws of political sociology posit an inverse relation between high economic and social status and support of left-of-center political candidates, it would appear that Jews are an exception. Contrary to the experience of other ethnic groups such as the Irish and Italians, the ascent of Jews up the economic and social ladder has not been accompanied by a political move to the right. As Milton Himmelfarb noted some three decades ago, Jews earn money like Episcopalian but vote like Puerto Ricans.

Himmelfarb believed that the romance of American Jews with the left was becoming increasingly counterproductive to Jewish interests; scholars and political commentators for the past thirty years have been predicting an imminent transformation of Jewish political behavior. As yet, however, voting statistics have given little comfort to Republican operatives salivating over the prospects of a mass conversion of Jews and their checkbooks to the party of Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott. In the last two presidential elections, less than 20 percent of Jews voted for the GOP candidate. The same pattern is true regarding voting for Congress. Not only have Jews voted overwhelmingly for Democratic, and particularly liberal Democratic, candidates for Congress, but they have personally identified with the Democratic Party through financial contributions and political participation. Of the ten Jewish United States Senators, only Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania is a Republican. The rest, including Barbara Boxer of California, Paul Wellstone of Minnesota, Ron Wyden of Oregon, and Carl Levin of Michigan, are members of the dwindling liberal bloc in the Senate. The same is true of the nearly thirty Jewish members of the House of Representatives. Not surprisingly, the only Socialist in Congress, Rep. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, is a Jew.

For nearly a century the political liberalism of American Jews contained economic and social elements. During the past two decades, however, the Jewish support for economic liberalism has waned as the benefits of a free market and the deleterious effect of social and economic engineering have become obvious. On the other hand, their support for cultural liberalism has intensified at the same time.

STUART SVONKIN'S incisive and well-researched examination of American Jewish political attitudes after World War II, a reworking of his 1995 Columbia Universi-

EDWARD S. SHAPIRO *is Professor of History at Seton Hall University and author of* A Time for Healing: American Jewry Since World War II *(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).*

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ty dissertation, helps explain why Jews have been so sensitive to violations of civil liberties and so distrustful of the abuse of private and public power. Part of the answer is that American Jews, despite their remarkable social and economic ascent prior to the Great Depression, continued to see themselves as victims threatened by malevolent forces, whether these emanated from town hall, the military, the White House, or the corporate boardroom. As a result, they identified their interests with other oppressed groups such as blacks, the working class, and the falsely accused. Jews also reflexively feared political and economic power as inimical to Jewish interests. When the rabbi in *Fiddler on the Roof* is asked by one of his congregants to say a prayer for the Czar, he is momentarily nonplussed by the request to bless such a notorious anti-Semite. He quickly recovers, however, and prays, "May God bless and keep the Czar . . . far away from us!"

The Holocaust deepened this psychological insecurity and put Jews on the alert for any threat to their civil rights and to the civil rights of others. Despite all evidence to the contrary, American Jews believed that what occurred in Europe could happen here. Recalling that opposition to Jewish emancipation and equality in the nineteenth century had been led by conservative forces, including the Church and the military, they believed National Socialism and fascism to have been right-wing movements. Little wonder then that Jews argued, and have continued to argue to this day, that Jewish interests and values require that they identify with the left and distrust those in power.

*Jews Against Prejudice* chronicles the activities of the three major national Jewish "defense" organizations—the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the American Jewish Congress. After World War II, they refocused their work from the defense of purely Jewish interests to a broader assault on all forms of prejudice. They now argued that anti-Semitism was not unique but part of a broad phenomenon involving bigotry and authoritarianism, and that the fate of America's Jews was inextricably tied to that of other minority groups, particularly blacks. Just as America had emerged victorious from the war as a result of the contributions of all ethnic, racial, and religious groups, so the war against prejudice could not be won in isolation. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, president of the AJ Congress, told the United States Congress in 1947 that his organization considered "ethnic discrimination, whether directed against Jews, Negroes, Chinese, Mexicans, or any other group, as a single and indivisible problem and as one of the most urgent problems of democratic society."

EACH OF THE defense organizations had a different approach to what was then called "human relations," "intergroup relations," or "community relations." The AJ Committee subsidized research on the sources of racism and anti-Semitism; the ADL publicized acts of discrimination, kept records on anti-Semitic and racist individuals and organizations, and provided material combating prejudice to educators and the media; the AJ Congress focused on direct legal and political action to attack discrimination. These three organizations, Svonkin writes, "made vital contributions to the advancement of political liberalism and civil rights, to the development of strategies for combating prejudice and discrimination, and to the formulation of an ethnic identity for an American Jewish community increasingly distant from its immigrant roots." For many Jews, the essence of American Jewish identity became the liberalism espoused by the AJ Committee, the ADL, and the AJ Congress.

Ironically, the postwar Jewish campaign against discrimination, which was rooted in the Jews' perception of themselves as outsiders and victims, transformed them into major players in American poli-

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tics. In describing their work, the defense organizations now used the term "community relations" rather than "Jewish defense," reflecting their belief that their mission was broader than merely furthering Jewish interests. By the early 1960s, however, the universalistic liberalism that underlay this attack on all forms of prejudice was itself being questioned—Jews were becoming increasingly concerned with narrower ethnic concerns such as Israel's security and the status of Jews in the inner city. The honeymoon between Jews and blacks was effectively over by 1970, and conflicts between the two groups over employment in municipal bureaucracies and community control over local schools took center stage. If the Jewish buzzwords of the 1940s and 1950s were "survival" and "equality," their counterparts in the 1970s and 1980s were "identity" and "continuity."

Svonkin wants to do more than tell the story of the postwar Jewish assault on prejudice. Three chapters detail the response of the defense organizations and American Jews generally to the challenge of domestic communism. The "liberal anticommunism" of the AJ Committee and the ADL led them to try to purge Communists from the American Jewish community. Svonkin believes that, except for the AJ Congress, the Jewish community had become "increasingly acculturated and middle-class [and therefore] rejected political solutions that required significant changes in the socioeconomic order." While the American Jewish Congress made much of the social and economic factors at the root of prejudice, the other groups focused on the less revolutionary psychological factors. To Svonkin's regret, the pressures of the Cold War convinced Jewish community relations organizations that "problems of prejudice and discrimination could be solved within the context of existing political and economic relations." The AJ Congress, says Svonkin, took a more principled stand. Equally opposed to communism, it was more concerned than the other organizations with the abuse of the civil liberties of accused Communists and with the use that right-wing elements were making of the Communist issue.

CONTRA SVONKIN, it is quite reasonable that the AJ Committee and the ADL did not want to become involved in a quixotic crusade to change the political, social, and economic institutions of a society that was becoming noticeably friendlier to Jews and other minorities. The postwar years saw a dramatic decline in anti-Semitic and racist attitudes and actions, and this happened without unduly disturbing the economic and political status quo. The openness and pluralism of American society, as well as the rewards which the economy offered to those exhibiting initiative and entrepreneurship, encouraged rather than impeded the social and economic mobility of Jews, blacks, and Hispanics.

Svonkin's attempt to be politically correct as defined on Morningside Heights is rather ahistorical. Jews had good reasons, apart from the fear of right-wing reprisals, for wishing to eliminate Communists from their ranks. Despite what his American apologists claimed, Stalin had made it clear by the early 1950s—through the murder of Russia's leading Jewish intellectuals, by talk of a Jewish "doctors' plot" against the Soviet Union, by opposition to the state of Israel, and by the repression of Jewish cultural and religious activities behind the Iron Curtain—that he was no friend of the Jews. To expect American Jews to be dispassionate about Jewish apologists for Stalin or to go out on a limb for the likes of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was to expect the impossible. The surprising thing is not that the Jewish establishment sought to eradicate all traces of Communist influence from its ranks, but that this was done with such concern for due process.

## Doing Theodicy

**CAN GOD BE TRUSTED? FAITH AND THE CHALLENGE OF EVIL.** By JOHN G. STACKHOUSE, JR. *Oxford University Press. 190 pp. $25.*

***Reviewed by*** **Jerry L. Walls**

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL is a perennially baffling intellectual puzzle that

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has generated countless monographs, articles, and anthologies. It would be a grave oversight to dismiss these debates as academic exercises far removed from the real concerns of life and faith, because, as John Stackhouse, Jr. indicates in his title, what is at stake religiously and existentially is whether or not God can be trusted. Suffering and senseless tragedy raise the possibility that faith in a good God is a profoundly misguided thing, ultimately to be mocked by the harsh realities of life.

Though philosophically informed, Stackhouse's project has a pastoral objective as well. He wants readers to engage these issues rationally before they have to face them emotionally. To accomplish this, he summarizes and reports on some of the best recent philosophical and theological literature on the problem of evil, stressing its practical implications. The first part of the book spells out the problems posed by evil in its various dimensions, while the second offers responses to these problems.

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The classic form of the problem as formulated by skeptics such as David Hume is that there is a tension, if not contradiction, in believing both that there is a God who is all powerful and perfectly good, and that there is evil. For if God is both omnipotent and perfectly benevolent, then it seems He both could and would eliminate evil. The effort to justify God in the face of evil is the great project of theodicy.

AS STACKHOUSE POINTS OUT, the problem takes different shapes in different religions and worldviews. In some of these, the problem, at least as classically construed, disappears. Some definitions of God, for instance, dissolve the logical problem by denying either His perfect goodness or supreme power. Certain modern philosophies refrain from making any claims about the way things ought to be, reducing both good and evil to little more than matters of personal preference.

Traditional theists, whether Jewish, Christian, or Muslim, cannot evade the problem so simply, however. Their strong claims about the nature of God, along with their belief that good and evil are not matters of mere subjective preference, give the problem its distinctively sharp edge. Ironically, the stronger the claims advanced about God, the sharper the problem becomes.

Stackhouse begins his responses to the various "problems of evil" by looking at such matters as the crucial role of the afterlife in the Christian account of evil, and at the whole question of whether evil can be a means towards the good. As Stackhouse recognizes, the latter is a deeply ambivalent matter—although evil can serve as a means to character growth and development, it often also leads to even worse evils. As he puts it: "Grief can remind one of ultimate questions, but it can also dispose the heart to listen to the worst possible answers."

Stackhouse asks whether this world, despite its numerous evils, might not be a good world after all. Clearly our world does not now embody shalom, the comprehensive wholeness in human relationships, both with God and with each other, that the great theistic religions affirm as the end for which the world was created. Just as clearly, we need to change before shalom could be realized. Although God created us to love Him and each other, we have chosen otherwise and have corrupted ourselves and our relationships.

Stackhouse explores this theme by summarizing one of the most celebrated pieces in contemporary philosophy of religion, namely, Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense. The heart of Plantinga's famous work is that it is possible, given free will, that God could not have created a world containing moral good but no moral evil. Plantinga has always been careful to stress that he was not proposing a theodicy, that is, an actual explanation of why God allows evil. His Defense has the more modest goal of showing that theism can be saved from the charge of internal contradiction advanced by those who maintain that a perfectly powerful and good God could surely create a world without evil.

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


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STACKHOUSE VENTURES BEYOND the relatively safe world of this defense by pushing the free will theme in the direction of theodicy. The result is a free will theodicy with an Irenaean or "soul making" twist. The Irenaean theodicy, named after the Church Father and recently popularized by John Hick, sees our world as an arena of "soul making," that is, a place where free but immature creatures can grow up into moral and spiritual maturity. As Stackhouse puts it: "A good world would be a kind of boot camp or training center—an obstacle course, and encounter group, and extended family, and pilgrim community all at once. It would challenge us every day, from every angle, to grow up—and would do so without allowing us to be so crushed by evil that we could not possibly complete the regimen."

All of this sets the stage for the heart of the book, a chapter entitled "The Fork in the Road." Recognizing that his arguments for a good God are far from conclusive, Stackhouse raises the question of whether there are "any more substantial grounds upon which to base one's faith." There are, he suggests, two options. The first is that God could provide us with a complete theodicy, that is, a detailed explanation of every evil we ever encounter. Stackhouse doubts whether our intellects could grasp such a theodicy—supposing God were disposed to give it to us—and he argues this point by way of a helpful discussion of the story of Job.

Nonetheless, Stackhouse says, if God calls us to trust Him, and such trust is not to be a matter of blind or arbitrary faith, it is necessary that God provide us "with some other intellectually satisfying grounds." This leads Stackhouse to a broad-ranging discussion of "sufficient warrant" for Christian belief. Noting that even Christian philosophers rarely discuss Jesus Christ and appear to reduce the theodicy debate to the generic alternatives of theism or atheism, Stackhouse wonders how this difficult problem "might be affected by bringing Jesus squarely into the picture."

Quite profoundly, it seems. For a start, this moves us immediately beyond generic theism into the rich and complex world of Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection. Stackhouse demonstrates this by sketching the Christian story of things from creation and fall to redemption and eschatology. He shows that Christianity provides a compelling picture of our world and human existence that can account plausibly for the origin and nature of evil and offer hope for its ultimate resolution and defeat. He argues that intimacy with Christ provides satisfactory answers to both the religious and existential dimensions of the problem of evil. For instance: "Yes, God can seem remote and impassive when we read about a tragedy in the newspaper or experience suffering ourselves—but can we imagine Jesus Christ not near and caring, not doing all he can and should to help, however mysterious that help might be to us? We can respond properly to evil in our lives because we know that God is all-good and all-powerful because we know Jesus."

At times Stackhouse's argument takes on an evangelistic tone. Thus he can say: "I don't want to give up Jesus. And I don't want you to miss him, either." Some may see this as inappropriate in a scholarly book, even one that aims at a more popular audience. I would argue, however, that such material is simply a matter of coming to grips with the truth claims that are the subject matter of the book. As Stackhouse observes, for example, anyone who wants to confront Christianity seriously must decide whether or not he believes the Resurrection actually occurred. Either way, enormous ramifications are involved.

THERE ARE A FEW criticisms worth noting. In the first place, Stackhouse appeals to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination to illustrate the point that sometimes believers must learn to trust in the face of mysteries they cannot understand. He does not commit himself to the doctrine and apparently does not believe it, given his view of free will, but he does see it as a useful example of the nature of religious trust. As he notes, both Calvin and Luther had difficulty with the doctrine that God unconditionally elected some but not others to salvation, yet both believed it because they were convinced Scripture taught it. The problem for trust in

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this case is that nothing can compensate for the unrelieved evil and misery of eternal damnation. There is always consolation amidst the evils of this life, no matter how severe, if one affirms an eternity that can bring healing and resolution. But if God himself unconditionally consigns persons to eternal misery—persons He could just as easily save—there is no conceivable way for such an evil to be rectified. To believe God could be good despite such unconditional election requires an act of blind faith, not a good model for the rational trust Stackhouse wants to commend.

Similarly, it is unclear how to square his claim that "evil can have no lasting place in God's creation" with his affirmation of the possibility of eternal damnation, which, as he concedes, entails "that some evil cannot be reclaimed, that some losses can never be recouped, that some evil remains just evil."

Also, Stackhouse overstates the case when he claims, in his discussion of the nature of faith, that we cannot know anything certainly. No doubt Cartesian certainty eludes us on most of our beliefs and much of what we know cannot be proven to everyone's satisfaction. But as Plantinga has argued at length, it does not follow that we cannot know many things and be reasonably assured of them.

FINALLY, STACKHOUSE'S careful avoidance of all masculine pronouns for God results in several notably inelegant passages. In any case, this is not simply a matter of style; it raises theological questions. Does Stackhouse believe we can depart from traditional language on this matter without significant loss? Might the traditional pronouns for God consistently employed in revelation involve more than patriarchal custom, even if we cannot be altogether sure what that is? Perhaps more humble trust in the given language of revelation would be appropriate at this point.

None of this detracts significantly from the value of this book. Stackhouse has succeeded admirably in producing a broadly accessible work that is religiously sensitive and offers for the reader a reasonable argument that it is rational to trust God even in the glaring face of evil.

## The Good Casuist

**THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS, VOL. 3: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS.** By GERMAIN GRISEZ. *Franciscan. 927 pp. $35.*

***Reviewed by* David Novak**

THIS MASSIVE BOOK is a collection of two hundred responses to personal inquiries about particular moral dilemmas written by one of the most important—and most controversial—Catholic moral theologians at work today. The *responsa* of Germain Grisez selected for presentation here cover virtually all areas of moral life of concern to contemporary Catholics and non-Catholics alike.

For Catholics, they present the point of view of a theologian of extraordinary learning in the tradition of the Church, a thinker whose even more extraordinary rational power makes compelling arguments for whatever position he takes in each respective case. Furthermore, it seems that John Paul II, especially in his encyclical on moral theology *Veritatis Splendor*, has indicated that he prefers Grisez's type of moral theology to that of his principal rival moral theologians, most notably Father Richard McCormick (whose advocacy of "proportionalism" has been the object of Grisez's sustained critique for many years now).

FOR NON-CATHOLIC CHRISTIANS, Grisez's work deals with moral questions that face any Christian and that cannot be avoided on the assumption that they are of real concern only to conservative Roman Catholics like Grisez's followers. For Jews like this reviewer, it is notable that Grisez's moral theology, being authentically Christian, is primarily rooted in the Hebrew Bible; that being the case, even the questions that pertain to specific Church issues of doctrine and ritual (as distinct from universal issues like abortion or euthanasia) have recognizable parallels in our own tradition. And, finally, for persons who are still convinced that morality is a matter of truth and thus not an arbitrary

DAVID NOVAK *holds the J. Richard and Dorothy Shiff Chair of Jewish Studies at the University of Toronto. He wrote his doctoral dissertation in philosophical ethics at Georgetown University under the mentorship of Germain Grisez.*

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construction, Grisez is one of the most important ethicists at work today, one who should not be ignored even by those unable to agree with some or most of what he has to say.

Since Grisez has already laid out the principles of his moral theology with architectonic precision in the first two volumes of this proposed four-volume series, one might suppose that readers—whether or not they agree with him on the level of principle—could assume that all his answers to specific questions in this volume are predictable from what he has already said. Reading his *responsa* would thus be like reading an article whose title and the name of whose author already give away its conclusion. But that is not the case, because Grisez is here attempting to use his principles to apply what he thinks *the Church* either teaches or could teach. Since he accepts the magisterial authority of the Church to be wholly true, he readily admits that what he has either ruled or advised in this volume could be wrong by the final authority of what he calls "the better judgment of the Catholic Church." In other words, he uses his own system of ethics to interpret the teaching of the Church, not to insist that the teaching of the Church conform to his own system. For this reason, his references to his own work are few and suggestive, whereas his references to the Catholic tradition are many and determinative. Moreover, he has to be a true "casuist" in these *responsa*, that is, he has to employ a variety of sources to come to his conclusion rather than simply subsuming the case at hand under one specific rule, itself part of a larger general category. That was the method of the old moral manuals, a method that after Vatican Council II, with its call for a renewal of moral theology, virtually all Catholic ethicists have explicitly eschewed.

Ultimately, anything Grisez advocates has to be appropriated by the consciences of those who choose to listen to him. Grisez is quite aware that he is walking a tightrope here between those who think the formation of conscience is a matter of individual responsibility alone and those who think that conscience should be formed by an authoritative application of what the Church teaches. To the first group, Grisez has an answer honed for years by his philosophical training and teaching: if morality is a matter of truth that can be articulated, it is thereby a matter of public discourse. That being so, people need guidance from others wiser than themselves in the formation of their consciences. To deny such guidance is to deny our status as social and moral beings, which we are simply insofar as we are discursive beings. (For Jews and Christians, even acts not directly involving other human persons still involve God, with whom we are involved in a covenanted community.) To miss this point is to fall into the error of "situationalism" (another object of sustained critique by Grisez over the years).

AT THE SAME TIME, Grisez is intent on avoiding "legalism," even though most of his more liberal Catholic critics (let alone most Protestant ethicists) often accuse him of it. Legalism would be an application of the moral teaching of the Church that primarily stresses its authority, appealing only to persons whose primary moral concern is being told by someone else what to do (what many philosophers have quite pejoratively called "heteronomy"). Here is where Grisez the philosopher steps in: "A sound alternative to legalism is to assume that people who ask moral questions are capable of moral reflection and judgment."

In the various *responsa* he delivers on this promise by leading his questioners in a process of moral reasoning. He tries to *persuade* them to accept a certain moral alternative by rational means, appealing to both universal and Christian truths, using criteria of coherence and sufficient evidence to make his points. This book is of special value to Catholics, who need to learn *what* their Church teaches and be persuaded by it whether or not they themselves are personally faced with any of the particular questions under discussion.

Since Grisez deals with two hundred difficult moral questions, it is impossible to do more than mention a few. There is, for example, the question raised by a couple whose teenage son has been sexually seduced by "Father Jack," their parish priest. They ask Grisez whether or not they should report this priest to the police. Here Grisez knows that he must carefully distinguish between the Church per se, which as a theologian faithful to her he regards as infallible, and the Church as a community of sinful human beings. Thus, with the usual courage of his convictions, he bluntly states, "The real problems presented and revealed by the conducts of priests like Father

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Jack have hardly been acknowledged by bishops, including yours, and . . . thus far they have developed no adequate policy or procedure for dealing with those problems."

Grisez's criticism of many of the bishops is that they have tended to treat the sexual misconduct of priests in their charge simply as a matter of psychological illness. Such priests are taken to be emotionally disturbed and must be regarded as objects of compassion, for whom therapy (with its supposition of confidentiality) is the appropriate response. Even though Grisez does not dispute the need for therapy, he rightly emphasizes that priests like Father Jack are capable of free choice and thus morally responsible for their crimes. And in the case at hand, the crime has had a victim, namely, the questioners' teenage son, "Frank." Grisez wisely notes that even if this priest's sexual behavior is psychologically compulsive, he was still "gravely responsible for failing to get the help he needed to forestall . . . betraying Frank's trust and abusing his body." What Grisez is also saying is that attempts of Church officials to deny the moral nature of this type of situation has been a source of scandal, leading both Catholics and non-Catholics to conclude that the Church, in effect, exempts priests from ordinary moral responsibility instead of holding them to Christian standards, which include and go beyond ordinary morality.

FINALLY, Grisez also courageously notes that Frank was not raped but seduced by Father Jack. Therefore, his own complicity (not having been a morally innocent child) in these illicit sexual acts must be dealt with. It is thus the task of his parents and a more responsible priest to enable Frank to repent and be spiritually healed. In our age of "victimology," this might sound cruel, but anyone who appreciates religious morality can see its authentically religious compassion. Indeed, Frank's psychological healing will be greatly aided by his being able to realize his own moral powers and come to see how their proper exercise can be strengthened by overcoming their improper exercise. Following the view of many psychologists today that emotional problems be seen in a larger interpersonal communal context, one can see Grisez's counsel as truly enabling Frank to be reintegrated into the Church as his primary communion. That reintegration is his experience of true forgiveness from God through the Church, something that can be given only to a morally responsible human person.

In these *responsa*, Grisez on the whole has been a good casuist, that is, he has directed his full attention to the moral case [*casus*] at hand and has avoided the temptation of the theorist to see a particular question as a mere illustration of a larger point. There are some lapses, however, especially regarding abortion, where Grisez's occasional hyperbole weakens his otherwise sound arguments. Although abortion is not just a "Catholic" issue (and, fortunately, there is now powerful Jewish, Protestant, and Orthodox opposition to it), it has become for conservative Catholics like Grisez *the* central moral issue. I don't dispute the gravity of the issue, even its centrality, living as we do in a "culture of death," as Pope John Paul II has memorably put it. Nevertheless, Grisez engages in overkill when, in responding to a question about pro-life political activity, he states that abortion is "in some ways comparable to those crimes [those of Hitler and Stalin] and in other ways even worse."

To be sure, the taking of innocent human life is horrendous wherever it occurs and whatever the number of victims involved. Yet there is an essential difference between a state like Nazi Germany or Communist Russia that engages in mass murder as positive, official policy, and a state like the United States or Canada that no longer extends the full protection of the law to all human life. It is essential to understand the different political meaning abortion as a type of killing has in constitutional democracies as opposed to the meaning of the killing that occurs in totalitarian regimes.

In a state where humans are arbitrarily killed as a matter of official policy, the communal sin of commission is so ghastly that one can definitely advocate either overthrowing or fleeing such a regime as soon as possible. In constitutional democracies that permit (but do not command) individuals to practice abortion, there is a lesser—though genuine—communal sin of omission. (As far as I know, only in China are women forced to undergo abortions as a matter of current state policy.) In democratic regimes, judicial and legislative means are still officially available to rectify the moral lack (hence some of the political successes, heretofore modest to be sure, of the pro-life movement). Furthermore, unlike Nazi Germany or Commu-

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nist Russia, where citizens were really prisoners of the state, those who judge a constitutional democracy incorrigibly corrupt always have the legal option of relocating, thus avoiding violent revolution with all its dangers, political and moral. The pro-life cause is not at all helped by even the hint that its advocates have something in common with various anarchist fanatics in our society who advocate violent revolution and often act accordingly.

I think Grisez is right to counsel the moral duty of everyone (and not just Catholics) to stop abortions, but I think he has given imprudent advice on the theoretical level by giving an incorrect reason. And that leads him to assume that the only reason for not killing abortionists is because of bad political consequences rather than bad political reasons per se, reasons which for a natural law theorist cannot be separated from morality. The reason it is wrong to kill an abortionist is because he or she has not been convicted through due process of law. Here it seems that we have an instance of Grisez's moral passion getting the better of his moral reason.

Fortunately, this is quite rare. In the book as a whole, Germain Grisez has once again shown how faith seeking understanding, when done by someone of great faith and great understanding, is the most impressive of all human efforts.

## BRIEFLY NOTED

**STARING INTO CHAOS: EXPLORATIONS IN THE DECLINE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION.** By B. G. BRANDER. *Spence. 418 pp. $29.95.*

This fin-de-siècle has seen much less talk about "decline" and "degeneration" than the last time around, probably because the idea of "organic" cultural decline is alien to the postmodern worldview. B. G. Brander, a former writer for *National Geographic* and sometime reporter for the World Vision global relief agency, has performed a useful service of recollection by providing this handy summary of the major "pessimist" philosophies of history of the last century or so. The intuition that the Western world had entered a new "Hellenistic" age was common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *Staring into Chaos* is chiefly concerned with Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, and Pitirim Sorokin, each of whom turned the analogy with classical times into a metahistorical grand opera. Mention of Spengler's *Decline of the West* still gives some people fits, but Brander notes it has been in print since the first volume appeared in 1918. Toynbee's *Study of History* was a major cultural phenomenon in its 1950s heyday, though it has not aged well. Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* is today the most obscure of the three. Maybe he broke the rules of metahistory by doing too much empirical research. All three predict some sort of spiritual revival for the next century. (In its later volumes, Toynbee's *Study* became in effect a theodicy of history.) Still, there are differences. For Toynbee and Sorokin, the religious revival can be the occasion of a new springtime, whereas for Spengler this "Second Religiousness" will be just another sign of senility. All three expect some sort of universal government, but Toynbee and Sorokin speak of the possibility of international cooperation, while Spengler will hear of nothing but the arbitrament of force. They all predicted an end to chaos; they differed on whether it will end by free will or compulsion.

— *John J. Reilly*

**THE ART OF THE IMPOSSIBLE: POLITICS AS MORALITY IN PRACTICE.** By VACLAV HAVEL. *Knopf. 273 pp. $24.*

In an age of spin it is refreshing to read the words of a national leader who in spite of numerous political difficulties and temptations remains a man of integrity. This is one reason why this collection of thirty-five speeches and essays written by Czech President Vaclav Havel between 1990 and 1996 is so welcome. In one typically forthright speech given in late 1991 Havel points an audience in Los Angeles to the environmental destruction wrought by the former Eastern Bloc's command economists and warns them "against all those who despise the mystery of Being, whether they be cynical businessmen with only the interests of their corporations at heart, or left-wing saviors high on cheap ideological utopias." To recognize and appreciate Havel's frankness is not to say that his thinking is always clear. On numerous occasions Havel claims that if the world's peoples wish to live in relative peace with one another they must look to that which transcends them. "The Declaration of Independence . . . states that the Creator

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gave man the right to liberty," he said in Philadelphia on July 4, 1994. "It seems that man can realize that liberty only if he does not forget the One who endowed him with it." What "the One" is in Havel's view—what he variously refers to as "the transcendent," the "Anthropic Cosmological Principle," the "Gaia Hypothesis," "a God," "the Creator," "Heaven above us," "Him who is omniscient," "the order of the Omniscient," and "the mystery of the world"—is obscure. Yet that *he speaks about such things openly*, and not merely for political reasons, sets him apart from the great majority of the industrialized world's public officials. And for that he can be respected.

*— Preston Jones*

**ON BEING CATHOLIC.** By THOMAS HOWARD. *Ignatius. 263 pp. $12.95 paper.*

With his customary vivid style and striking images, Thomas Howard insightfully expounds the faith, doctrine, and piety of the Roman Catholic Church. His understanding of what it means to be Catholic is orthodox and traditional. There is no explaining away the mystery; no ameliorating the effects of sin; no downplaying the cost of daily taking up the cross. Whether in his magnificent commentary on the Eucharistic liturgy or when arguing a point of morality, Howard stresses the biblical foundation, as *interpreted and expanded by tradition*. Howard is able to present both sides of differing positions with clarity and sympathy. An example is his sensitive discussion of the varying attitudes toward salvation. Protestants tend to stress the fact of "being saved," whether Calvinism's perseverance of the saints or the evangelical's altar call. In contrast, Catholics emphasize "the blessed hope," laboring in hopeful expectation of receiving the promised reward—a perspective, he maintains, much more in keeping with that of the New Testament writers. But is being Roman Catholic essential to being Catholic? Howard might well have made many of the same points while an Episcopalian, as he was before converting over a decade ago. Here he discusses being Catholic in contrast principally to evangelical Protestantism, the tradition in which he was raised; his book would have been strengthened by also addressing why he found inadequate the claim to Catholic tradition of the church in which he spent most of his adult life. However, this one quibble should not detract from a truly fine exposition of the faith.

*— Michael J. Godderz*

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**PHILIP OF SPAIN.** By HENRY KAMEN. *Yale University Press. 448 pp. $35.*

Professor Kamen continues his rectification of history, called by some revisionism, with an assiduously researched biography of the much vilified Philip II (1527-1598), who ruled what was viewed as the largest empire in history for almost fifty years. Closely associated with the Spanish Inquisition, another subject on which the author has made invaluable contributions, and responsible for, among other disasters, the Spanish Armada, Philip has over the centuries been a key figure in the promulgation of the "Black Legend" of Spain so successfully disseminated by Protestant, especially English Protestant, propagandists. In part, Kamen tells "the other side" of the story, but in more important part he helps the reader to understand the frailties of a largely delusory empire of hodgepodge sovereignties that likely could not have been ruled effectively even by a man of much greater vision and competence than Philip. Ever loyal to Catholicism, if in frequent conflict with Popes, Philip, like most sovereigns of the time—Catholic or Protestant—could not conceive of religious tolerance as anything other than a formula for sedition and anarchy, and thus helped prepare the way for the wars of religion that in his century and the next established the secularist dogma, also among devout Christians, that civil peace requires the exclusion of religion from public life. *Philip of Spain* should be welcomed by history buffs and, in particular, by those sensitive to the mistreatment of Spain in the usual tellings of the European story.

**THE SWISS, THE GOLD, AND THE DEAD.** By JEAN ZIEGLER. *Harcourt Brace. 306 pp. $27.*

A Swiss sociologist writes a searing indictment of Switzerland's role in World War II and the alleged cover-up ever since, especially by Swiss banks resisting the demands of Jewish organizations for reparations to Holocaust victims. Ziegler makes little effort to be even-handed, and ideological biases are but slightly under the surface, but the book forcefully presents the case for the prosecution.

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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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**OUT OF ORDER: HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE BIBLE AND THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST.** By DONALD J. WOLD. *Baker. 288 pp. $19.99.*

The late John Boswell of Yale established an orthodoxy among gay advocates that the historic teaching of Christianity with respect to homosexuality was based on a massive misunderstanding of the Bible and the cultures of that time. Donald Wold, who earned his doctorate in biblical and Judaic studies from the University of California, makes a valuable contribution with his careful reexamination of the evidence. In a manner that is both scholarly and accessible, he vindicates the Christian tradition while, at the same time, suggesting ways of effectively engaging the homosexual revisionists. Wold is an evangelical Protestant who convincingly protests his love for the sinner while also making no secret of his belief that unrepentant sinners, including those who engage in homosexual acts, face a very grim future both here and hereafter.

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In the face of a looming "clash of civilizations," scholars examine the various moral traditions undergirding a hope for a common global discourse. Among the essayists are Robert P. George, David Novak, and Max Stackhouse, all regular contributors to these pages. Stackhouse's argument for a Christian warrant for a new international order is particularly suggestive.

**THE PILGRIM'S GUIDE: C. S. LEWIS AND THE ART OF WITNESS.** Edited by DAVID MILLS. *Eerdmans. 297 pp. $23.*

Of the making of books about C. S. Lewis it seems there is no end, especially in this centenary year of his birth. *The Pilgrim's Guide* is a most welcome addition to the crowd, however. These nineteen essays, all appreciative of Lewis of course, are thoroughly ecumenical in terms religious, literary, and philosophical. Lewis devotees, who are legion, will not want to bypass this collection, which serves also as a fine introduction for those who still have the pleasure and excitement of reading Lewis ahead of them.

**FLANNERY O'CONNOR: A PROPER SCARING.** By JILL PELAEZ BAUMGAERTNER. *Cornerstone. 233 pp. $10.95.*

A revised edition of a much-used introduction to Flannery O'Connor's writing. Baumgaertner resists the English lit penchant for over-interpretation and exhibits a very nice sensibility to the Christian, and specifically Catholic, character of O'Connor's genius.

**DEEPENING COMMUNION: INTERNATIONAL ECUMENICAL DOCUMENTS WITH ROMAN CATHOLIC PARTICIPATION.** Edited by WILLIAM G. RUSCH and JEFFREY GROS. *Paulist. 627 pp. $29.95 paper.*

A helpful collection of documents from international dialogues between Rome and most of the major communions (except Orthodox). Ecumenists will want to have it near at hand.

**MARY AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE.** By PETER M. STRAVINSKAS. *Our Sunday Visitor. 279 pp. $12.95 paper.*

Concerned about proselytizing (as distinct from evangelizing) by Protestant fundamentalists, Father Stravinskas has undertaken a study of Protestant polemics against Catholic "Mariolatry" (an old subject) as well as the ways in which proselytizers employ a positive appreciation of Mary (something new). The result is a little book that may portend a curious convergence that advances Christian unity in the name of Mary.

**SOULS, BODIES, SPIRITS: THE DRIVE TO ABOLISH ABORTION SINCE 1973.** By KERRY N. JACOBY. *Praeger. 230 pp. $59.95.*

There has been a distinct rise in the number of books chronicling the abortion wars, to which the present volume makes a distinct contribution with its sympathetic treatment of anti-abortion activists and its theoretical setting of the wars within the context of American "civil religion." Jacoby is especially perceptive in her analysis of the ways in which evangelical Protestants entered into a cause that was in its beginning almost totally Catholic in inspiration and leadership. This strategic convergence has, as she recognizes, far-reaching implications for the reconfiguration of moral argument in American public life.

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# THE PUBLIC SQUARE

A Continuing Survey of Religion and Public Life

Richard John Neuhaus

## A Passion for Truth: The Way of Faith and Reason

Nearly 130 years ago the First Vatican Council, in a document called *Dei Filius*, affirmed the complete compatibility of faith and reason, and a few years later, in 1879, Leo XIII issued the encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, "On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy," which affirmed the normative status of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Both texts come in for frequent mention in the new encyclical by John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio* (Faith and Reason), but this reflection of almost thirty thousand words also reaches back to biblical and classical sources, lifts up the pioneering intellectual work of the patristic era, pays high tribute to its development in the medieval period (with particular attention to St. Anselm of Canterbury as well as St. Thomas), and brings all this into critical conversation with the modern era and the Church's response to it in the Second Vatican Council. *Fides et Ratio* is as breathtaking in its historical and intellectual reach as it is provocative in its argument.

Each time I work through the encyclical, I do so with quite different sensations—ranging from intellectual excitement to puzzlement to wonder that such a thing should be attempted and, finally, to a humbling awareness that there is more going on in this text than I understand. Reading it is rigorous mental exercise, which, given the subject matter, is not surprising. It is also, more than might be expected, a spiritual exercise. One's purpose of course is "to think with the Church" (*sentire cum ecclesia*), and thinking with the Church begins with thinking. I will here present, in a straightforward and relatively brief manner, the argument of *Fides et Ratio* and then offer a few initial observations. I warmly recommend a reading of the complete text, for this encyclical will be grist for philosophical and theological mills for a long time to come, also, no doubt, in the pages of this journal. (The numbers in what follows refer to the sections of the encyclical. The complete text of *Fides et Ratio* appears on the Vatican web page at www.vatican.va.)

### *We Are Natural Philosophers*

Human beings, says John Paul in the introduction, are natural philosophers. In every culture, they ask the fundamental questions: Who am I? Where have I come from and where am I going? Why is there evil? What is there after this life? To deny these questions is to deny our humanity (1). The Church accompanies humanity on its pilgrimage toward truth, bearing the message that Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, and the life. The Church serves humanity by her service (*diakonia*) to the truth. Any truth attained is but a step toward the fullness of truth to be revealed in the End Time (2). Philosophy, meaning "the love of wisdom," is one resource for understanding the truth, and philosophy is universal (3). Philosophy begins in wonder at the world and oneself in it, then moves through speculation to produce systems of thought. Such systems are never final but must always recognize "the primacy of philosophical enquiry" from which they stem and which they are meant to serve. There are "core insights," such as the principle of noncontradiction, that are common to all philosophies and required by right reason (*recta ratio*) (4).

Such core insights are often denied in modern philosophy that is right to focus on the human being and has achieved much, but is so preoccupied with our knowing that it neglects what can be known. "Reason has wilted," no longer "daring to rise to the truth of being," with the resulting consequence of the threatening triumph of technique, agnosticism, relativism, and skepticism. Philosophy has lost its nerve, confidence in reason is abandoned; "with a false modesty, people rest content with partial and provisional truths, no longer seeking to ask radical questions about the meaning and ultimate foundation of human life, personal and social" (5). As the bearer of revelation,



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the Church proclaims that truth can be known. She assures us of our "capacity to know" and challenges philosophy "to recover and develop its full dignity." The purpose of this encyclical is "to pursue that reflection by concentrating on the theme of *truth* itself and on its *foundation* in relation to *faith*" (6).

### *Truth in History*

In the "utterly gratuitous" initiative of the Word made flesh, it is revealed that "God desires to make himself known; and the knowledge which human beings have of God completes all other true knowledge of the meaning of their existence which their mind is able to attain" (7). Against the rationalist critique of that time, Vatican I stressed that there is "knowledge peculiar to faith" that transcends but does not contradict natural reason. Such knowledge is certain, said the Council, "since God neither deceives nor wishes to be deceived" (8). Vatican I affirmed a "twofold order of knowledge"; natural reason and divine faith are distinct in both their source and object. Philosophy and the sciences operate within the order of natural reason, while faith recognizes the fullness of truth that God has revealed in history, most definitively in Jesus Christ (9). Vatican II, on the other hand, stressed the historical character of revelation. God's deeds in history have an "inner unity" with the words by which they are understood, with Christ being both the mediator and fullness of revelation (10). In the incarnation of Christ, truth is "immersed in time and history" and is "entrusted to the frail structure of our knowledge (11). Thus, in history is found the synthesis by which "the Eternal enters time, the Whole lies hidden in the part, God takes on a human face" (12).

Revelation remains "charged with mystery" because our vision "is always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our understanding." Faith is obedient response to God, assent to His testimony, and the act of entrusting ourselves to Him, which is an act of intellect and will that is consummately free, since "there is no exercise of true freedom when decisions are made against God." It cannot be true freedom to reject "the very reality which enables our self-realization." In the free act of faith the person "reaches the certainty of truth and chooses to live in that truth." In a sacramental way, illustrated by the Eucharist, revelation bears the signs that disclose its meaning in an "indissoluble unity between the signified and the signifier" (13). The knowledge of faith does not abolish the mystery but constantly "refers back to the mystery of God which the human mind cannot exhaust but can only receive and embrace in faith." Between that knowledge and that mystery, human reason has free play to enquire and understand, "restricted only by its finiteness before the infinite mystery of God." Revelation impels reason to leave "no stone unturned" in seeking the truth, knowing with St. Anselm ("one of the most fruitful and important minds in human history") that the ultimate truth, namely God, is "not only that than which nothing greater can be conceived" but also that which "is greater than all that can be conceived" (14).

The words of Jesus, "You will know the truth and the truth will make you free," speak of revelation's summons to be "open to the transcendent." This revelation is neither the product nor the end of human reason, but a gratuitous expression of love that anticipates the ultimate truth, which is the theme of philosophy and theology alike (15). In the wisdom literature of Israel and other cultures, we learn that the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of reason are bound in a "profound and indissoluble unity." Reason can best reach its goal when its search is set within the horizon of faith (16). There must be no separation or competition between reason and faith: "one is in the other, and each has its own scope for action." God's glory, the fullness of the mystery, makes possible human nobility, which is the exercise of reason. The heart knows there is an answer to every unanswered question (17). Israel, which opened reason to the path of mystery, understood, first, that knowledge is a journey that allows no rest; second, it is not a way for the proud who seek personal conquest; third, it must be traveled in the "fear of God." When these rules are forgotten, one ends up as "the fool" who is a threat to himself and others (18). Wisdom literature, like Greek philosophy, understood that "the book of nature," read by reason, can lead to knowledge of the Creator (19). Faith, however, "liberates reason" to set its knowledge "within the ultimate order of things" (20).

### *Reason and the Infinite*

Israel understood man as "being in relation"—with himself, others, the world, and God. The opening to the ultimate mystery allows reason to "enter the realm of the infinite." Our mission from God is to be explorers on the way to truth, leaving "no stone unturned," resisting doubt, and leaning on God (21). In Romans 1, St. Paul affirms reason's capacity for knowledge of God, but reason was "wounded" and "warped" at "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" in the human assertion of autonomy in deciding for ourselves what is good and evil. "Reason became more and more a prisoner to itself," an imprisonment from which it is released by the coming of Christ (22). In 1 Corinthians, Paul contrasts the wisdom of the world with the foolishness of the cross. "Human wisdom refuses to see in its own weakness the possibility of its strength," namely, that it is supported by the gratuitous love of God. The cross is the definitive critique of the pride that thinks truth can be autonomously possessed. "The preaching of Christ

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crucified is the reef upon which the link between faith and philosophy can break up, but it is also the reef beyond which the two can set forth upon the boundless ocean of truth" (23).

In every human heart there is "a seed of desire and nostalgia for God," as is made evident in the arts, literature, philosophy, and other work of creative intelligence (24). We all desire to know the truth, and want to live the truth we know (25). Truth comes to us first in the form of questions about the meaning of life, of suffering, and, most particularly, of death (26). The answer we give such inevitable questions will determine whether we think universal and absolute truth is possible. "Every truth—if it really is truth—presents itself as universal, even if it is not the whole." On such questions there is a universal search for "a certitude no longer open to doubt" (27). There are obstacles to reaching the goal, but we may define the human being "as the one who seeks the truth" (28). "It is unthinkable that a search so deeply rooted in human nature would be completely vain and useless." The very search "implies the rudiments of a response"; in everyday life, as in scientific method, the search is premised upon the intuition that there is an answer. To deny the "thirst for truth [is to] imperil existence" (29).

There are different "modes of truth": the truth of evidence and experiment, the speculative truth of philosophy, and religious truth, which is "to some degree grounded in philosophy" (30). Truths are socially embodied in traditions, and we all live by more truths that are simply believed than by truths acquired by personal verification. Therefore, "the human being—the one who seeks the truth—is also the one who lives by belief" (31). In believing, we entrust ourselves to others and the knowledge they impart. Such knowledge, while not primarily empirical or philosophical, is not inferior, for it engages "the truth of the person" and the human capacity for "self-giving and fidelity." Here the martyr is the most compelling example (32). The search for truth is sustained by trust and friendship. "A climate of suspicion and distrust . . . ignores the ancient philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the prime requirements for sound philosophical enquiry." The search for truth, which is "humanly unstoppable," is finally a search for a person to whom we can entrust ourselves. Beyond simple belief, Christian faith immerses us in the order of grace; in the mystery of Christ we are offered "true and coherent knowledge of the Triune God," in whom our desire and nostalgia come to fulfillment (33). This truth of faith is not opposed to the truth of reason. "The unity of truth is a fundamental premise of human reasoning," and that unity is "rendered certain" by the truth that the God of creation is also the God of salvation history (34). We now explore the connection between revealed truth and philosophy, beginning with the history of that connection (35).

### *How We Got Where We Are*

On the Areopagus (Acts 17) St. Paul positively engaged the natural knowledge of God, even though it had lapsed into idolatry. A major concern and achievement of classical philosophy was to employ rational analysis in purifying religion of its superstitious and mythological elements. On that basis, early Christianity entered into fruitful dialogue with ancient philosophy (36). While engaging philosophy—understood as practical wisdom—St. Paul warned against gnosticism and "the various kinds of esoteric superstition widespread [also] today, even among some believers who lack a proper critical sense" (37). The fathers such as Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, and Clement of Alexandria employed Greek philosophy in order to show that Christianity is "the only sure and profitable philosophy" (Justin) and to expose the errors of those who attacked the truth. Clement wrote, "Greek philosophy is rightly called the hedge and the protective wall around the vineyard" (38).

In critically adopting Platonic thought, Origen began to construct a Christian theology of rational discourse expressing the true doctrine about God (39). Christianizing Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought, St. Augustine, "the great Doctor of the West," produced "the first great synthesis of philosophy and theology" (40). Augustine and others did not simply put the truths of faith into philosophical categories. They disclosed what remained implicit and preliminary in the philosophers, showing how "reason could find its way out of the blind alley of myth" and be opened to the absolute. This was more than a meeting of cultures. "It happened in the depths of human souls and was a meeting of creature and Creator," demonstrating that "reason could attain the supreme good and ultimate truth in the person of the Word made flesh" (41).

In medieval thought, Anselm's view of the understanding of faith (*intellectus fidei*) is one of the intellect seeking that which it loves: the more it loves, the more it desires to know. He wrote, "To see you was I conceived, and I have yet to conceive that for which I was conceived." Given reason's capacity to exceed whatever it attains, it is not defeated by the inability to understand the object of its love. Anselm: "Thought has comprehended rationally that God is incomprehensible." The harmony of faith and philosophy is again confirmed. "Faith asks that its object be understood with the help of reason; and at the summit of its searching reason acknowledges that it cannot do without what faith presents" (42).

St. Thomas Aquinas saw that nature, philosophy's proper concern, could contribute to understanding divine revelation. "Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in

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it. Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to perfection, so faith builds upon and perfects reason." Faith is also an "exercise of thought," and Paul VI was right to say that what St. Thomas "gave to the new encounter of faith and reason was a reconciliation between the secularity of the world and the radicality of the gospel" (43). Convinced that all truth is of the Holy Spirit, Thomas underscored the harmony among the Spirit's gifts of wisdom, philosophical wisdom, and theological wisdom. In St. Thomas we see "the passion for truth" tied to "realism," which produced not merely a philosophy of "what seems to be" but a philosophy of "what is" (44).

### *A Fateful Separation*

With the late medieval universities, the distinction between faith and reason "became more and more a fateful separation." The profound unity of patristic and medieval thought was sundered by, at the same time, an exaggerated rationalism and a distrust of reason's capacity to reach the highest forms of speculation (45). The nineteenth century was the apogee of philosophy pitted against Christian revelation, with some trying to transpose the contents of Christian faith into structures of dialectical reason, while atheistic humanists constructed new religions in the service of projects that "gave rise to totalitarian systems which were disastrous for humanity." In science, positivism, combined with technological progress and the logic of the market, removes the human person from the center of concern, and results in a nihilism that denies the human possibility of attaining truth (46).

In contemporary culture, philosophy as universal wisdom has been marginalized by "instrumental reason" which is divorced from the search for absolute truth, and ends up by debasing the dignity of reason and turning it against man himself (47). This "rapid survey" of the history of philosophy shows the growing separation of faith and reason. Notable achievements of modern philosophy notwithstanding, reason "has taken side-tracks" and lost sight of the goal of wisdom. "Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling and experience, and so runs the risk of ceasing to make a universal claim. . . . Faith then runs the grave risk of withering into myth or superstition." Faith and philosophy each have their own autonomy, and the boldness of one must be matched by the boldness of the other (48).

The Church has no philosophy of her own, but respects the autonomy of reason that is by its nature oriented to truth. "A philosophy which did not proceed in the light of reason according to its own principles and methods would serve little purpose." The Church does respond to errors in reason that threaten what has been revealed (49). The Church takes note of philosophical ideas and systems that are incompatible with her faith, which is also a service to philosophy in support of *recta ratio*, "reason reflecting rightly on what is true" (50). Philosophers recognize the need for self-criticism and should know that no philosophical system "can legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth." The Church "intervenes to stimulate philosophical enquiry" lest it stray from the path that leads to recognizing the mystery hidden in Christ (51). This encyclical is in continuity with past interventions, notably that of Vatican I in *Dei Filius*, which corrected both the underestimation (in fideism and radical traditionalism) and the overestimation (in rationalism and ontologism) of reason's natural capacities (52). Vatican I taught that faith and reason, revelation and the natural knowledge of God, are distinct but inseparable. Against rationalism, the distinction is emphasized, together with the "transcendence and precedence" of the mysteries of faith. Against fideism, the inseparability is emphasized, which is grounded in the unity of truth, which is, in turn, grounded in the unity of God. "This God could not deny himself, nor could the truth ever contradict the truth" (53). In this century, the Magisterium has cautioned against rationalism and "modernism," as well as errors of reason connected with evolutionism, existentialism, historicism, and Marxism. These past interventions are "an invaluable contribution which should never be forgotten" (54).

### *"I cannot fail to note with dismay . . . "*

Today, old problems return in new forms. There is a deep distrust of reason that leads some to speak of "the end of metaphysics." Theological research frequently succumbs to an uncritical rationalism. There is also a resurgence of fideism, "which fails to recognize the importance of rational knowledge and philosophical discourse for the understanding of faith, indeed the very possibility of belief in God." Fideism is evident in a "biblicism" that neglects the living tradition of the Church or limits scriptural interpretation to one methodology that has its own philosophical underpinnings (55). John Paul urges, "I cannot but encourage philosophers—be they Christian or not—to trust in the power of human reason and not to set themselves too modest goals in their philosophizing. . . . One must not abandon the passion for ultimate truth. . . . It is faith which stirs reason to reject all isolation and to run risks gladly that it may attain whatever is beautiful, good, and true. Thus faith becomes the convinced and convincing advocate of reason" (56). To this end, Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* ("the one papal document of such authority devoted entirely to philosophy") is still pertinent, especially in "his insistence upon the incomparable value of the philosophy of St. Thomas" (57). That initiative produced a great revival in Thomistic studies (58).

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Thomism and Neo-Thomism were not alone, however. A number of Catholic philosophers and schools have produced remarkable syntheses that "have sought to keep alive the great tradition of Christian thought which unites faith and reason" (59). Vatican II, especially in *Gaudium et Spes*, offers "a virtual compendium of the biblical anthropology from which philosophy too draws inspiration." The Council teaches that Christ, the new Adam, "fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high calling." The Council underscores the importance of philosophy in Christian education, especially in the formation of priests and those preparing for theological studies (60). Unfortunately, this teaching has not always "been followed with the readiness one would wish." "I cannot fail to note with dismay and displeasure that [the] lack of interest in the study of philosophy is shared by not a few theologians." Reasons for this lack of interest include contemporary philosophy's distrust of reason, a disordered preoccupation with the "human sciences," and a misunderstanding of cultural pluralism, especially in relation to non-Western cultures (61). Since the late Middle Ages the Church has understood that "the study of philosophy is fundamental and indispensable" to theological studies and priestly formation. Without philosophical training, there is an inability to dialogue with modern thought and culture or "an indiscriminate acceptance of any kind of philosophy" (62). "It is my task to state principles and criteria which in my judgment are necessary in order to restore a harmonious and creative relationship between theology and philosophy" (63).

Theology is "a reflective and scientific elaboration of the understanding of God's word in the light of faith," and that task demands "recourse to philosophical enquiry" (64). Philosophy's study of the structure of knowledge and personal communication helps theology to both receive and understand faith, while philosophical training is also necessary to understand the thought forms employed by the Magisterium and great theologians of the Church's tradition (65). The *intellectus fidei* recognizes that revelation "enjoys an innate intelligibility, so logically consistent that it can stand as an authentic body of knowledge." This is not only of intellectual interest, but brings to light "the salvific meaning of these propositions" in leading people to share in the mystery of Christ by their assent of faith. Dogmatic theology must articulate the universal meaning of God and salvation "both as a narrative and, above all, in the form of argument." Likewise with moral theology, which depends in part upon philosophical ethics. "Believing reason needs to acquire a natural, consistent, and true knowledge of those created realities—the world and the human being—which are also the object of divine revelation" (66).

### *Remaining Open to the New*

At the same time, fundamental theology "should show how, in the light of the knowledge conferred by faith, there emerge certain truths which reason, from its own independent enquiry, already grasps." "Although faith, a gift of God, is not based on reason, it can certainly not dispense with it. At the same time . . . reason needs to be reinforced by faith, in order to discover horizons it cannot reach on its own" (67). Moral theology has perhaps an even greater need for philosophy, since "moral theology requires a right philosophical vision of human nature and society, as well as general principles of ethical decision-making" (68). Admittedly, theology needs many other kinds of knowledge, but I emphasize philosophy "lest the prime task of demonstrating the universality of faith's content be abandoned" (69). The Church, commanded to go "to the ends of the earth," has from her beginning known about the encounter of cultures. St. Paul tells the Ephesians, "You are no longer strangers and sojourners, but you are saints and members of the household of God." The great truth is that "faith's encounter with different cultures has created something new." In the household of God, the "seminal revelation" in all cultures is brought to fulfillment (70).

"Cultures survive and flourish insofar as they remain open to the new." Culture has "an intrinsic capacity to receive divine revelation." As demonstrated by Pentecost, cultural identity is secured and what is implicit "will be made fully explicit in the light of truth." No one culture is normative for revelation; all cultures "are prompted to open themselves to the newness of the gospel's truth and to be stirred by this truth to grow still more" (71). The challenges of "inculturating" the gospel today are "not unlike those faced by the Church in the first centuries." The East, and India in particular, can greatly enrich Christian thought. If this is to happen, we must keep in mind, first, "the universality of the human spirit" despite disparate cultures. Second, the Church cannot forget her "inculturation in the world of Greco-Latin thought," which is part of God's providential plan for the Church through history. Third, a legitimate defense of the uniqueness of Indian thought cannot mean that "a particular cultural tradition should remain closed in its difference." This is true for all of Asia, and for the traditional cultures of Africa, "which are for the most part transmitted orally" (72).

In all this, the relationship between theology and philosophy is "best construed as a circle." Theology begins with the word of God and has as its final goal a deeper understanding of that word. Since God's word is truth, the human search for truth—i.e., philosophy pursued according to its own rules—has the same goal. God's word stirs reason to discover new and unsuspected horizons (73). The fruitfulness

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of this relationship is confirmed by theologian-philosophers whose writings "warrant comparison with the masters of ancient philosophy." For instance, Gregory of Nazianzus, Augustine, Anselm, Bonaventure, Thomas, John Henry Newman, and Antonio Rosmini. Both philosophy and theology are weakened by neglect of such thinkers (74).

### *Christian Philosophy?*

Before Christianity, there was philosophy completely independent of the gospel. Such philosophy had a valid aspiration to be an autonomous enterprise obedient to reason alone. Also today, theology must respect philosophy's "rigorous rational criteria [that are necessary] to guarantee that the results attained are universally valid." Philosophy, on the other hand, should not claim a "self-sufficiency of thought" that refuses "the truth offered by divine revelation, since this precludes access to a deeper knowledge of truth" (75). We must be careful in speaking of "Christian philosophy" since the Church has no official philosophy. The term indicates "a Christian way of philosophizing" that has both subjective and objective aspects. Subjectively, the theological virtue of faith guards against presumption, "the typical temptation of the philosopher." St. Paul, the church fathers, Pascal, and Kierkegaard must be heeded on this score. Objectively, Christian philosophy proposes truths that might not be discovered by unaided reason, although they are not naturally inaccessible to reason. Truths proposed by revelation about anthropology, time, history, event, and sin "broaden reason's scope for action." Much of contemporary philosophy would not exist "without this stimulus of the word of God" (76).

Theology needs philosophy "as a partner in dialogue in order to confirm the intelligibility and universal truth of its claims." From the patristic period on, philosophy was called *ancilla theologiae* (the handmaid of theology), in the same sense that Aristotle said the experimental sciences are "ancillary" to philosophy. Such terminology leads to misunderstanding today, but it underscores the inseparability of theology and philosophy. Theologians who reject philosophy end up in accepting thought structures uncritically, while philosophers who reject theology completely are "forced to master on their own the contents of Christian faith, as has been the case with some modern philosophers" (77).

Here again, St. Thomas is "the guide and model for theological studies" and indeed "for all who seek the truth." "In his thinking, the demands of reason and the power of faith found the most elevated synthesis which human thought has ever attained, for he could defend the radical newness introduced by revelation while never demeaning the venture which is proper to reason" (78). Philosophy must obey its own rules and principles. Truth, however, can only be one. Revelation does not undermine reason, and reason "should never lose its capacity to question and be questioned." Revelation is "the true point of encounter" between philosophy and theology in the search for "a philosophy consonant with the word of God." This is the common task of believers and nonbelievers alike. Believers are reminded by St. Augustine: "To believe is nothing other than to think with assent. Believers are also thinkers: in believing they think and in thinking they believe. If faith does not think, it is nothing" (79).

### *Mutual Challenges*

(The following chapter, the seventh, deals with the challenges the word of God poses to philosophy, and then the challenges posed to theology.) We and our experience are finite, neither uncreated nor self-generating. God alone is the Absolute. The Bible provides an account of the drama of man, created in the image of God, giving rise to moral evil through the disordered exercise of freedom. The world and human life have meaning and promised fulfillment in the mystery of the Incarnation. "This mystery challenges philosophy in ultimate ways, because reason is summoned to make its own a logic that destroys the walls within which it risks confining itself." In the Incarnate Word, human nature and divine nature are safeguarded in all their autonomy and mutuality, without confusion (80).

Our time is marked by a "crisis of meaning" and increasing fragmentation of knowledge, which often leads to skepticism and nihilism. Philosophy must "recover its sapiential dimension as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning of life." Otherwise, instrumental reason in the service of technology and utilitarian ends "becomes potentially destructive for the human race" (81). Philosophy should "verify the human capacity to know the truth, to come to a knowledge which can reach objective truth." "Scripture assumes that the human being, though guilty of duplicity and mendacity, can know and grasp the simple truth." In articulating her own faith, the Church needs the help of philosophy "which does not disavow the possibility of a knowledge which is objectively true, even if it is not perfect" (82).

Further, we need a philosophy of "genuinely metaphysical range," addressed to knowledge that transcends the empirical and is "true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical." The human capacity for self-transcendence requires a philosophy that "moves from phenomenon to foundation" in the task of "mediating the understanding of revelation." Such metaphysics is necessary also to theology, for theology without metaphysics cannot get beyond an analysis of religious experience, and cannot give a coherent

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account of universal and transcendent truth (83). Current developments in hermeneutics and linguistic analysis often undermine confidence in the powers of reason. "Faith clearly presupposes that human language is capable of expressing divine and transcendent reality in a universal way—analogically, it is true, but no less meaningfully for that." Were that not the case, there would be no revelation of God but only interpretations of interpretations of human notions about God (84).

"I am well aware," the Pope notes, that this argument goes against the grain of much philosophy today. Philosophy should resume its place "in organic continuity with the great tradition which, beginning with the ancients, passes through the Fathers of the Church and the masters of Scholasticism, and includes the fundamental achievements of modern thought." This tradition is not "a mere remembrance of the past" but the cultural patrimony of all humanity. "It is we who belong to the tradition and we cannot dispose of it at will." Precisely by being rooted in the tradition can we develop for the next millennium "an original, new, and constructive mode of thinking" (85). If that is to happen, some errors and consequent risks must be noted.

## *Necessary Corrections*

"Eclecticism," for instance, appears in both philosophy and theology when ideas are picked from here and there "without concern for their internal coherence," resulting in thought that is neither serious nor scientific (86). Closely connected is "historicism," which, at least implicitly, denies the enduring validity of truth. In theology this is a form of the "modernism" that, trying to make things understandable, "exchanges truth for relevance" (87). Another threat is "scientism," which limits real knowledge to the positive sciences and "relegates religious, theological, ethical, and aesthetic knowledge to the realm of mere fantasy." Metaphysical statements are declared to be meaningless, although "critical epistemology has discredited such a claim" (88). No less dangerous is a form of "pragmatism" that precludes principled moral judgment and supports an idea of democracy in which there is no appeal beyond parliamentary majorities or institutional agencies. It proposes a "one-dimensional vision of the human being" which denies "the great ethical dilemmas and existential analyses of the meaning of suffering and sacrifice, of life and death" (89).

These trends lead to "nihilism," which not only contradicts the word of God but "is a denial of humanity and of the very identity of the human being." To lose touch with objective truth is to lose touch with the ground of human dignity. All that is left is a destructive will to power or despair. Nihilism promises freedom but: "Truth and freedom are either joined together or together they perish in misery" (90). Modern philosophy has notable achievements to its credit, but the irony is noted that the dominant rationalism of the past has provoked a new irrationalism that radically disputes what was once thought indisputable. This mood is sometimes called "postmodernity," which is an ambiguous term. Yet currents of thought that claim to be postmodern merit attention. Irrational nihilism is understandable in view of the terrible evils experienced in our age. The century began with the rationalist optimism of history as the triumphant progress of reason, and is ending in the temptation to despair. At the same time, however, many still subscribe to the illusion of the omnipotence of scientific and technological progress (91).

## *Theological Tasks*

Turning to the tasks of theology, it must help the Church to evangelize, remembering that its primary duty is to the ultimate truth of revelation. "The Truth, which is Christ, holds out to theology and philosophy alike the prospect of support, stimulation, and increase." The knowledge of a universally valid truth does not encourage intolerance but, on the contrary, is the essential condition for authentic dialogue (92). "The chief purpose of theology is to provide an understanding of revelation and the content of faith." In doing so, theology is committed to an understanding of God's *kenosis*, a love which gives itself and seeks nothing in return (93). With the help of philosophy, theology explores the relationship between fact and meaning, meaning and truth. Human language embodies the language of God, "who communicates his own truth with the 'condescension' that mirrors the logic of the incarnation." In interpreting the texts of revelation, the theologian is not limited to "neutral facts" but draws on "the Church's constant reading of these texts over the centuries, a reading which preserves intact their original meaning" (94).

The statements of dogmatic theology, like all human language, are historically and culturally conditioned, "but the human being can express truths which surpass the phenomenon of language." Truth is known in history, "but it also reaches beyond history" (95). Hermeneutical problems are real and complex, but "certain grounding concepts retain their universal epistemological value and thus the truth of the propositions which express them." Otherwise, "philosophy and the sciences could not communicate with one another," nor could they be understood in different cultures. Philosophy should seek to clarify the relationship between conceptual language and truth (96). The *intellectus fidei* requires a philosophy of being, especially in dogmatic theology. The "dogmatic pragmatism" that viewed the truths of faith as mere

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rules of conduct has been refuted, but there remains the temptation to think of these truths in purely functional terms. If the *intellectus fidei* is to integrate the theological tradition, it must turn to a philosophy that "proposes anew the problem of being"—"a dynamic philosophy that views reality in its ontological, causal, and communicative structures" (97).

With respect to moral theology, the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* (The Splendor of Truth) argued that our moral crisis is a "crisis of truth." Conscience is no longer understood as an act of intelligence in discerning the truth, but as an individual right to determine the criteria of good and evil. "Moral theology must turn to a philosophical ethics that looks to the truth of the good," which presupposes a philosophical anthropology and a metaphysics of the good (98). Theology in the Church serves proclamation and catechesis. Catechesis can benefit greatly from philosophical inquiry that clarifies the relationship between truth and life, event and doctrine, transcendent truth and human language. Here, too, reciprocity between philosophy and theology can deepen understanding of the faith (99).

## *Conclusion*

More than a century after Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris*, it is important to emphasize the value of philosophy for the understanding of faith and the Church's conviction that faith and reason "mutually support each other" (100). Theology challenges philosophy to be open to "the radical newness found in God's revelation"; in theology, philosophy finds a "communal reflection" that holds together "many different fields of learning and culture within the unity of faith" (101). The mission of the gospel requires that people "discover their capacity to know the truth and their yearning for the ultimate and definitive meaning of existence." The "mediation of philosophy" can lead people to Christ, and thus "they will become more human" (102). In "cultures of ancient Christian heritage," philosophy can contribute to the "new evangelization," preparing the world for the new millennium (103). Christian philosophers should shape arguments in a way that provides common ground with those of other religions and all "who have at heart the renewal of humanity." "A philosophy in which there shines even a glimmer of the truth of Christ" can contribute to "the true and planetary ethics that the world needs now" (104).

John Paul calls on theologians to "enter into a demanding critical dialogue" with philosophy in all its aspects, "whether consonant with the word of God or not." Theologians must remember the words of St. Bonaventure, "that great master of thought and spirituality," who recognized the inadequacy of "reading without repentance, knowledge without devotion, research without the impulse of wonder, prudence without the ability to surrender to joy, action divorced from religion, learning sundered from love, intelligence without humility, study unsustained by divine grace, thought without the wisdom inspired by God" (105).

The Pope appeals to philosophers to have the courage to recover the great tradition of philosophical enquiry into authentic wisdom and truth, being assured that the Church respects "the rightful autonomy of their discipline." He asks scientists, whose achievements "never cease to amaze us," never to abandon "the sapiential horizon" in which scientific achievements are wedded to philosophy and ethics, "which are the distinctive and indelible mark of the human person" (106). "I summon everyone to look more deeply at the human being, saved in the mystery of Christ's love, and at his unceasing search for truth and meaning." Only within the "horizon of truth" can we understand our freedom and our call "to know and love God as the supreme realization of the true self" (107). Among her many titles, Mary is called "Seat of Wisdom." As Mary offered herself so that "God's Word might take flesh and come among us," so philosophy that offers its "rational and critical resources" in response to the gospel's truth is in no way compromised but sees that "all its enquiries rise to their consummation." The ancient monks called Mary "the table at which faith sits in thought," and so it is with philosophy when it is true to itself (108).

## *Four Preliminary Observations*

The argument of *Fides et Ratio* is breathtaking in its ambition and comprehensiveness. Permit me a few preliminary observations. First, it is a powerful restatement of the radical humanism of Catholic Christianity, a truth that has been so relentlessly pressed by John Paul II. Were this to be the final encyclical of his pontificate, it would be a fitting capstone to the repeated insistence that Jesus Christ is not only the revelation of God to man but also the revelation of man to himself. Second, one is struck by the adamant contention for the unity of truth. The way to truth is "twofold," but it is not, as in some earlier Catholic treatments of faith and reason, two-track. It is not as though faith and reason, revelation and philosophy, belief and knowledge are on separate tracks that finally converge on the one truth. Rather, the transcendent truth, which is revelation, is the horizon and guarantor of the immanent truth of human reason—and all this because *the* truth, Jesus Christ, is the Absolute incarnate in the human project.

Third is the way *Fides et Ratio* criticizes both philosophy and theology. Modern philosophy has lost its nerve, and John Paul urges that it resume its dignity and duty in addressing the big questions that are born in wonder and directed to ultimate

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meaning. Theologians, on the other hand, are censured on several scores: their false sense of self-sufficiency, their uncritical acceptance of bits and pieces of philosophy without regard to theological consequences, and their violation of the necessary autonomy of the philosophical task. Fourth—and this has enormous significance for evangelization in the next century—*Fides et Ratio* is a very sharp criticism of any and every form of fideism. Anything that pits faith against reason, belief against knowledge, or religious experience against critical intelligence has no place in authentically Christian thought.

John Paul is keenly aware of the postmodernist mood and the idea promoted by some Christians that the collapse of Enlightenment rationalism is a great opportunity for evangelization. He, too, looks forward to the next century as a possible "springtime of evangelization" (*Redemptoris Missio*), but he insists this must not happen on the postmodernist or multiculturalist assumption that the gospel is simply one truth among other truths. Even if it seems to be in the short-term interest of Christianity, any evangelization that seeks to use fideism, or superstition, or irrationalism, or religious emotivism in advancing the gospel is, in fact, a betrayal of the gospel. The Catholic Church, he says, will have none of it. The gospel is universally true—and can be perceived as such by both faith and reason—or it is not true at all. Augustine is right: "If faith does not think, it is nothing." One studies the bold argument of *Fides et Ratio* with this purpose in mind: *Sentire cum ecclesia*—to think with the Church, knowing that to think with the Church begins with thinking.

FT

# WHILE WE'RE AT IT

■ Of the people who have had the greatest influence on my life, Arthur Carl Piepkorn is right up there. He was professor at Concordia Theological Seminary, St. Louis, for many years and was a pioneer of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic theological dialogue. Dr. Piepkorn ("the Pieps") died twenty-five years ago on December 13, 1973. There will be a memorial lecture honoring him on Sunday, December 13, at five o'clock at Immanuel Lutheran Church, 88th Street and Lexington Avenue in Manhattan. The lecture is by Professor Robert Louis Wilken of the University of Virginia, another close student of Piepkorn's, with responses by George Lindbeck, William Wiecher, John Damm, and your scribe. For further information call Immanuel Church at (212) 289-8128. The church will also provide a light supper afterwards, but you must make your reservation at least two weeks in advance.

■ The Rutherford Institute points out that last December the Supreme Court again did what is prohibited in other public spaces, notably in government schools. In the Great Hall of that august institution was a tree topped by a star, and the annual Christmas party included the singing of traditional Christmas carols. I'm all for it, but one may wonder why this does not violate the separation of church and state. As the Justices would no doubt explain, they, unlike children and ordinary citizens, are not suggestible.

■ It's not too often that I agree with Ralph Nader. Matter of fact, it's not too often one hears about him nowadays. But last year at this time he did protest to the DreamWorks movie people an advertisement for their film *Mouse Hunt*. The full-page ad in the *New York Times* was headed, "12 DAYS TILL CHRIS-MOUSE." Nader did not think that "juxtaposing the name of Jesus Christ with a clever little rodent is just a funny, attention-getting phrase." "What other major religion," he asked, "has been subjected to such crude commercialization with the envelope being pushed further and further from Xmas to Chris-Mouse (a picture designed for family entertainment, no less!)?" Some things, said Nader, are "just not done." The head of marketing for DreamWorks, a person with the apt name of Terry Press, wrote back advising Nader, in effect, to lighten up. "As you referenced in your letter, over time Christmas has come to take on a dual meaning." For some it is the birth of Christ, but "to millions around the world—regardless of their faith—it is a season of giving, of peace and joy and laughter." "The ad was certainly not intended to offend anyone's faith; it was meant more as an homage to the carol 'The 12 Days of Christmas.'" Some things just are not done? Get with it, Ralph, we do them all the time. To jolly up the unhappy Mr. Nader, Mr. Press adds in a PS: "For the record, we do not endorse aluminum Christmas trees, or the colorization of *It's a Wonderful Life*." So they are not entirely bereft of a sense of the sacred.

■ As a Mexican-American child in Denver, Linda Chavez learned something about the anxieties of ethnicity and trying to figure out where you stand in a world constituted by "others." That is why she is so opposed to a proposal in California that, since most public school students belong to racial and ethnic minorities, the books they read should be written by people like themselves. Ms. Chavez' world was opened up by her housepainter father's encouragement to read the great literature of the

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Western world. She writes: "Thankfully no one thought to tell me that the authors of such books were all dead white males with whom I had nothing in common. No teacher suggested I'd be better off reading books by second-rate authors who happened to share my ethnicity or gender. It never occurred to my father or me that the Great Books were not a part of our intellectual heritage and tradition. We believed they belonged to us as much as to anyone. Imagine what the diversity crowd would say to the young W. E. B. DuBois were he a student today. DuBois, one of America's great intellectuals, was born in Massachusetts in 1868. At a time when few blacks, even in the North, managed to attend high school much less college, DuBois graduated from Harvard University in 1890. At the age of fourteen, he was already reading the poet Virgil in Latin. As a sophomore in high school, DuBois saw a five-volume set of Lord Macaulay's *History of England.* He 'wanted it fiercely,' he later wrote, and paid for it on the installment plan, twenty-five cents a week—his entire salary. From the Victorian Englishman Thomas Macaulay, DuBois learned a vivid writing style and a love of history that no doubt influenced his later work, including *The World and Africa,* an encyclopedic look at the role Africa played in world history. What both my father and DuBois knew—and today's diversity mavens seem blind to—is that you can't judge a book by its author's race or sex. The tragedy is that now some educators would relegate young black, Hispanic, and Asian children to an intellectual ghetto they might never escape, all in the name of diversity."

■ In 1980, Fouad Ajami of Johns Hopkins published *The Arab Predicament,* still one of the best guides to understanding the personal and cultural pains attending the experience of being left out of history, or at least the history of others who appear to be running the world. Now his *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey* (Pantheon) is receiving deserved praise. Here he tries hard to be less judgmental, to enter into the world of the left-out, but his conclusions are equally melancholy. This on the response to what is called "the peace process": "Arafat had done well by Oslo; history had given him that rarest of gifts—a second chance. Palestinian nationalism had been rescued, but Arafat had gone into the situation alone, it seemed. Few among the Palestinian intellectual and political class were there for him. He was deserted by some of the very figures of note who had been the standard-bearers of Palestinian nationalism in the preceding three decades. The poet laureate of the Palestinian national movement, Mahmoud Darwish (born in 1942), now living in Paris, gave voice to the disenchantment with the peace in an interview he gave on a visit to Gaza in 1995, when he said that he had felt as though he had returned to Palestine and had not returned, that he had arrived and not arrived, that his exile had not come to an end. The language, he said, had to be modest in the face of this kind of misery. In less poetic terms, the Palestinian-American author Edward Said, a former member of the Palestine National Council and a writer who must be considered the preeminent public intellectual among the Palestinians, condemned the peace of Oslo as an American peace and dismissed Arafat as an enforcer of Israeli rule. The great day on the south lawn of the White House, the celebrated handshake between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin, ought to be a 'day of mourning' for all Palestinians, Said wrote. The Arafat regime in Gaza, the Palestine National Authority, was, in Said's view, a security apparatus working in tandem with the Israeli intelligence services. 'People have been tortured to death. Newspapers have been closed. His [Arafat's] opponents are being rounded up. And still he rules, and most of his people either endure that rule silently or try to get a position in it.' A 'quisling' Palestinian regime had arisen in Gaza; the Palestinians had come out empty-handed from this 'Israeli-American peace.'" The book concludes with this: "Vanquished, the Palestinians had hitched a ride on the coattails of a successful Zionist enterprise. As the world batters the modern Arab inheritance, the rhetorical need for anti-Zionism grows. But there rises, too, the recognition that it is time for the imagination to steal away from Israel and to look at the Arab reality, to behold its own view of the kind of world the Arabs want for themselves." It is, as Fouad Ajami undoubtedly knows, a wan and wistful conclusion, for one fears that the world the Arabs want for themselves is inescapably a world without Israel so long as Israel looms so large in defining their possible worlds. One expects they will continue to have recourse to their dream palace, with continuing forays of violence into a world unamenable to dreams.

■ A friend has been rummaging through the *Columbia Dictionary of Quotations* and has come up with some doozies that outrage him and he thinks should outrage me. For instance, British novelist Muriel Spark on John Paul II: "I wouldn't take the Pope too seriously. He's a Pole first, a Pope second, and maybe a Christian third." That's just vulgar nasty, the kind of thing said by minor celebrities who get interviewed and feel the need to say something smart. Thomas Hobbes is very different. He said, "The papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof." That's classy nasty. And worth pondering as the judgment of an eminent seventeenth-century philosopher with views that hardly seemed outrageous at the time. Given the way history is turning out, one wonders

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what Hobbes would say now. I cannot imagine that three hundred years from now, or thirty years from now, anyone will wonder what Muriel Spark might have said about anything.

■ Full of secrets are the archives of the Inquisition and the Congregation for the Index of Prohibited Books, which aimed in the sixteenth century to counter, among others, the Protestant heretics. The secrets are secret no longer, thanks to Josef Cardinal Ratzinger and his archivist, who have opened up the files to serious scholars, among whom is Peter Godman. Writing in the *Times Literary Supplement*, Godman suggests that the Holy See was not quite up to speed in enforcing orthodoxy. "They pursued this end with methods that will disappoint those who come to the archives expecting to meet the parents of Big Brother. For what one finds is not a monolithic structure of repression but—let it be said with deep affection and profound respect for the *Bel Paese*—Italian organization." A few years after the Index was launched, one censor wrote, "What we need is a halt to printing, so that the Church can catch up with this deluge of publications." Among the diverting documents Godman came across is one from the sixteenth century urging that certain authors be "liberated" from the stigma of prohibition, including a leading member of the Congregation of the Index, now a saint and Doctor of the Church, Robert Bellarmine. The document is signed by one R. Bellarmine. Godman concludes: "As one watches censors proscribing one another, inquisitors keeping an eye on Popes, and authors vying for the privilege of a purge, one tends to think that the simplifications of religious polemic, rampant in an age of confessional conflict and still influential today, are inadequate to grasp the complexity of this fascinating subject. Perhaps more useful, for those who enter the archives of the Inquisition and Index with an open mind, are that sense of irony, that feeling for human frailty which may enable them to discover there not the beginnings of repression, but the origins of surrealism."

■ I have met Norman Mailer only a few times, chiefly during the sixties, when we would run into one another at the countless rallies and demonstrations of what was then simply called "The Movement." Most memorably late one night in a park at the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, where I was a delegate, and a totally sloshed Mailer was set upon demonstrating his pugilistic gifts by beating up on a cop or two. A couple of us managed to get him back to his hotel where he wisely passed out. My friend Norman Podhoretz knew Mailer very well, and is doing a book on former friends in which he will be prominently featured. This reflection is occasioned by the appearance of *The Time of Our Time*, a monster anthology (Random House, 1,286 pages) of Mailer's work over fifty years. Some of that work is simply superb, notably the journalism of the sixties such as *The Armies of the Night* and *Miami and the Siege of Chicago*. Much of it, as too many lesser talents relish pointing out, is execrable. James Shapiro, who teaches English at Columbia, writes in the *New York Times Book Review* that Mailer often tried too hard to be outrageous in both his writing and his life, frequently making the latter the issue of the former. But his main complaint is that Mailer, now age seventy-five, has never been able to accept the fact that he is a conservative. "Beneath his surface outrageousness, his hipster pose, his advocacy of sexual and social license, even of violence, was a deep conventionality about the family, homosexuality, and, most of all, the relations between the sexes. Mailer may have fled his Brooklyn Jewish roots, but he never quite shook off many of the deep-seated antipathies of the culture in which he was nourished." That is why, writes Shapiro, Mailer has not been a public voice "in the '80s and '90s when more and more Americans [have been] rejecting these values as part of his time and not their own." Mailer "badly misjudged three of the great revolutions of his day: civil rights, gay rights, and the women's movement." Shapiro's reading of American culture and values, notably on the acceptance of homosexuality, speaks volumes about the little world of intellectual fashions in which he lives, but he has a point about Norman Mailer. One suspects that Mailer's driving obsession is to be the baddest of all bad boys, which assumes a world far removed from Shapiro's Morningside Heights, a world in which people understand what it means to be good. Mailer is not a nihilist; he needs the standards he so exuberantly offends. That doesn't mean he is a conservative, but it does mean his celebrity fed off a world in which most people are. I look forward to seeing whether the more serious Norman agrees.

■ The question comes up from time to time, as in a letter received the other day. The writer complains that FT's use of "Catholic" ignores the claims of Orthodox, Anglicans, Old Catholics, Lutherans, and others who think of themselves as Catholic—whether in upper or lower case. Here is what I wrote in response, and perhaps it will be helpful to others who share the writer's concern:

Dear _____,

Thank you for your thoughtful letter with its generous comments on FIRST THINGS.

I understand well the concern you raise. During my many years as a Lutheran pastor who called himself an evangelical catholic, I frequently had occasion to tweak Roman Catholics about their assumed monopoly on the word "Catholic"—whether upper or lower case.

Notwithstanding the legitimate theological

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claims of others, the (Roman) Catholic Church does teach, and as a Catholic priest I do believe, that the (Roman) Catholic Church is the Church of Jesus Christ most fully and rightly ordered through time. As Vatican Council II makes clear, this is in no way incompatible with recognizing the authentically Christian realities outside the boundaries of the Catholic Church. In addition, the near universal usage in English publications is to refer to the Catholic Church, and everybody knows what is being referred to, even if they dislike the usage. It would be stylistically awkward to be constantly referring to the Roman Catholic Church (or the Church of the Latin Rite, or similar constructions) —plus it might be taken by Catholic readers as a implicit dissent from the Catholic Church's self-understanding. Similarly, we refer to the Orthodox Church without suggesting that there are no other orthodox Christians, and to the Episcopal Church, which surely has no monopoly on bishops.

So the end result is that in FIRST THINGS we speak of the Catholic Church, taking care at the same time to acknowledge the claims and realities outside its boundaries. Admittedly, this is not satisfactory, and that realization should compel us the more urgently to seek the full communion among all his disciples that Christ desires.

■ Congratulations to Valery Gergiev, artistic director of the St. Petersburg's Mariinsky Theatre, for being named the first recipient of the annual Philips Excellence in Arts Award. I don't know him personally, but the announcement is in a classy full-page ad that encountered me over breakfast, and I have no reason to doubt that he richly deserves the award, which comes with a $100,000 donation to the charity of his choice. That's somewhat less impressive when one considers that the ad, which prominently features the Philips electronics business, cost well over $60,000, or that "charity" in Russian law is wondrously flexible. What I can't help but wonder about is how much Philips paid the "creative people" who came up with the slogan for the Philips Excellence in Arts Award: "Let's make things better." Apparently that is also the slogan that "embodies the Philips mission." This is not a good way to begin the day, pondering the possibility that our expression of grand notions such as excellence and mission has been reduced to "Let's make things better." It's better than making things worse, of course, but it's hard to imagine that the motto gets the day off to an inspiring start at the Philips factories, never mind the Mariinsky Theatre. "Let's make things better." I'm thinking about it. But not too much, lest I conclude that this item wasn't worth the fifteen minutes it took to write.

■ In the world of film and stage, Oscar Wilde is back in a big way. Adam Gopnik, writing in the *New Yorker*, thinks it says something about who obliges whom to be, as they say, understanding: "At a time when gay sensibility has been as much in the ascendant as Jewish sensibility was thirty years ago, the first gay saint naturally assumes a huge role. (Thirty years ago, Updike's utterly typical writer was a Jew in his forties with a block; today, he would be a gay man in his twenties with a screenplay.) It has come to seem as much of an obligation for non-gays to understand gay sensibility as it once was for non-Jews to understand Jewish sensibility, and the obligation is carried out with the same fascination and anxious, not-that-there's-anything-wrong-with-that tolerance mixed with an odd sort of envy, rooted in the realization that, as Nicholson Baker has suggested, gays are fortunate in still having a closet to come out of. Writing is made of exits and entrances."

■ I mentioned Huston Smith's incisive observation that science is based on controlled experiment, we can only control what is inferior to us, ergo science excludes by definition God, angels, and anything else not inferior to us. Robert C. McCarthy of Buchanan Dam, Texas, would take the point a step further: "However, another conclusion is also valid and probably more useful inasmuch as it demonstrates the fatal weakness of the medical and social 'sciences' of psychiatry, psychology, sociology, etc. That conclusion is that we cannot conduct a validly controlled experiment on that which is *equal* to us. One human mind cannot successfully identify or exclude the variables involved in the total human nature of another person. It is like scratching a diamond with another diamond. And behavioral studies are merely statistical tabulations without any value content." I'm thinking about it.

■ St. Martin's continues to publish a distinctive, if not distinguished, list. There is, for instance, *The Pleasure Principle: Sex, Backlash, and the Struggle for Gay Freedom* by Michael Bronski, who writes: "For decades, conservative psychoanalysts, religious leaders, and politicians have charged that homosexuality is about nothing more than having sex; that homosexuals are 'obsessed' with sex; that homosexuality is a 'flight' from the responsibilities of 'mature' sexuality. And they are right." That's the point of the "pleasure principle"—pleasure for pleasure's sake. The reviewer in *Publishers Weekly* says Bronski takes on the question of homosexuals and children "forthrightly." I don't think you want to know what that means. The review concludes by noting that before matters of sexuality can be resolved, "sexuality itself and the concept of pleasure must be confronted head on." An editor might have suggested rephrasing that.

■ "If God had been indifferent to you he'd have made someone else." I don't know if that will make it

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past the epistemology police, but it's one of many items for putting on the refrigerator door or pondering in the heart (or both) to be found in *Leaves of Water*, poems by Father Ralph Wright of Saint Louis Abbey ($12.95), 500 South Mason Road, St. Louis, MO 63141.

■ A federal court ruling in the Fourth Circuit upholds Virginia's very modest requirement that parents of teenagers seeking abortions be informed. The parental notification provision was challenged in *Planned Parenthood of the Blue Ridge v. Cambios*. As the individual autonomy project seems to be sweeping the cultural field, the court's language about the "sacred endeavor" of parenthood as "the highest calling in life" is striking. Herewith a passage from the final page of the opinion: "Our Constitution confers no more fundamental rights than those brought into relief by a statute requiring that the mother and father of a teenager with child be informed of the daughter's decision to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. A mother and father who assume the responsibility of the highest calling in life are entitled to the fullest possible measure of not only constitutional solicitude, but constitutional encouragement in their sacred endeavor. They are obliged to know, and they are entitled to know, the life-defining decisions their children face. By the same token, as the Supreme Court has held and recently reaffirmed, there are few rights more fundamental than that of a woman—even a minor—to decide herself whether or not to carry her pregnancy to term. We conclude today, however, that these liberties are fully compatible, each with the other, when the law requires what the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly characterized as 'mere notice' by the child to the parent. To hold otherwise, we are convinced, would be to turn a child from parent, and a parent from child—at the very moment in life when each is most in need of the other. Such a plenary violation of family the Constitution cannot be construed to require. Were it to be so, right would be they who said that with arrogance implacable we had our foundation rent asunder."

■ Here's a happy ending. Recall that Belmont Abbey College in North Carolina returned a $40,000 grant from Philip Morris in protest against the company's implicit encouragement of sexual promiscuity in its advertising. When the matter was brought to the attention of Geoff Bible, CEO of Philip Morris, he agreed with the college, the offending ad was pulled, and the company issued new guidelines for its advertising. Mr. Bible then persuaded the president of the college to accept the grant after all. The moral of the story, according to the college newsletter: "Stand up for what you believe in—It's worth it." Of course virtue is not always rewarded so neatly, but we have it on the highest authority that it is rewarded.

■ Linda Greenhouse wrote the obituary that began on the front page of the *New York Times* and went on and on. "Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Supreme Court Justice who brought a voice of moderation and civility to an increasingly polarized Court during his fifteen-year tenure, died today at the age of ninety." Relentless support for the unlimited abortion license is, we are given to understand, the mark of moderation and civility. Ms. Greenhouse opines, "Justice Powell did not hesitate to place the Court's weight on the side of those who had nowhere else to turn." Right.

■ It was big news in Rome and Israel, but elsewhere it got hardly a mention. In August, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed outrage over the Pope's appointment of a bishop, Boutros Mouallem, in Galilee, claiming that he was too sympathetic to Palestinians. He went so far as to suggest that he might prevent the bishop from taking up his post. Luigi Cardinal Poggi, a long-time Vatican diplomat, commented, "Bishops are the successors of the apostles and it must be the Pope, the vicar of Christ, who names them in complete autonomy." He noted that the idea that a government has the right to approve episcopal nominations went out with the Middle Ages. The new papal nuncio to Israel and Palestine, Archbishop Pietro Sambi, is reportedly calming the waters, and the prime minister has apparently decided not to play Henry IV in a repeat of the investiture controversy of the eleventh century.

■ Seldom does headline hype soar so wondrously over the top. I confess to having choked on my breakfast Cheerios when confronted by this headline on the front page of the *Times*: "Mass Found in Elusive Particle: Universe May Never Be the Same." Wow! The universe may never be the same! The story continued: "Among other things, the finding might affect theories about the formation and evolution of galaxies and the ultimate fate of the universe." I love that, putting the ultimate fate of the universe into the category of "among other things." These excitements are occasioned by physicists announcing that they have discovered the existence of mass in an elusive subatomic particle called the neutrino. Malcolm Browne, the paper's excitable science writer, may be right that this is a very important discovery indeed. But it means the universe will never be the same? If the neutrino has mass today, didn't it have mass yesterday or, say, a billion years ago? Or maybe like Bishop Berkeley's falling tree in the forest, things are not unless we perceive they are. The headline's embrace of a radical theory of the social, in this case scientific, construction of reality seems somewhat overheated. I'm no authority on neutrinos; for all I know the little buggers do have mass, but I expect the universe is sublimely indifferent to our discovery of the fact. At the risk of sounding like an old-fashioned

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philosophical realist, I think we should be careful about assuming that our consciousness creates reality. A measure of modesty is in order, especially when the ultimate fate of the universe is at stake.

■ This item rated twelve column inches in the *Times*. Jason A. Turner, the city's commissioner of human resources, has learned his lesson. In a television interview he discussed why welfare dependency is a bad thing and how working gives a person "a greater measure of personal freedom, independence, and self-sufficiency." Then he said it: "Work makes you free." Immediately, the telephone lines at City Hall and the Anti-Defamation League lit up. Didn't Mr. Turner know that "Work Makes You Free"— *Arbeit macht frei*—was the slogan on the gates of Auschwitz? Said one angry viewer, a Mr. Gilbert Jonas, "Work will make you free? That was the justification by the Gestapo. One does not need to pile this on the people of New York, especially with people here who escaped those camps and, more than that, had relatives who never did." It turns out that neither Mr. Turner nor the interviewer knew the history of the phrase, and the spokesman for ADL offered conditional absolution: "I'm not saying that he used it intentionally as an anti-Semitic remark." Mr. Turner issued the requisite apology. Eternal vigilance is the price of making sure "It" never happens again, and no place is more vigilant than New York. A few days later I caught a movie star with a drug problem being interviewed on the evening news. "My life," she said, "can be summed up in two words: My struggle." *Mein Kampf*! There was nothing on that provocation in the next day's *Times*. I do not say the remark was intentionally anti-Semitic, but one hates to think the ADL may be nodding.

■ Herewith another pronouncement from an elevated religious authority on the great evil of consumerism: "In a radically new world of unprecedented technological change, the media, and television in particular, have effectively deprived millions of people of their moral agency, programming them as passive consumers in the slave-like service of a vast economic machine that is out of control. Human beings have become means to the end of consumption." If true, this is truly alarming, and it has regularly worried me that I am not alarmed about it. Maybe, I thought, I am missing something. So the other evening I made notes of the commercials while watching *The Maltese Falcon* for the enteenth time. I was determined to have a record on how the television monster was turning my mind to mush and reducing me to a slave of consumerism. First, there was a pitch for a zippy BMW, but I live in Manhattan where sensible people don't have cars, so I resisted the impulse to run out and buy one. About a third of the commercials were for forthcoming television shows, aimed at persuading me this is a really neat channel. It's nice that the people there seem proud of their work. There were two pitches for mutual fund operators, both claiming they are good at making money. They would say that, wouldn't they? The Sears company wants me to buy a nifty new wrench they sell. I'll keep it in mind in the event I ever need one. I see there's a pill that relieves headache faster than aspirin, which is good to know. Apparently there is a veritable plague of stomach gas going around, but, fortunately, there are all kinds of new remedies for that. The effectiveness of one of them was conclusively demonstrated with scientific charts and the assurance that doctors recommend it. It didn't say which doctors. I'm told I can get a good price on a Caribbean cruise, and I suppose that would be of interest to people with time on their hands. As for me, I'm busy countering the dehumanizing effects of the consumerist beast. Oops, here's an ad for a pill that relieves genital herpes. What's that doing here? But then I recall reading that nine out of ten "sexually active" Americans have STDs—sexually transmitted (a.k.a. venereal) diseases. Back to Bogart. Nothing like that would happen to him. In the next break, American Express tells me I should be sure to take my card with me if I don't want a boy in Italy to steal my donkey, or something like that. Then there's Delta airlines saying they'll get me there on time, which I know isn't true, but I really didn't expect them to buy television time to fess up to that three hour delay on the flight to San Francisco. Next is an outfit called ACE hardware which has just the tool for digging in the garden, if I had a garden. That is followed by Xerox, which I am told has a color copying machine that works much faster than the competition's. After the deliciously wicked Sidney Greenstreet slips Bogart that mickey, Prudential life insurance delicately hints that a lot of people have not adequately provided for their families. Even the unsophisticated can see that this is in the sneaky service of getting people to buy more life insurance. There are two ads for alternative phone companies that, as best I can make out, will pay me for making all my calls with them. I'm sure there's a catch somewhere. Finally, there is a spot urging people to subscribe to the *New York Times*. I already get it, but I can see how the critics of our radically-unprecedented-technology-dominated consumerist society might in this case be on to something when they claim advertising is a threat to public health. So that's it, one evening's notes on the dehumanizing assault by the corporate masters of consumerism. Of course, as I assume most people do, I ordinarily hit the mute button during commercials. After this one evening of careful scientific research, I do not say that ours is an age of innocence, but I am inclined to the view that moralists raising alarums about the insidious predations of television advertising

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turning us into ciphers of consumerism should maybe take a Caribbean cruise. I know where they can get one cheap. As for the movie: Don't trust fat men shopping for birds.

■ In *Letters to Gabriel* (Briefly Noted, October), Karen Garver Santorum includes a moment that should not be forgotten. In the Senate her husband Rick Santorum was in 1997 leading the fight on behalf of a ban on partial-birth abortion. Senator Barbara Boxer of California, in opposition, thanked the women who had had such abortions for coming forward with their stories and declared, "They are crying. They are crying because they do not understand how Senators could take away an option. They are crying because they do not believe that those Senators truly understand what this meant for their families." Santorum said in response, "The Senator said she hears the cries of the women outside this Chamber. We would be deafened by the cries of the children who are not here to cry because of this procedure." The *Washington Post* described what happened next: "Republican Sen. Rick Santorum turned to face the opposition and in a high, pleading voice cried out, 'Where do we draw the line? Some people have likened this procedure to an appendectomy. That's not an appendix,' he shouted, pointing to a drawing of a fetus. 'That is not a blob of tissue. It is a baby. It's a baby.' And then, impossibly, in an already hushed gallery, in one of those moments when the floor of the Senate looks like a stage set, with its small wooden desks somehow too small for the matters at hand, the cry of a baby pierced the room, echoing across the chamber from an outside hallway. No one mentioned the cry, but for a few seconds, no one spoke at all."

■ One can understand perfectly well the view, associated with certain streams of Calvinism, that in the world to come the saints will rejoice at the sight of the sufferings of those condemned to Hell. The logic is syllogistically perfect: Their condemnation is God's will; the saints rejoice in God's will being done; ergo, the saints rejoice in the sufferings of the damned. One recalls Chesterton's observation that the problem with the mad man is not that he is not logical; it is that he is only logical. This is not to say that those who hold the above view are mad, but the view is perverse. I mention this to introduce a fine reflection of Eamon Duffy, the author of *The Stripping of the Altars* and a new history of the papacy, on the subject of Hell: "For above everything, we believe in Hell because we can imagine ourselves choosing it. We cannot know the secrets of other people's souls, but we know enough of our own to recognize something within us which shies away from God, something which wants to close our hearts to others. There is no inevitability about our response to God or to other people: hate and fear, as well as love and trust, are close to hand. Hell, in that sense, is a perpetual calling within us, from which only the loving mercy of God holds us back. We can trust in that mercy, but to trust in God's mercy is not the same as taking it for granted. We may hope for salvation for all humankind, even for ourselves: but Hell remains a terrible possibility, the dark side of our freedom. But the last word in all this belongs not with our freedom, but with God's grace. The most passionate modern theologian of Hell was the late Hans Urs von Balthasar, who returned to the possibility of damnation again and again in his writings. For von Balthasar, Christ himself had descended on Good Friday into the heart of human desolation, Christ himself experienced damnation, as he entered the uttermost limits of humanity's alienation from God. Rejecting absolutely the easy optimism which denied the possibility of such loss for every human being, von Balthasar nevertheless insisted that the essence of Christian hope was the prayer that Hell might be utterly empty, that the mercy of God reached down even to those who willed damnation for themselves, plucking them despite themselves into the heart of love. Here, he wrote, 'lies hope for the person who, refusing all love, damns himself. Will not the man who wishes to be totally alone, find beside him in Sheol Someone lonelier still, the Son forsaken by the Father, who will prevent him from experiencing his self-chosen Hell to the end?'"

■ A Baptist leader in Brazil observes, "The Catholic Church opted for the poor, but the poor opted for the Pentecostal churches." That's quoted by Father Ronato Poblete of the Centro Bellarmino, a research center in Santiago, Chile. He notes that, while 85 percent of the people of Latin America say they are Catholic, only 15 percent are practicing Catholics and 12 percent are evangelical Protestants. Of course in many parts of the world and throughout history, millions of undeniably devout Catholics do not meet the conventional criteria of "practicing." Yet it is a great encouragement that there is a growing awareness of the challenge of evangelical Protestantism, especially in its Pentecostal variations, in Latin America. They are commonly referred to as the "sects," and Fr. Poblete joins last year's Synod for America held in Rome in urging that that pejorative term be totally rejected. He adds: "I want the last thing I have to say to emphasize the fact that the advancement of the so-called sects has been a gift to the Church. It has taught us valuable lessons: that the great success of their evangelization arises out of the participation of lay people, people organized into specific jobs with responsibility. They felt needed and a part of the action of their church." Among his suggestions is this: "The Catholic Church invests much money and many years of training in the preparation of its personnel,

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clerical and otherwise. The Pentecostals, on the other hand, have a trained pastor in a year or two. So we see that the area of personnel training must also be seriously considered by the Church." Recent years have seen a decided upswing in the number of priestly vocations in Latin America, and there is considerable resistance to the idea of reducing the requirements for priestly formation, but it is a subject that warrants careful reflection. It is among the many questions addressed in my forthcoming book, occasioned by the Synod for America, *Appointment in Rome: The Church in America Awakening*, which should be out by the end of the year—maybe even in time to ease your Christmas shopping worries.

■ Once again, the nettlesome question of those ads for the *New Oxford Review*. Nettlesome because, as I have said before, I think the magazine is immeasurably better than its ads. I am excruciatingly reluctant to hinder promotion by a publication that I respect, and there is no doubt that we need the income from advertising. That being said, however, the ad that ran in our November issue was simply beyond the pale. Whatever the derelictions of liberalism, and they are many, it is simply not true, as the ad claimed, that "liberals . . . would love to make every woman a whore" and embrace the goal of "Every gal a slut." I did not see the ad in advance and I apologize for its appearance. Of course the editors do not agree with every claim made by an advertiser. Most obviously, a book publisher may hype a book that we think thoroughly wrongheaded. We cannot and would not require that advertisers agree with all our judgments. We can and will make judgments about what is mean-spirited, malicious, violative of good taste, or seriously false. Yes, making such judgments is difficult, but that's why editors are paid such princely salaries. With the cooperation of our advertisers, we hope the necessity for such judgments will be few and far between.

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**Sources:** On Ralph Nader protest over ad for "12 DAYS TILL CHRIS-MOUSE," personal correspondence. Linda Chavez on her childhood reading, *Chicago Tribune*, March 18, 1998. On the Inquisition and the Index of Prohibited Books, *Times Literary Supplement*, January 16, 1998. James Shapiro on Norman Mailer, *New York Times Book Review*, May 10, 1998. Adam Gopnik on the gay sensibility, *New Yorker*, May 18, 1998. *The Pleasure Principle* by Michael Bronski reviewed in *Publishers Weekly*, June 29, 1998. On Fourth Circuit upholding Virginia law requiring notification to parents of teenagers seeking abortions, press release of The Family Foundation; ruling on internet (www.law.emory.edu/4circuit/aug98/971853a.p.htm). On Belmont Abbey College, personal correspondence. Linda Greenhouse on Justice Lewis F. Powell, *New York Times*, August 26, 1998. On Israeli protest over appointment of Catholic bishop in Galilee, *Pilot* (Boston), August 28, 1998. "Mass Found in Elusive Particle: Universe May Never Be the Same," *New York Times*, June 5, 1998. On the phrase "Work makes you free," *New York Times*, June 27, 1998. Eamon Duffy on Hell, *Tablet*, December 13, 1997. On Protestantism in Latin America, *Origins*, April 16, 1998.


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


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


















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